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Abstract 
 China’s foreign policy has been making an assertive turn. Over the disputed 
Diaoyu Islands against Japan, China adopted the most assertive policy so far in 2010. 
However, in previous incidents of 1996 and 2004, such assertive policy was not found. 
What explains China’s recent assertive foreign policy?  
By integrating the two-level game into David Easton’s Systems Theory to explain 
Chinese foreign policy making, this dissertation expects to generate a theoretical 
framework that can apply to foreign policy making in an authoritarian context. This 
dissertation examines China’s foreign policy making during three incidents over the 
Diaoyu Islands against Japan, in 1996, 2004 and 2010. China was reactive and passive 
in 1996. In 2004 however, China was steadfast, demanding Japan to release arrested 
Chinese citizens. In 2010, China adopted the most assertive policy among these three 
against Japan, the “countermeasures”, which involved a series of suspensions of 
bilateral contacts after Japan detained a Chinese fisherman in waters near the disputed 
Diaoyu Islands.  
 What explains the variation in Chinese reactions in these three incidents? First of 
all, the government’s actions are responsive to Japan’s actions. The stronger Japan’s 
actions are, the stronger the Chinese public’s mobilization is, and the more assertive 
policy the government has to take. This partially explains why the Chinese 
government adopted the most assertive policy in 2010. I have described in chapter 7 
that “jurisdiction” issues involving arrest and trial of Chinese citizens are most 
concerned by China. 
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Second, in order to investigate the nuances in Chinese foreign policy making, I 
employ a narrative analysis approach to compare the policy preferences of the 
government, intellectuals and the Public Opinion Leaders (POLs) in three incidents. 
The narrative analysis suggests the development of bottom-up policy actors who 
function as mediating institutions in Chinese foreign policy making, including the 
intellectuals and the POLs. The authoritarian government seems to respond to the 
policy narratives in order to stabilize domestic policy relations, suggesting policy 
actions that are dramatically different than those employed over the course of history.  
 This project contributes to extant literature a revised version of Easton’s Systems 
Theory. In addition to previous version of Systems Theory, I add arrows symbolizing 
the interaction of quelling and appeasing between the government and the public. I 
also add a “two-level game” arrow denoting the interaction among the Chinese 
government, the public and Japan. This revised model offers a more robust tool than 
previous version in capturing the nuanced interactions in Chinese foreign policy 
making. This research contributes to our knowledge in both International Relations 
and Public Policy disciplines over the topic of China. Based upon this model, future 
research can be conducted to explore China’s foreign policy making over foreign 
policy issues, analyzing when China is to become more assertive in its foreign policy. 
Knowledge generated from this research can also inform the development of 
mediating institutions and the influence of social media in China’s policy making 
process.  
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“In regard to China-Japan relations, reactions among youths, especially students, are 
strong. If difficult problems were to appear still further, it will become impossible to 
explain them to the people. It will become impossible to control them. I want you to 
understand this position which we are in.” 
 
------ Deng Xiaoping, speaking at a meeting with high-level Japanese 
officials, including Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, 
Agriculture, and Forestry, June 28, 1987
1
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Whiting (1989), p. 164, in translation from Cankao Xiaoxi, June 30, 1987.  
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                     ------- Designed by the author, drawn by James Yang,  
a long-time, truthful friend.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
Small Islands, Big Influence 
 In March 2012, China’s ships were patrolling around the water near the disputed 
Diaoyu Islands (Japan calls them Senkaku Islands) in the East China Sea. Ships of 
Japan Coast Guard (JCG) were just a few nautical miles away, ready for possible 
confrontation.  
 In September 2010, a Chinese fisherman, Mr. Zhan Qixiong, was arrested by JCG 
while he and his crew were fishing in the waters near the Diaoyu Islands. After Mr. 
Zhan was arrested, China adopted an unprecedentedly assertive “countermeasure” 
policy against Japan, demanding the unconditional release of Mr. Zhan.  
 Covering an area of seven square kilometers (1,700 acres) in total, the Diaoyu 
Islands have no population, no arable territory, nor any precious resources on the 
islands. However, these islands seem to be big issue in China-Japan bilateral relations 
than what their size would indicate. While China claims sovereignty of these islands 
based on historical discovery, Japan stated that they discovered these islands as terra 
nullius in 1884. The term terra nullius in international law denotes the status of a 
territory that has never ever been governed by any human society, therefore, whoever 
discovers the territory will have indisputable sovereignty over it. 
 These islands were under the US trusteeship since the end of World War II, and 
they were returned to Japan along with Ryukyu (Okinawa) by the United States in 
1972. Since early 1970s, there have been generations of Chinese activists, identifying 
themselves as the “Defend Diaoyu Movement” (DDM) activists, calling for the return 
of the Diaoyu Islands to China. DDM activists are those individuals who actively 
advocate China’s sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, usually with actions. 
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Beginning with some Chinese graduate students in the United States, they now spread 
across Taiwan, Hong Kong, the North America and the mainland China. DDM in 
mainland China developed after the 1996 incident over the Diaoyu Islands. The 
strategies they adopt include holding protests in cities, and trying to land on the 
disputed islands to demonstrate China’s sovereignty. Their successful landing in 2004 
caused an incident between China and Japan, in which China successfully pressured 
Japan to release the seven DDM activists landing on the disputed islands.  
Numerous incidents have happened over these islands in history, and the dispute 
over these unpopulated small islands does not seem to be ending soon. On March 2, 
2012, the Japanese government announced its plan to rename 39 islands in the East 
China Sea, including the disputed Diaoyu Islands. In reaction, on March 3, the 
Chinese government also announced its plan of renaming these islands. Whether the 
disputed islands are called Diaoyu Islands or Senkaku Islands is deemed an important 
issue by both governments, symbolizing who has sovereignty over them.  
Another motivation for this project is that China is about to see its leadership 
transition in 2012.
1
 Both these two sets of events - the imminent transition of 
administration in China and series of crisis over disputed islands- happen at a critical 
time when the world is debating about how a rapid-developing China will act in the 
twenty-first century, especially under its new leadership in the near future.  
One issue when discussing China as a rising power is how its geopolitical 
situation may inhibit its development. When discussing the “tragedy of great power 
politics”, Mearsheimer woefully underestimated this aspect when he predicted China 
would pose as a great challenge to the United States hegemony.
2
 In his discussion of 
                                                             
1 The transition will not take place until 2012, and the full power will be handed to the new government in two 
years (2014). For the nomination of new leader Xi, Jinping and the transition of power in Chinese government, 
see “Xi who must be obeyed”, The Economist (2010-10-21).  
2 Page 401 in Mearsheimer, John (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company: New 
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the “great power politics in the twenty-first century”, Mearsheimer acknowledged the 
territorial disputes China had with its neighbors,
3
 although he did not take into 
consideration that these disputes may cost a considerable amount of China’s wealth 
even after its economy has quickly developed.
4
  Many other scholars realize the 
geopolitical challenges China faces, and estimate the influence of these challenges 
will have on China’s rise as a world power. For instance, William Overholt of the 
RAND Corporation, in his testimony to the U.S.- China Economic and Security 
Review Commission on May 19, 2005, highlighted the challenge China is facing on 
its borders, “Chinese military has to defend 11,000 miles of not-always-friendly 
borders, and its growing military is far from excessive for the tasks it faces.”5 In June 
2011, in the Munk Debate at the University of Toronto over whether the twenty-first 
century will belong to China,
6
 Fareed Zakaria and Henry Kissinger both expressed 
the concerns over how China’s geopolitical situation has and will inhibit its rising. An 
important issue they mentioned was the territorial dispute over islands China is having 
with neighboring states
7
, including the one with Japan (over the Diaoyu Islands), and 
another with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei (over the Nansha Qundao, 
the Spratly Islands).  
Disputes over islands comprise an important sector in China’s relations with its 
neighbors. This background makes research on China’s behavior in island disputes 
relevant: observations on how China behaves in these territorial disputes offer insights 
                                                                                                                                                                              
York. 
3 Page 375 in Mearsheimer, John (2001). 
4 Rather, Mearshimer argued that China’s prospects of becoming a potential hegemon depend largely on whether 
its economy continues modernizing at a rapid pace. See Page 401 in Mearsheimer (2001).  
5 See Page 13 in Overholt, William (2005), China and Globalization, testimony presented to the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission on May 19, 2005. Overholt, William (2005) China and 
Globalization. Santa Monica, CA : RAND [Congressional Series CT-244].  
6 See www.munkdebates.com for a video of this debate between Niall Ferguson and David Daokui Li (on the for 
side) and Fareed Zakaria and Henry Kissinger (on the “against” side).  
7 For nations involved and disputes over the Spratly Islands, see also Bennett, Michael. (1991-1992). “The 
People’s Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute”, Stanford Journal of 
International Law 28 – 425.  
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into how China handles relationships with its neighboring countries. These 
observations also open a window for inferring how China will act in this century - 
after its economy has been expanding aggressively at double-digit rates for more than 
a decade.  
 
Why are Islands so Important? 
 In order to understand China’s foreign policy making and its trends in the future, 
China’s past actions in islands disputes offer a solid basis. In this sense, islands are 
important.  
First and foremost, islands are of equal – if not more – importance as continental 
territories for countries. As Shaw argued, the sea historically serves two important 
functions, as a medium of communication, and “as a vast reservoir of resources, both 
living and non-living.”8 Therefore, sea water has been an important facet of national 
interests for states.
9
 In terms of “as a reservoir of resources for living”, ocean freight 
shipping takes about 90 percent of world trade today, especially in those industries 
like crude oil, minerals and cargos. An island represents an area of surrounding 
territorial sea, and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), both of which are crucial for 
military and commercial interests of states. Furthermore, it can be concluded that 
islands are valuable to states not only in their symbol of territory, but also because of 
their geographical, economic, military and even emotional values. In this sense, even 
a remote island would involve sovereignty in the same sense that a piece of 
continental territory would.
10
 Therefore, we can expect states to demonstrate as much 
attention and resolve in defending their sovereignty over disputed islands as that over 
                                                             
8 Shaw (1991) at 337.  
9 Alfred T Mahan (2006) The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. Kessinger Publishing.  
10 See pp 45 in Browett, Derek (1979). The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law. Oceana Publications, 
Inc.: Dobbes Ferry, New York.  
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disputed continental territories. Actually, in both disputes China is involved in, the 
disputed islands are believed to locate upon a large reserve of crude oil and natural 
gas. 
Second, the equal attention and resolve states give to islands and continental 
territories may indicate almost equal likelihood of conflicts, however, I would argue 
that disputes over islands offer fewer incentives for nations to adopt military means 
than in disputes over continental territories, controlling for other factors. Therefore, 
island disputes yield more space for interstate interaction and bargaining.  
Compared with territorial disputes regarding continental land, island disputes 
have less incentive to bring states into war because geographic protections offered by 
great waters increases the difficulty of initiating military conflicts. States can be 
deterred from fighting for islands by factors including sophisticated naval technology, 
amphibian warfare strategy and difficulty in governing islands after victory. John 
Mearsheimer also mentioned the hurdle big water presents for conquest.
11
  
Empirically, China was unable to send its armies to liberate Taiwan after 1949 
(when the Communist took over all mainland China) due to the wide Taiwan Straits 
and inferior navy China had at that time
12
. On the contrary, in his research of causality 
between territorial disputes and war, Kocs argued that “territorial disputes between 
contiguous states are an extremely potent predictor of interstate war.”13 Therefore, we 
see the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands lasting for about four decades and the Spratly 
Islands for even longer. From the interactions of all parties over the disputed islands, 
researchers can better understand how foreign policy decisions are made.  
None the less, it should be noted the argument that large bodies of water are 
                                                             
11 See Mearsheimer (2001) on his discussion about the primacy of land power (87-96). Mearsheimer argued that 
independent naval power must be accompanied by amphibious assault and landings to conquer another country, 
which requires military technology not easily acquirable.  
12 Michael O'Hanlon (2000). “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan”. International Security 25-2: 51-86.  
13 Page 160 in Kocs, Stephen (1995) “Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945-1987” Journal of Politics 57-1: 
159-175.  
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natural barriers to prevent wars from happening is contestable. For instance, over the 
Falkland Islands, Britain (eight thousand miles away from the Falkland Islands) 
waged a war and won over Argentina (three hundred miles away) in 1982. Therefore, 
relative military power of both parties matter in determining whether an island dispute 
will escalate into war. In the two island disputes China is involved in, in terms of 
military power, Japan is not an countries any weaker than China; in the Spratly 
Islands, another island dispute China is involved in today, however, China is not 
facing a single country, but rather, a group of countries including Vietnam, Philippines, 
Malaysia, Brunei, and indirectly the US. The power of all these countries added 
together will deter China from resolving the dispute with force.  
In sum, islands are of great importance, but in the two island disputes (Diaoyu 
Islands and Spratly Islands), with a large body of water as the natural barrier and 
obstacle, China is deterred from initiating wars. Therefore, island disputes allow more 
space for investigating foreign policy making in China.  
 
Policy Approach of Studying Islands Disputes  
 Island disputes are defined as officially acknowledged conflicting claims of 
sovereignty over the same island(s) by two or more sovereign states. In this project, I 
used the word “crisis” to refer to those decisive moments when China and Japan 
express their conflicting claims over the disputed islands. 
China’s actions in island disputes offer a window for understanding China’s 
foreign policy making. This dissertation will investigate the foreign policy actions 
adopted by China over the disputed Diaoyu Islands, with expectation to find out what 
explains China’s assertive policy emerging in recent incidents  
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 To explain China’s assertive policy in the Diaoyu Islands dispute, two theories 
may apply. However, their inadequacy to explain China’s assertive turn in its foreign 
policy proves the necessity of adopting a public policy approach of studying domestic 
influence on foreign policy making. Realism from the International Relations (IR) 
discipline would argue that China’s increasing power against Japan in the past decade 
explains China’s increasingly assertive power. While it explains the change of foreign 
policy partially, it fails to point out the causes for the change in China’s foreign policy. 
With increasing power, China has been more assertive over the Diaoyu Islands dispute, 
however, it has not been more assertive against Vietnam than in the middle 1980s, 
when it fought a war against Vietnam for disputed islands in the South China Sea, for 
example. Therefore, the change in relative power may partially accounts for the 
assertive change in China’s foreign policy, but it does not reveal the cause of this 
change, nor does it predict what will happen in the future. Alternatively, top-down 
approach may explain the assertive policy as strategy adopted by the Chinese 
government. However, this explanation seems inaccurate in believing that the Chinese 
government can make foreign policy free of domestic influence. Nor does it help to 
generate a trajectory for China’s foreign policy in the future over islands disputes and 
other foreign policy issues.  
  In order to start from a small island and bilateral relations and then expand to the 
role of public opinion in foreign policy making and how the state may use these 
policy actions to influence domestic policy, the Systems Theory from public policy 
literature is a better alternative to address the process of Chinese foreign policy 
making.  
By following a policy perspective with the Systems Theory, my dissertation 
investigates the foreign and domestic policy interplay in actions China adopts over the 
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disputed islands.  
 This dissertation identifies three incidents for research, these incidents over the 
Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan happened in 1996, 2004 and 2010. China 
adopted different policy actions: in 1996, China’s actions were passive and featured 
low-level protests, which were made mostly by government officials below the 
ministerial-level. In 2004, however, China adopted more assertive actions when seven 
Chinese DDM activists were arrested by Japan after landing on the Diaoyu Islands. 
Japan released Chinese DDM activists almost immediately in response to China’s 
protestation. China adopted high-level protests in the 2004 incident. In 2010, however, 
China took the most assertive actions among these three incidents. China termed these 
actions against Japan “countermeasures”, which included suspension of all 
ministerial-provincial dialogues, the cancellation of cooperative meetings in aviation 
route and coals, and the refusal to issue visa for Japanese cultural exchange groups. 
Why were these assertive policies adopted by China in 2010? Are they an indication 
of possible changes in China’s foreign policy in general?  
 These incidents shed light to the long-time discussion of whether public opinion 
influences China’s foreign policy making. David Easton’s Systems Theory seems a 
helpful tool for explaining China’s foreign policy making, but a puzzle remains on 
whether it is sufficient to illustrate all nuanced interactions between the Chinese 
government and other actors in foreign policy making. 
 
Domestic and Foreign Policy Narratives: How It Helps.  
  In order to enhance the applicability of Systems Theory in China’s foreign policy, 
with the expectation of producing a revised version of a more robust Systems Theory 
in explaining China’s assertive foreign policy, this dissertation focuses on the 
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narratives of policy actors in three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands. 
Analysis in this project is reliant upon narrative analysis, believing that what 
actors say in the policy making process indicate their stances over the dispute and 
reflecting different policy outputs they prefer. An analysis of their narratives 
surrounding an incident will reveal the interaction among actors.  
 Who are those actors? Following Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, I identify 
actors at three levels in Chinese foreign policy making: the government (“elites” as 
Fewsmith and Rosen defined), intellectuals (“sub-elites”), and the public (“the 
popular”).14 Recently academia has studied the variety of actors joining in Chinese 
foreign policy making. Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, for example, have identified 
business sectors, local governments, research institutions and academia, the media 
and “netizens” (net-citizens) as the most notable actors in Chinese foreign policy 
making.
15
 With respect to the dispute on the Diaoyu Islands, however, only the last 
two categories (research institutions and academia, the media and netizens) are 
relevant. Therefore, I include these three actors, government, intellectuals and the 
public in my analysis. I also use media as the venue for transferring information, and 
employ public opinion leaders (POLs) as a proxy for estimating public opinion.   
I compare their narratives in each incident according to the time-lag, i.e. which 
happened first and how the narratives of another actor changed later. By revealing 
what they said and did during and after each incident, I argue that the Chinese 
government is facing the “demands” from the public and constant “support” from the 
intellectuals. The public almost always makes more assertive demands than the 
government can adopt; failure of the government to appease the public, however, will 
                                                             
14 Fewsmith, Joseph and Stanley Rosen. (2001). “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does ‘public 
Opinion’ matter?” in David M. Lampton ed. The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of 
Reform. Stanford University Press.  
15 Jakobson, Linda and Dean Knox. (2010). “New Foreign Policy Actors in China.” STOCKHOLM 
INTERNATIONAL 
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) Policy Paper No. 26. Sep., 2010.  
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end up requiring the government spending extra resources on quelling domestic 
public opinion. Therefore, Easton’s Systems Theory needs to be modified by adding 
quelling as a form of interaction between the government and the public. 
Moreover, by conducting narratives analysis, it can be found that the Chinese 
government is facing a two-level game (as Putnam phrased it in 1988), when adopting 
foreign policy over the Diaoyu Islands. On one hand, it allows some public 
mobilization domestically to show to Japan, demonstrating the government is under 
pressure from domestic public opinion, but on the other hand, the Chinese 
government signals to Japan that it is under the influence of domestic public opinion 
when adopting assertive foreign policy, so the government may maintain the stability 
of bilateral relations. Therefore, Easton’s model – in order to be applied to the 
Chinese context – also needs to accommodate this two-level game.  
 
 The conclusion of this dissertation speaks to a wide audience, from China 
scholars to the decision makers of those states who are concerned by a more assertive 
China. Intellectually, while it is difficult to draw an affirmative conclusion on the 
influence of public opinion on Chinese foreign policy making, my dissertation reveals 
that the government does respond to public opinion, which is measured using POLs as 
a proxy. The government listens and cites public opinion and modifies its foreign 
policy to appease the domestic public, rather than to quell domestic public sentiment. 
For decision makers, this dissertation’s analysis yields a finding which resembles that 
of Thomas Christensen in 2010 on a similar topic. China’s foreign policy is driven by 
foreign countries’ actions, as well as its domestic public opinion –the latter’s influence 
has increased recently.  
 This finding also contributes to the understanding of the role played by mediating 
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institutions in Chinese politics, with mature moderating institutions absent in 
contemporary Chinese politics. Some unexpected findings are also interesting for 
future researchers, including the role played by social media in public mobilization in 
China and how the Chinese government’s loosing grip of media censorship will 
further involve the public in policy making – to name just a few. These are interesting 
topics encountered in this dissertation, and are worthwhile for research in the future.  
 Currently China is engaged in a multilateral dispute over the Spratly Islands 
which is now extending out to the South China Sea and involving additional nations. 
This situation offers an inviting context for testing the model generated in this 
dissertation and investigating China’s foreign and domestic policy making in a 
two-level game theory. 
 
Conclusion: Structure of this Dissertation  
 This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents background 
information necessary for understanding the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. With 
respect to the Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese sentiments against Japan are quite negative. 
Where do these negative sentiments come from? It is necessary to understand the 
suffering of China in the past century prior to 1949 (the so-called “hundred years of 
humiliation”) to fully grasp the root of contemporary sentiments of the Chinese public. 
This chapter also presents background information about the Chinese government, 
Chinese foreign policy makers and Chinese foreign policy making theories.  
 Chapter 3 starts with considering an IR answer to the puzzle of China’s assertive 
policy. The shift of relative powers between China and Japan can partially explain 
when assertive policy is adopted, but it does not demonstrate why China adopts 
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assertive policy over certain disputes, but not others. In addition, Chapter 3 also 
reviews three bodies of literature, respectively, on the Systems Theory, on the topic of 
public opinion and foreign policy making, and on the “two-level game” by Putnam. 
This chapter reviews previous research on public opinion and foreign policy making, 
pointing out that there has been a trend for Chinese foreign policy making to be 
influenced by public opinion. The review of the “two-level game” in this chapter 
summarizes Putnam’s theory and its previous usage.  
 Chapter 4 introduces the methodology of this project, and also defines those key 
concepts relevant to analysis of narratives. This chapter also includes an example of 
text by Hilary Clinton to demonstrate my approach of narrative analysis with java 
software Yoshikoder and word clouds.  
  Chapter 5, 6 and 7 are the analytical chapters. Chapter 5 analyzes the different 
policy actions taken by Chinese government in the three incidents, while Chapter 6 
conducts narrative analysis of actors in these three incidents. Chapter 7 summarizes 
the analysis and points out how the narratives indicate the interaction among the 
government, intellectuals and the public. Chapter 7 also draws a conclusion on the 
applicability of Easton’s Systems Theory in a Chinese context. By adding the quelling 
interaction between government and the public, and integrating the “two-level game”, 
the Systems Theory serves as a robust tool for analyzing Chinese foreign policy 
making. Moreover, by adding multiple Systems Theory models together, I show that 
previous incident will have impact on the next around of policy making by 
influencing the “environment” with “institutional memory.” In this sense, multiple 
Systems Theory models construct a 3-D game for future incidents.  
 Chapter 8 summarizes findings and practical implications, and concludes this 
project by pointing out possible topics for future research. It also acknowledges those 
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threats towards the validity of this research. 
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUNDS: CHINESE HISTORY, GOVERNMENT, AND 
FOREIGN POLICY MAKING  
 
I. Memory of Humiliation: China Before 1949 
 With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, 
twentieth century China was divided into two eras. In the pre-1949 era, the suffering 
of the Chinese people during the two world wars and numerous civil conflicts has 
influenced the way of thinking of contemporary Chinese government and the public. 
After 1949, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) terminated the 
hundred years of humiliation and has witnessed a rise of nationalism on both the 
government and the public sides.  
 This chapter serves the purpose of explaining background terms and concepts that 
will be mentioned in the following chapters. It is organized to include the following 
parts. First, I will present the substances of the hundred years of humiliation. China 
suffered before 1949. The suffering China endured at the hands of the West and Japan 
sets a background for understanding the Diaoyu Islands dispute – with the memories 
China had from Japan throughout history, the Diaoyu islands reflect just one example 
of Chinese negative sentiment towards Japan. The second part reviews the negative 
sentiment Chinese has towards Japan. Such a negative sentiment is reflected on 
several contemporary issues, including the Diaoyu Islands. The third part turns to 
presents the political system of China, emphasizing the foreign policy making organs. 
The fourth part of this chapter describes the roles played by intellectuals and the 
public in Chinese foreign policy making throughout history, concluding in the 
analysis of why these actors have more influence on foreign policy making now than 
in any other time in history.  
 According to Peter Gries, Chinese nationalism has a fundamental tone of 
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humiliation and suffering.
1
 This feeling of suffering and of being bullied before 1949 
has had an impact on China’s national pride, and has also allowed the communist 
government to be supported by the people in 1949. As Gries described, the communist 
regime’s advocacy of nationalism has catered to the feeling of suffering among the 
public. The best evidence that demonstrates the government’s nationalist argument 
was what Chairman Mao Zedong said towards millions of people around the world in 
Tiananmen Square on October 1, 1949. In his speech announcing the foundation of 
the PRC, Chairman Mao said, “Chinese people, from today on, have stood up!” – 
implying that before 1949, the Chinese people had been “kneeling down” in a 
hierarchical society below the foreign imperialists and previous government. But 
where were the Chinese people standing? From the debris of two world wars and 
three years of civil war against the Nationalist regime, who fled to Taiwan in 1949.  
 The following part presents the source of China’s memory of humiliation in the 
twentieth century by reviewing the Chinese hundred years of humiliation [bai nian 
guo chi]. Knowledge of Chinese history will help readers understand the political 
narratives made by the government, the intellectuals and also the public, most 
importantly, why such a high level of sentiment was shared by all of them.  
 
Hundred Years of Humiliation. 
 From 1842 until 1949, the 107 years are remembered as the “hundred years of 
humiliation.” The key events of humiliation in these hundred years are summarized in 
Table 2.1. 
 
 
                                                             
1 Gries, Peter. (2005). China’s New Nationalism. University of Berkeley Press.  
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Table 2.1 Key Events in the “Hundred Years of Humiliation”  
Date Events 
1840-1842 The First Opium War 
1842 The Treaty of Nanking was signed between China and Briatin; Hong 
Kong was ceded 
1843 The Treaty of Bogue between China and Britain; Britain obtained 
“extraterritoriality” in China.  
1844 The Treaty of Wang Hya between US and China; US obtained all 
trading privileges Britain had received.  
The Treaty of Whampoa between France and China; France obtained 
all trading privileges Britain had received.  
1856-1860 The Second Opium War (Arrow War) between China and 
Britain-France alliance.  
Anglo-France alliance invaded Beijing and destroyed the Summer 
Palace.  
Four Treaties of Tientsen between China and Britain, France, US and 
Russia respectively. These treaties force China to open more ports for 
trade, legalize opium trade and ceded large amount of territory to 
Russia.  
1887 China ceded Macau to Portugal.  
1894  The Jiawu War broke out between China and Japan (the First 
Sino-Japanese War).  
China signed the Shimonoseki Treaty, ceding Taiwan and all its 
affiliates to Japan and paid Japan two hundred million taels of silver.  
1900-1901 Multi-national armies invaded Beijing [Ba Guo Lian Jun]. 
China was forced to sign the Boxer Protocal and pay the invading 
nations four hundred million taels of silver.    
1912  Qing Dynasty was overthrown.  
Republic of China (ROC) was established.  
1931-9-18 Japan occupied the three provinces in Northeast China. 
1932 Manchukuo was established under the control of Japan.  
Resigned Qing emperor Pu Yi (Emperor Xuan’tong) was designated 
by Japan as the head of state. 
1937-7-7 Japan occupied Wanping near Beijing and initiated comprehensive 
invasion to China.  
The Second Sino-Japanese war broke out.  
1937-12-13 Japan occupied the capital city of ROC, Nanjing (Nanking) and 
committed the Nanjing Massacre. 
ROC government relocated to Chongqing.  
1945-8-15 Japan surrendered, World War II ended.  
1946-1949 China’s Civil War. 
1949-10-1 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded.  
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Before 1949, there had been two regimes governing China: the Qing Dynasty, 
governed by the Manchu elites (1644-1912) and the Republic of China (ROC) 
governed by the Nationalist [or Kuomingtang] (1912-1949). The Qing Dynasty 
surrendered its power in 1912, as suggested by a former Qing general named Yuan 
Shikai who acted on behalf of revolutionaries who later became known as the 
Nationalists. In the same year, the ROC was founded in Nanjing. Qing Dynasty, the 
last imperial dynasty of China, had ruled China since 1644. The ruling elites of Qing 
Dynasty were not Han Chinese, which comprises more than 90% of all residents in 
China, but they were a group of people from Northeastern China, called the “Manchu” 
[man zu]. Manchu nomads overthrew the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) ruled by the 
Han Chinese in 1644, occupied their capital Beijing in the same year and terminated 
all regional regimes in South China in the following decades. The Manchu-governing 
Qing Dynasty became the national government of China during the next three 
centuries until 1912.  
 Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of ROC, and his Nationalist Party were devoted to 
the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty since the late 19
th
 century, when the “hundred 
years of humiliation” passed by its half. After he founded the Republic of China in 
1912, China witnessed multiple domestic conflicts among different regions and 
military warlords. During the World War II, Japan occupied all major cities in East 
China, including Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and even Wuhan in the 
central China. A civil war broke out between Communist and the Nationalist after the 
World War II ended in 1945, until the PRC regime was founded in 1949.  
 
 The “Hundred Years of Humiliation” began in 1842, when the First Opium War 
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between the Qing Dynasty and Britain ended with the Nanking Treaty,
2
 in which 
China ceded Hong Kong to Britain. In addition, China was forced to open five ports 
to Britain for trade, Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo and Shanghai, and also to 
pay Britain six million silver dollars for Britain’s losses in the opium trade. That was 
not the end - with the Opium War and Treaty of Nanking, China’s nightmare in 
international politics had just begun.  
 In 1843, Britain forced China to sign the Treaty of Bogue (Humen Tiaoyue), 
which gave Britain the extraterritoriality in China and most-favored-nation status. Per 
the request of extraterritoriality, a British citizen in China could only be tried by 
British consular officers, not under Chinese jurisdiction. With the 
“most-favored-nation” status, Britain would receive any trading privileges China had 
granted or would grant to any other countries.  
 In 1844, the United States forced China to sign another treaty, the Treaty of Wang 
Hya [Wang Xia Tiaoyue]. According to this treaty, the United States also obtained 
extraterritoriality in China, as well as all privileges in trading that Britain had obtained 
with the Treaty of Nanking and the Treaty of Bogue. France obtained from China the 
same privileges given to Britain in 1844 with the Treaty of Whampoa (Huangpu 
Tiaoyue).  
 These treaties were signed when China was outpaced and preempted by the 
advanced military technology of the West during the First Opium War. In 1840, 
British vessels attacked the Chinese port of Zhenjiang, a city 50 miles east of Nanjing 
(also spelled as Nanking). After centuries of isolation, the Chinese government found 
itself far behind the West in technology and military prowess. British military vessels 
resided outside the city of Nanjing, and threatened to attack this major city in 
                                                             
2 Nanjing, a city in Southeast China, was spelt as “Nanking” before 1949.   
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Southeast China. In order to appease Britain, the Qing Government succumbed and 
agreed to sign the Treaty of Nanking on the HMS Cornwallis on the water north of 
Nanjing City on August 29, 1842. The United States and France had similar requests 
for trading privileges – and the Qing Dynasty agreed to both as it was in awe of their 
advanced technology.  
 In 1856, when the Taiping Rebellion – (a rebellion waged by peasants in the 
name of heterodox Christian) swept over Southern China, the Second Opium war 
(also known as the “Arrow War”, or “Anglo-French expedition to China”) broke out 
between China and Britain who was allied with France. China lost the war again, with 
four more unequal treaties signed, the four Treaties of Tientsen (with Britain, France, 
Russia and the US respectively) in 1856. These treaties forced China to open more 
ports to the West, to allow Christian missionary activities and to legalize opium trade 
with China. In addition, China had to compensate British and French troops with six 
million taels of silver. Between China and Russia, the Treaties of 1858 and 1860 
ceded to Russia a territory of 150 square kilometers, just slightly smaller than the size 
of the American state of Alaska. In the subsequent decades, Western countries came to 
China and enjoyed trading privileges granted under those unequal treaties. Even a 
small country like Portugal was able to force China to sign a treaty and occupy Macau 
in 1887.  
 Since 1842, the first four decades of humiliation forced China to open up to the 
West. Meanwhile, these experiences educated Chinese officials about modern 
international relations. For example, it acquainted China with the modern diplomatic 
norms and systems. If consider those experiences educational, the tuition was very 
high.  
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 Similar to China, Japan was also forced to open its country to the West in 1853, 
when the Western steam vessels arrived at Japanese ports and forced Japan to accept 
unequal treaties.
3
 Three decades after economic, social and some political reforms, 
called the Meiji Restoration, Japan became another world power with which China 
was faced. Before 1898, Japan was able to control Korea, which had been protected 
by China under the so-called tribute system. A war broke out between China and 
Japan to determine the status of Korea. China lost to Japan in the Jiawu War (the First 
China-Japan war) in 1894. Japan was even more insatiable than previous Western 
powers: it wanted Taiwan and all of its affiliates, and also two hundred million taels of 
silver dollars from China, which equaled three times the annual Gross Domestic 
Production (GDP) of Japan in the 1890s.  
 In 1894, the humiliation worsened with Japan’s victory over China, resulting in 
the loss of Taiwan, and arguably the Diaoyu islands. The defeat in 1894 was even 
more unacceptable for the Chinese than previous the losses against Britain, France or 
the United States. If the Western powers’ victory against China can be explained by 
China’s long-time self-isolation, and therefore their technological advancement in the 
past centuries, the victory of Japan was astonishing. Japan had been a weak neighbor 
of China and after only three decades of reform, Japan’s military power was able to 
defeat China, which is ten times the size of Japan, calling itself the “Middle Kingdom.” 
As a consequence of this unequal treaty and a reflection of Chinese intellectuals’ wish 
to change China’s humiliating situation, domestic reform has been advocated since 
1895. In 1895, intellectuals who were taking the meritocratic official selection exam 
in Beijing wrote a petition letter to the Manchu Emperor, demanding reform. In 1898, 
the so-called “Reform in the Year of Wuxu” (1898) was implemented to imitate the 
                                                             
3 Japan called these Western steam vessels “the black boats” because they were made of iron and looked 
differently from the wooden boats which were popular in Asia at that time.  
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Japanese and promote social and political reforms. However, the intellectuals’ plan in 
1898 was centered on a young emperor whose power was actually in the hands of his 
mother, who was strongly against the reforms, believing they might undermine the 
interest of ruling Manchu elites. The reforms were terminated after 103 days of 
implementation, with the young emperor being imprisoned by his mother and dozens 
of intellectuals executed in public.  
 Just two years later, in 1900, troops from eight countries invaded China when the 
Chinese government was unable to quell the domestic Boxer Rebellion. The Boxer 
Rebellion was a movement organized by civilians who called themselves “boxers” 
with their xenophobic advocates; they rallied against Western imperialism and 
Christianity. In the Beijing Battle, Britain, Russia, Japan, France, Germany, America, 
Belgium and Austria-Hungary formed an alliance and invaded Beijing, forcing the 
Chinese empress (after imprisoning her son- the emperor, she became the de facto 
leader of China) to leave Beijing as a refugee. The photograph in Figure 2.1 taken in 
1900 shows Western invaders sitting on the throne of Chinese emperor in the 
Forbidden City, after the Chinese emperor was ousted along with his mother.  
Figure 2.1. [Ba guo Lian jun] Military Ally of Eight States in Beijing 
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 The invasion was waged in the name of ending the Boxer Rebellion. The 
consequence of this invasion, however, included the temporary relocation of 
government, the signing of the Boxer Protocol in 1901, and a remittance from the 
Qing Government to all eight countries totaled at 450 million taels of silver, which 
was equal to US$ 335 million gold dollars or £67 million at that time, approximately 
equal to US$6.653 billion today.
4
  
 The loss of the Beijing Battle to the multi-national army intensified the domestic 
conflict between the public and the ruling Manchu elites. The constant cession of 
lands and the large amount of compensation paid to invaders, including Japan, 
severely undermined the authority of the Qing government. Decades of humiliation 
accompanied China into the twentieth century.  
 The Chinese Revolution [also known as “Xinhai Revolution”] on October 10, 
1911 brought the Qing Dynasty to an end and replaced it with the Republic of China 
(ROC). When established, the ROC advocated the anti-Manchurism [pai man zhu yi], 
aimed at ousting all Manchus in China and overthrowing the Manchu regime. ROC 
became the first republic in Chinese history after overthrowing the Qing Dynasty. 
However, it did not end the hundred years of humiliation. 
 After 1912, the central government was not able to control hundreds of warlords 
in different areas of China. For example, Northeastern China was under the control of 
Zhang Zuolin. These warlords did not always obey the central government and 
conflicts happened frequently.  
 On September 18, 1931, Japanese troops occupied the three provinces in 
Northeast China, and in 1932, Japan invited the resigned Qing emperor, Xuantong, to 
become the Emperor of the Manchurian nation (Manchukuo). However, the emperor 
                                                             
4 Spence, Jonathan D. (1991). The Search for Modern China. WW Norton & Co.  
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was controlled by Japan from his personal life to his political administration. The 
Japanese language was taught in all schools in Manchukuo, and emperor would have 
to include Japanese officers at all levels of his government. China was divided. 
September 18, from then on, became the anniversary remembering the invasion of 
Japan.  
Figure 2.2 notes in green the territory of the Manchurian nation, which was a 
regime controlled by Japan and ruled by last Manchu emperor in the Qing Dynasty. 
The territory of the Manchurian nation covers three provinces in Northeast China 
today - Jilin, Liaoning and Helongjiang, covering an area of more than 430 million 
square miles, with a population of 37 million in 1937. Also in Figure 2.3, the red areas 
denote Japan and all territories it had formally acquired, including Taiwan (occupied 
in 1894 from China), and the entire Korean Peninsula (Japan forced Korea to “merge” 
with Japan in 1910 via the Japan–Korea Annexation Treaty).  
Figure 2.2 Map of Manchukuo (1932) [In green] 
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Figure 2.3-1 National Flag of Manchukuo (1932-1945) 
 
 
Figure 2.3.-2 National Flag of ROC (1912-1949)  
 
 
 Figure 2.3-1 shows the newly adopted national flag of Manchukuo that was used 
to represent the independence of Manchukuo from the ROC (its national flag is shown 
in 2.3-2). Given the independence of Manchukuo, this action further inflamed the 
relationship because it was suggesting that traditional Chinese lands were now under 
Japan’s control. The Manchuria regime, controlled by Japan, considered itself a 
separate state from China. The rest for China, however, was under the de jure control 
of Chinese central government.  
 Japan waged a comprehensive invasion of “China” – the southern part of China to 
the south of Manchuria on July 7, 1937, when Japanese troops in Manchuria occupied 
a small town south of Beijing called Wanping, using the search for a lost Japanese 
soldier as an excuse. The second China-Japan War broke out.  
 As in 1894, China could still offer a strong opposition to Japan in 1937. On 
December 13, 1937, Japanese troops occupied then capital city of ROC, Nanjing (also 
spelled as “Nanking”). In the six weeks following Japan’s capture of Nanjing, 
Japanese troops committed mass murder, massive war rape and looting in Nanjing, 
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with more than 300,000 Chinese citizens being killed, and hundreds of thousands of 
Chinese women raped. This incident is known as the Nanjing Massacre (or the Rape 
of Nanking) in 1937.
5
  
 The atrocities Japanese troops committed in Nanjing were appalling, as suggested 
by Iris Chang’s 1997 book title The Rape of Nanking and the records of foreigner like 
John Rabe who stayed in Nanjing during the massacre. As Rabe, a German engineer 
who stayed in Nanjing during the massacre wrote in his diary on December 13, 1937,  
 “It is not until we tour the city that we learn the extent of destruction. We come 
across corpses every 100 to 200 yards. The bodies of civilians that I examined 
had bullet holes in their backs. These people had presumably been fleeing and 
were shot from behind. The Japanese march through the city in groups of ten to 
twenty soldiers and loot the shops (...) I watched with my own eyes as they 
looted the café of our German baker Herr Kiessling. Hempel's hotel was broken 
into as well, as almost every shop on Chung Shang and Taiping Road.”6 
 
Japanese troops systematically massacred unarmed Chinese citizens and prisoners 
of wars (POWs), and searched door-to-door for women to rape, including infants and 
the elderly. The Nanjing Massacre was the peak of Japanese atrocities during the 
World War II in China, and its impact on Chinese sentiment towards Japan is still a 
stumbling block between China and Japan today.  
 Before Japan occupied Nanjing, the ROC government had moved to Chongqing, 
a city in West China. The ROC government stayed there until 1945, when Japan 
surrendered and retreated from China.  
 During the World War II, Chinese communists gained public support and power 
in rural areas. Their criticism towards the ROC government for its one-party 
dominance finally led to the civil war between Communist and the Nationalist from 
                                                             
5 For more about this tragedy, see Chang, Iris (1997). The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World 
War II. Basic Books.AND Woods, John E. (1998). The Good man of Nanking, the Diaries of John Rabe. Also in 
the movie directed by Zhang, Yimou, the Flowers of War (2011), and Nanking (2007), directed by Bill Guttentag 
and Dan Sturman.   
6 Woods, John E. (1998). The Good man of Nanking, the Diaries of John Rabe. p. 67. 
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1946 to 1949. The Civil War ended with the victory of the communists and the PRC 
regime was founded on October 1, 1949. The Nationalists fled to Taiwan, where the 
ROC regime still exists today.  
 Cumulatively, the hundred years of humiliation from 1842 to 1949 severely hurt 
the national pride of the Chinese people, and resulted in the public demand for a more 
assertive national government to defend China against foreign intrusions in her 
domestic spheres. In this context, Chairman Mao’s speech emphasizing that the 
“Chinese people have stood up” in 1949 was inviting for the public, and the PRC 
government obtained support from the public and also its legitimacy for terminating 
the hundred years of humiliation. The public, on the other hand, became sensitive to 
any actions taken by Japan or the West, with the presumption that they always had 
hostile intention towards China. 
 Hundred years of humiliation also set the stage for contemporary Chinese 
territorial disputes. To highlight a key facet of the humiliation in history, China was 
forced to cede lands and compensate. The PRC government and the Chinese people 
do not want to see territory cession happen again. 
 
II. History: Contemporary China’s Anti-Japanese Sentiments 
 Japan was an important contributor to China’s hundred years of humiliation. Two 
Sino-Japanese wars (one in 1894, the second in 1937-1945) caused tens of millions of 
casualties in China. More importantly, the insatiable demands of Japan in 1894 and 
atrocities committed during the World War II altogether functioned as a big obstacle 
for the Chinese public to view Japan as a friendly neighbors. Worse still, the Chinese 
public believes that the Japanese government established after World War II has 
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refused to offer formal apologies to the Chinese victims.  
However, it should be noted that the negative sentiment from the Chinese 
government did not emerge (though has existed since 1894) until after Deng 
Xiaoping’s rule in late 1980s. When Mao Zedong was ruling China, he met with the 
Japanese Prime Minister and asked for “no apology” from Japan. As Susan Shirk 
mentioned in her 2007 book, in the era of Mao Zedong, the strong leader had “little 
need to mobilize popular sentiment against Japan,” because he had “unchallenged 
authority on foreign policy matters.”7 The same logic can be applied to describe the 
China-Japan relations under Deng Xiaoping’s rule from 1978 to the early 1990s, when 
China had a peaceful relationship with Japan, and the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands 
was “shelved” by Deng.  
However, the Chinese government began to view Japan as both a historical evil 
and an imminent challenger since the Jiang Zemin administration (starting from early 
1990s). As Susan Shirk stated, after the “strong men” era of Mao and Deng, Jiang and 
incumbent Chinese President Hu have no experience fighting in wars as Mao and 
Deng did, therefore they dare not risk their ruling status by being lenient with Japan.
8
 
Such a change of the Chinese government’s stance towards Japan between Mao-Deng 
rule (strong men era) and Jiang/Hu administrations may also be explained by the 
different experiences of leaders during the World War II: while Mao and Deng were 
leading armies fighting against Japan, Jiang was a student suffering under the 
Japanese rule.
9
  
On the other hand, the Chinese public always has negative sentiment against 
Japan whoever the leader is. Even under Mao’s rule in 1965, at a Japanese cultural 
                                                             
7 Shirk, Susan. (2007). Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail its Peaceful Rise. Oxford 
University Press.  
8 See Shirk (2007), pp. 46-47 and 158.  
9 See Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. (2005). The man who changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin. Crown. 
Chapter 2 mentioned Jiang’s experience as a student under Japanese rule of China in the late 1930s.  
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exhibition in Beijing, people came in and saw the Japanese flag, they “fell to the floor 
in shock and dismay, they had such bad memories.”10 This background may indicate 
the importance of leadership in China-Japan relations. However, after Mao and Deng, 
we are and will be an era without strong men who have prestige to control the Chinese 
public’s sentiment, then where will be China heading in its Japan policy?  
A large amount of literature is devoted to the China-Japan relationship in the 
twentieth century. To describe a narrative on the complicated feelings between these 
two countries, there are several key issues that go hand-in-hand with the Diaoyu 
Islands dispute in bilateral relations. As the websites of several Defend Diaoyu 
Movement (DDM) groups indicated, these issues have the roots in the history of the 
World War II, including the quests for compensation to victims suffering from 
Japanese chemical weapons, massacre in Nanjing, and “comfort” women, and the fact 
that Japan never made an apology to China after the Second World War. In the late 
twentieth century, whether the Japanese prime minister should pay an annual tribute 
(canbai) to the Yasukuni Shrine
11
 is a highly disputable topic even within Japan. That 
Japan owes China an apology has been a main complaint among the Chinese public, 
and such an attitude has a great impact on China’s Japan policy, including the dispute 
over the Diaoyu Islands.  
In his analysis of security dilemmas in East Asia, Thomas Christensen stated that 
despite a more formidable US military force to China, Chinese analysts “view Japan 
with much less trust and, in many cases, with a loathing rarely found in their attitudes 
about the United States.”12 According to Christensen, Chinese aversion towards 
Japan sprang from two aspects, one is the historical legacy and Japan’s attitude 
                                                             
10 See Shrik (2007), pp. 158.  
11 Yasikuni Shrine is a Japanese shrine in Tokyo, where generations of martyrs of Japan were memorized, 
including those war criminals who waged the World War II in Asia. Many of these war criminals were responsible 
for massacres and atrocities in Asia during the World War II.  
12 See pp. 52 in Christensen, Thomas. “Security Dilemmas in East Asia.” International Security 23-4: 49-80. 
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towards historical issues, the other is a more imminent judgment on Japan’s military 
power and potential.
13
 The interaction of these two factors led to a negative, 
anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese public. Such anti-Japanese sentiments are 
so strong that it prevails in all aspects, not only political, but also in economic and 
cultural domains. Several incidents reflect Chinese public’s negative sentiments 
against Japan. 
In 2003 a famous Chinese actress Zhao Wei took a series of pictures for a fashion 
magazine, wearing dresses decorated with Japanese flag. The Chinese public waged a 
large scale of mobilization, demanding Zhao to apologize. In 2003, the explosion of a 
mustard gas bomb left by Japanese troops in World War II in Qiqihar caused mass 
protests and condemnation of Chinese public against Japan. Also in 2003, a sex party 
organized by the Japanese on September 18 in Zhuhai exploded nation-wide protests 
and accusation against Japan.
14
  
When political protests take place, a popular slogan is to ask the Chinese people 
to boycott Japanese products (dizhi rihuo). In 2003, when China was trying to develop 
its own bullet train system between Beijing and Shanghai, the Chinese public waged a 
protest against Japanese-made products. Chinese nationalist Feng Jinhua organized an 
online signature-gathering project to protest against the purchase of the Japanese 
bullet train (Shinkansen). Feng gathered approximately 100,000 signatures, and sent 
them to Premier Wen Jiabao to demonstrate the opposition of Chinese public against 
this possible billion-dollar contract with Japan. Feng believed his action made 
“significant influence”, which led to a Chinese government announcement stating the 
contract is postponed and China would listen to “the opinion of its people.”15  
                                                             
13 Ibid, pp. 55.  
14 Gries, Peter. (2005). “China’s ’new thinking’ on Japan”. The China Quarterly, No. 184, pp. 831-850.  
15 Li, Mujin. “Cyberspace nationalism led to a new chapter to Chinese nationalism” (Wangluo minzuzhiyi xiankai 
zhongguo minzuzhiyi xinpianzhang), published on International Herald Tribune (Guoji xianqu daobao),Beijing. 
  
32 
 
These seemingly radical protests actually are windows that display the negative 
feeling towards Japan among the Chinese public. Anti-Japanese sentiments are so 
strong that a small issue, like an actress wearing the Japanese sun-flag, inappropriate 
humor by Japanese students in Xi’an, can explode the barrel of explosives of 
nationalism. 
At these protests and eruptions of anti-Japanese sentiment, the role of the Chinese 
government is ambivalent. The Communist Party of China (CPC) won the trust of the 
people by advocating nationalism after the World War II. As Christensen stated, 
“nationalism has always been a strong element of the legitimacy of the CPC, and 
opposing Japanese imperialism is at the core of this nationalist story.”16 Meanwhile, 
the CPC has reservation on anti-Japanese protests, worrying that they may “backfire,” 
leading to the public questioning the Chinese government’s policy, even its 
legitimacy.
17
  
This discussion leads to question how the Chinese government is constituted and 
how their foreign policy making process accommodates the influence of public 
opinion.  
 
III. Top- down: PRC Government and Chinese Foreign Policy Making 
The Chinese Political System  
 Before discussing Chinese foreign policy making on the island dispute, it is 
necessary for readers to know about China’s political system and its foreign policy 
making structures. Information in this part is important not only in providing a 
background for the following discussion about the foreign policy over the disputed 
                                                                                                                                                                              
2003-9-18.  
16 Christensen (1999),pp. 54. 
17 See Gries (2002).  
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islands, but also in presenting a government isolating itself from influence of effective 
moderating institutions. The opaque nature of the Chinese government renders the 
“black box” of David Easton applicable to a Chinese context.   
The PRC government was founded under a strong leader, Mao Tse-tung (Pinyin 
as Mao Ze-dong)’s rule since 1949. As the strong leader, he waged the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966, expecting to “purify” the entire country by annihilating all 
vestiges of feudalism and capitalism in China. After Mao passed away, another PRC 
founder Deng Xiaoping came to power and pushed for China’s Reform and Opening 
up policy in 1978. Since 1978, China has moved from a closed, centrally-planned 
economy to a “more market-oriented one, playing a major global role.”18 After Deng, 
Jiang Zemin became the General Secretary of CPC and Commander of PLA in 1989, 
and then the Chinese president in 1993. Under his rule, China’s economy developed at 
a fast pace. Incumbent Chinese president Hu Jintao assumed his leadership in 2003.  
 Though often considered an authoritarian, communist state with an opaque 
decision-making process, the Chinese government within the “black box” does 
include two state institutions: one includes the government institutions (executive, 
legislative and judicial branches) as almost all countries have; the other set of 
institutions refers to the ruling Communist party, which is designated in China’s 
Constitution as the ruling party. These two sets of institutions are integrated and also 
interlocking each other.
19
 On one hand, China is controlled by one political party, and 
the party system dominates the bureaucracy, and also the military and the National 
People’s Congress (NPC), which is a legislative body functioning like the Congress in 
American politics; on the other hand, the bureaucracy, military and NPC also have 
their influence in Chinese policy making by offering feedbacks and assistance 
                                                             
18 CIA world factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.  
19 Dumbaugh, Kerry. (2010). Understanding Chinese Political System. DIANE Publishing.  
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towards the communist party. Moreover, even though considered an authoritarian, 
one-party government, China does have eight minor political parties. They assist the 
Communist Party in different organizations at both national and local levels.  
 
State Government 
With Beijing as the capital, the Chinese government governs 23 provinces 
(including Taiwan), 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities, as well as the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and Macau Special Administrative 
Region (MSAR). Within the Chinese government, the incumbent Chief of State is 
President Hu Jintao, who was appointed by the National People’s Congress in 2003. 
He is currently holding his second five-year term. A president can serve no more than 
two terms. The President of China is also the chief diplomat, and usually the 
Communist party leader. 
In the executive branch, the Head of Government is Premier Wen Jiabao, who 
was nominated by President Hu, reviewed by the National People’s Congress in 2003. 
The Premier is appointed and can also be removed by the President. The cabinet of 
government, the State Council is chaired by the Premier. It is composed of one 
Premier, four Vice-Premiers, five State Councilors, and numerous ministers and 
commissioners in charge of ministries and commissions in the State Council. 
Members of the State Council are nominated by the Premier, reviewed by NPC and 
appointed/removed by the President.  
 Within ministries of the State Council there are vertical hierarchies governing 
different policy areas. The Premier heads the national system of the bureaucracy, 
which includes ministries (for instance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of 
National Defense and Ministry of Agriculture) and organizations directly under the 
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State Council (for example, the General Administration of Customs, and State 
Administration of Taxation) – all of these ministries have a hierarchical organization 
governing policy areas at both national and local levels.  
 
Figure 2.4.  
Ministries and Commissions of State Council of the People’s Republic of China 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of National Defense 
National Development and Reform Commission 
Ministry of Education 
Ministry of Science and Technology 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
State Ethnic Affairs Commission 
Ministry of Public Security 
Ministry of State Security 
Ministry of Supervision 
Ministry of Civil Affairs 
Ministry of Justice 
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
Ministry of Land and Resources 
Ministry of Environmental Protection 
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
Ministry of Transport 
Ministry of Railways 
Ministry of Water Resources 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Ministry of Commerce 
Ministry of Culture 
Ministry of Health 
National Population and Family Planning Commission 
People's Bank of China 
National Audit Office 
Source: Chinese Central Government website (gov.cn) 
 
  
36 
 
China adopts a unitary system between the national government and provincial 
governments (including 5 autonomous regions). However, government system 
between HKSAR/MSAR and the central government is one that resembles federalism: 
HKSAR and MSAR surrender diplomatic and military rights to Beijing, while they 
retain other powers including currency issuance and maintaining their own judicial 
systems (the so-called “one country, two systems”).  
 The National People’s Congress (NPC) functions as the legislative branch of the 
government. It currently has 2,987 seats, with the members elected “by municipal, 
regional, and provincial people's congresses, and People's Liberation Army to serve 
five-year terms.”20 Members of the Congress meet every five years, the next 
forthcoming meeting is scheduled to occur between December 2012 and March 2013. 
The NPC has the constitutional right of amending the Constitution. Between the 
convocation of two NPC meetings, the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress (NPCSC), consisted of 150 members of the National People’s Congress, 
convenes between the plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress. When they 
convene, they make laws on behalf of the NPC. NPCSC is chaired by the top 
legislator, who ranks the third in Chinese politics, behind the Party Secretary and 
President. The current Chairman of NPCSC is Mr. Wu Bangguo.  
 With regard to the judicial branch, China has its Supreme People’s Court in 
Beijing and local court system comprised of higher, intermediate, and basic courts in 
the provinces and autonomous regions. Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan have their 
own judicial systems under the “one country, two system” principle. While Mainland 
China maintains a civil law system, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan have their own 
judicial systems. For example, Hong Kong adopts a common law system.  
                                                             
20 CIA World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.  
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Party System  
The Chinese government is unique with its dual set of institutions of a national 
government and the Communist Party in decision making. The President of China, Mr. 
Hu Jintao, is also the party leader of Communist Party of China (CPC), and also the 
Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Unlike the President of 
the United States, who becomes the Commander in Chief only after he becomes 
president, China’s Commander-in-Chief is the chair of the CPC Central Military 
Commission and also PRC Central Military Commission. In other words, theoretically, 
the President of China and the Commander in Chief of PLA can be two different 
individuals. However, these three positions (General Secretary of CPC, President and 
Commander in Chief) usually fall onto one individual after the terms transitions.  
 Within the CPC, there are organizations that interlock with ministries and 
commissions in all levels of governments. The CPC’s supreme power resides in the 
National Party Congress, which is held every five years, and it is convened by the 
Central Committee of CPC. The Central Committee is selected by the National Party 
Congress and it represents CPC outside of the party when the National Party Congress 
is not in session. The Central Committee has 204 members, and at the core of the 
Central Committee is a nine-member committee, the Standing Committee of the 
Central Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. The leader of the Standing 
Committee is known as the “Chief Secretary” – it is usually the President of China. 
This nine-member committee functions as the hub of Chinese policy making, 
including the President of China, the Premier of State Council and the chair of NPC – 
they also hold positions in national government.  
 The CPC Central Committee also appoints the Chairman of the Central Military 
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Commission, who is also the de facto Commander in Chief of the PLA.  
 Under the Central Politburo, there are those functioning departments and 
commissions within CPC, for instances, the General Affairs Office, the Organization 
Department, the Publicity Department, the International Liaison Department etc. They 
have overlapping areas within the ministries and commissions in the State Council, 
however, they all focus on party affairs.  
 
Figure 2.5 The Organization of CPC.  
(Source: China.gov.cn). 
 To sum up, what is unique in the Chinese political system is the existence of two 
sets of institutions: the Party system and the State government system. They integrate 
under the leadership of the CPC, and all state government departments follow the 
policy decisions of the CPC; meanwhile, state governments also make decisions, 
which may have influence on the CPC. These two sets of institutions are integrated so 
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that all state governments at all levels must be accompanied by a branch of the CPC. 
At local levels, the Secretary of the Party is usually higher than local government 
leader in Chinese political hierarchies. On the other hand, these two institutions also 
interlock each other by overlapping in some policy areas, for example, foreign policy. 
 
Organizations in China’s Foreign Policy Making 
 The central leadership, i.e. the CPC Standing Politburo Committee and other 
members of the Politburo assumes the task of formulating China’s foreign policy. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the organization in charge of Chinese foreign 
policy implementation. As stated on the official website of the MFA, the main 
responsibilities of the MFA include “to implement the state's diplomatic principles 
and policies and related laws and regulations; safeguard national sovereignty, security 
and interests on behalf of the state; run diplomatic affairs on behalf of the state and 
the government; and handle diplomatic activities between leaders of the CPC and the 
state with foreign leaders.”21 Other than the MFA, the CPC department International 
Communication Office, and the foreign relations department of the PLA General Staff 
Department also function in implementing the state’s diplomatic principles and 
policies, with emphasis on the communication of political parties and military 
collaboration respectively.  
 The MFA assumes the tasks of formulating and implementing China’s foreign 
policy. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yang Jiechi, served as the 
Ambassador to the United States between 2001 and 2005. MFA maintain regular press 
conference with MFA spokesperson.  
 The first press conference of MFA was held on March 26, 1982, by then-Minister 
                                                             
21 “Main Responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.” Available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zyzz/t558670.htm.  
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of Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen. Since then, regular press conference has been an 
regular institution of China’s MFA. Ministry of Foreign Affairs has four 
spokespersons now, Ms. Jiang Yu, Dr. Ma Chaoxu, Mr. Hong Lei, and Mr. Liu 
Weimin.  
 Since 1995, MFA press conferences have been held twice a week on Tuesday and 
Thursday. Since August 2011, MFA increased the number of press conferences to 5 
times per week. Press conference starts at 3 o’clock every workday afternoon in MFA 
headquarter in Beijing. Q&A sessions have been an integral part of MFA press 
conferences since 1988, when the limits on raising questions were removed. When the 
MFA officials speak at the press conferences, their statements are construed to be the 
official voice of the Chinese government.  
 The International Communication Office in the CPC was established to manage 
the relations of CPC with other communist parties around the world. It was modeled 
after the Soviet system and played important role before the Cold War ended. 
Nowadays, it still functions by maintaining close contacts with communist parties in 
North Korea, Cuba and Vietnam. However, its influence on the West is limited. Since 
the end of the Cold War, this organization of the party has been declining. They are 
inherently an organ of the party, and therefore does not speak on the behalf of the 
Chinese government.  
 Even though the President of China is also the leader of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA), the PLA’s influence on foreign policy is constrained to policy areas and 
departments related to military. For instance, the Foreign Relations department in the 
PLA General Staff Department helps to arrange the visit of foreign warship to visit 
Chinese ports. However, PLA as an entity in general has been found playing an 
important role in Chinese foreign policy making, especially during the Jiang and Hu 
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administrations, when the leaders had no experience of military service.  
 
 These organizations construct the system of Chinese foreign policy making and 
implementation. Foreign policy decisions are usually announced through several 
venues. First, the MFA makes statements on foreign policy issues usually after an 
incident. For example, after the arrest of Chinese fisherman by Japan, the MFA issued 
an official statement. MFA also makes statements at its regular press conferences. 
These conferences are held to voice the Chinese government’s official position on 
foreign policy issues.  
Second, the government leaders, including the Premier, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, sometimes make statements on China’s foreign policy stances. Never in PRC 
history had these three sources given conflicting information.  
Third, the Party voices its foreign policy stance in its official newspaper, the 
People Daily (Renmin Ribao). Controlled by the Central Committee of CPC, the 
People’s Daily offers a venue for understanding the policy stance of the Chinese 
central government. In addition, Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television 
(CCTV) are both fully owned and controlled by the Chinese government, therefore, 
they offer reliable “official” information on China’s foreign policy decisions. Other 
than these sources, all the others are considered as “unofficial” in this project. 
However, it should be noted that the boundary between official and unofficial media is 
blurry. The Global Times (huan qiu shi bao), for example, is a newspaper sitting on 
the boundary between official and unofficial sources. Owned and administered by the 
People’s Daily, the Global Times is very sensitive to popular press in its publications 
however. When gathering data on the Chinese government’s position, I go for those 
“official” media, discarding all the others, including the Global Times. The existence 
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of the Global Times in a country where censorship is active, however, indicates the 
Chinese government’s concern of the public opinion. 
 
This description of the Chinese government’s institutional arrangement may lead 
to an impression that a top-down approach will yield the richest rewards in 
understanding foreign policy of this communist nation. However, events in recent 
years suggest the development of additional social institutions whose actions may be 
mediating official Chinese public policy. This dissertation will reveal that a bottom-up 
approach, which focuses on public opinion and intellectuals, will make our 
understanding more robust on how and why Chinese foreign policy is made. 
 
IV. Bottom up? : Intellectuals, Public Opinion Leaders and Foreign Policy 
Making in China 
 Chinese intellectuals and public opinion leaders (POLs) maintain a historical 
tradition of striving to participate in policy issues in China. This tradition is evidenced 
in the ancient Chinese saying that “common citizens are responsible for the prosperity 
and failure of the state.” [国家兴亡，匹夫有责] 
 Chinese intellectuals [zhi shi fen zi] preserve a tradition of offering the authorities 
wise policy advice with their knowledge and expertise since the imperial eras of 
China. Such a tradition of intellectuals in political life has its root in the meritocratic 
official selection system in imperial China. As early as in the latter Ming Dynasty 
(1368-1644), Chinese intellectuals organized associations to comment on national 
political affairs and offer their advice. In the late 16
th
 century, the Donglin Academy 
in east China Wuxi city, was the forum for Chinese intellectuals to meet and discuss 
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about politics.
22
 In imperial dynasties with meritocratic official selection system, 
Chinese intellectuals were prepared to govern a nation ever since they studied for the 
government official exam (ke ju). In Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), intellectuals still 
played an important role in government administrations. In the late 19
th
 century, for 
example, Chinese intellectuals advocated the Wuxu reform 1898 after China’s defeat 
in the first Sino-Japan war.  
During the 38 years of ROC governance in China, intellectuals, including college 
students, organized several protests, criticizing the government’s weak foreign policy. 
The best known protests were the mass protests on May 4, 1919 and December 9, 
1935.  
The protests on May 4, 1919, or known as “May 4 Movement” (wu si yun dong), 
was waged against the government’s weak foreign policy at the Paris Peace 
Conference, when the League of Nations gave the previous German occupying 
Shandong Province in east China to Japan. In 1919, the Chinese government also 
signed the 21-demands Treaty with Japan, in which Japan’s occupation of Shan Dong 
was confirmed and Japan obtained exclusive control over China’s mining and railway 
systems. Mass protests organized by Chinese college students on May 4 criticized the 
government and demanded the Chinese government to forfeit its treaty with Japan. In 
1935, another mass protest was organized on December 9 to protest Chinese 
government’s appeasement policy during Japan’s annexation of the Hebei Province in 
North China. Later remembered as the “December 9 Movement”, it reflects the 
sentiments Chinese intellectuals and colleges students had towards a weak 
government on foreign policy.  
 During both movements, Chinese intellectuals participated with their expertise 
                                                             
22 Dong Lin Academy (东林书院) located in Wuxi, China, was organized by Chinese intellectuals in the late Ming 
Dynasty, and scholars of this academy educated students and also make public comments on political issues.  
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and knowledge to suggest the best policy for China, inheriting the spirit of Chinese 
intellectuals as reflected from the Dong Lin Academy. In 1919, the “New Cultural 
Movement” spread all across China, and intellectuals advocated the concepts of 
“Democracy” and “Science” for China and believed these two concepts would save 
China from a weak, semi-colonized state. In 1935, college students demonstrated their 
enthusiasm for politics and they turned out to be the core of intellectuals after the 
PRC was founded.
23
 
 Despite of their tradition of active participation in politics and commentary, 
Chinese intellectuals are often ignored, or even persecuted by the authorities. 
Throughout history, Chinese intellectuals are often the victims of political conflicts. 
The Dong Lin Academy in Ming Dynasty, for example, was brutally destroyed in 
1626 by the government controlled by eunuchs. They criticized the Academy for 
questioning the policies of the government. In 1898, the reform advocated by 
intellectuals lasted only three months. The dominant conservative power, headed by 
the Empress, crushed the reform, imprisoned the Emperor who supported the reform, 
and executed those major participants of this reform. In the twentieth century, the 
“May 4 movement” and the “December 9 Movement” both witnessed the blood of 
college students and quelled advocates of the intellectuals. In history, it seems that the 
intellectuals are struggling for the consent and tolerance of the authorities; whenever 
the authorities saw the intellectuals threaten their legitimacy, however, intellectuals 
were to be stifled.  
 After the PRC was founded in 1949, intellectuals continued to play an important 
role in politics, until 1956, when waves of anti-rightist movements constrained many 
                                                             
23 See He, Jiadong. (2003). “Where are we, and where are we going to?”[wo men zai na li, wo men you wang he 
chu qu?] Forum for Social Science [she hui ke xue lun tan] 2003-4.  
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intellectuals.
24
 The Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 then set the mainland 
China into turmoil.  
 After the Cultural Revolution, the role played by intellectuals and public opinion 
leaders in Chinese politics increased continually. The role played by intellectuals in 
Chinese foreign policy making has been documented by Zhao Quansheng in his book 
chapter titled “Impact of Intellectuals and Think Tanks on Chinese Foreign Policy.”25 
According to Zhao, he believed that this increase of intellectuals’ influence can be 
explained by the development of civil society in China, the greater demand of policy 
input from the Chinese government and the “growing professionalism in the foreign 
policy apparatus” required in diplomatic system in China.26 For these reasons, we see 
intellectuals’ opinions becoming more influential in Chinese foreign policy making.  
However, it must be noted that even after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese 
government still exercised considerable influence over intellectuals. For instance, the 
government used to determine where a professor would work. Now universities and 
faculties have obtained much more autonomy and mobility than before, but the 
government “still exercises substantial control by making top leadership.”27  
Meanwhile, the changes in civil society, demands for policy input, and “growing 
professionalism” also lead to more influential public opinion in Chinese foreign 
policy making. The public, which also contributed to the two movements in 1919 and 
1935, was also suppressed by the government. Before 1912, public opinion exploded 
in a form like the Boxer Rebellion or Taiping Revolution, which were bottom-up 
uprisings seeking to overthrow the regime. Currently, public opinion has a much 
                                                             
24 For the experience of intellectuals in 1956, see Zhang, Yihe. (2004). Last Aristocrats [zui hou de gui zu]. Oxford 
University Press: Hong Kong.  
25 In Hao, Yufan and Lin Su ed. (2005). China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American 
Policy. Ashgate. 
26 Zhao in Hao and Lin (2005), pp. 134-135.  
27 See Mohrman, Kathryn, Yiqun Geng, and Yingjie Wang. (2011). “Faculty Life in China.” The NEA 2011 
Almanac Of Higher Education.  
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larger influence than ever before due to the development of mass media and Internet.  
 
Conclusion 
 To summarize this chapter, China’s negative sentiment towards Japan has 
historical root. In the century prior to 1949, China was in the so-called hundred years 
of humiliation, the legacy of which has impacted how the contemporary Chinese 
government and public understand foreign policy issues. In this chapter, I have 
reviewed the substance of the hundred years of humiliation. Knowledge in this regard 
is helpful for understanding the contemporary Diaoyu Islands dispute between China 
and Japan.  
 Moreover, this chapter introduces the Chinese political system and foreign policy 
making process. The information is offered as background knowledge for a discussion 
of Chinese foreign policy making. This chapter also points out that recently in 
Chinese foreign policy making, there has been a tendency to accommodate more 
actors in addition to the government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
47 
 
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This chapter starts with reviewing the Balance of Power theory. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the IR theory can explain China’s assertive policy in part. However, it still 
needs an investigation from public policy perspective on China’s foreign policy 
making. Moreover, in Chapter 2, I showed that with the evolution of the roles of 
Chinese intellectuals and public opinion leaders (“POLs” herein), Chinese public 
policy no longer seems to be dominated by the state as the only institutional actor. 
This suggests that the policymaking environment has shifted so that the Chinese 
government is receiving “inputs” from additional institutions. Additionally, the 
“outputs” of Chinese foreign policy making also needs to target to these domestic 
actors. The second part of this chapter reviews the Systems Theory.  
As suggested in Chapter 2 as well, the advent of POLs is a relatively new 
phenomenon in China, occurring in parallel with the development of unofficial media 
sources. Now it can be expected that there are two streams of information that may 
influence how the Chinese people understand the government’s public policy actions 
as well as how Chinese leaders receive and respond to inputs from the public: through 
the official venue such as the official newspaper and television, or the unofficial 
venue, which includes social media, the Internet and those media not directly 
controlled by the Chinese government.  
The last part of this chapter will focus on previous research on public opinion in 
Chinese foreign policy making, and on the correlation between foreign policy and 
domestic politics in a two-level game. Drawing from Putnam’s work in 1988, the first 
level of the game at the international stage impacts domestic institutions, and now, 
with the introduction of the additional mediating institutions, we can observe a second 
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level game in Chinese domestic politics, where the public, led by POLs, exercises 
pressures on Chinese government; the latter meanwhile seeks to control public 
opinion by suppressing domestic public mobilization. 
 
I. Balance of Power and Assertive Policy over Disputed Islands 
 From the perspective of International Relations (IR), the emergency of assertive 
policy of China in recent incidents can be explained with a simple logic: the relative 
power of China has been much stronger vis-à-vis Japan in 2010 than in 2004 or 1996. 
Following this logic, it can be conclude that China’s assertive policy in 2010 is 
explained by its stronger economic and military power.  
 While it is true that China has been much stronger than before, however, this 
explanation only partially explains the story. If a much stronger China will suffice to 
explain its assertive policy, we should ask why China has not yet been assertive over 
the countries in other island disputes (say, Vietnam). Furthermore, if this theory 
explains the assertive policy, we may expect that China will keep adopting assertive 
policy in foreign policy in the future since China is much stronger. However, this does 
not seem true. Foreign policy is so complex that it cannot be captured and explained 
by a single factor.  
 The argument emphasizing on relative power will be supported by those realists 
in IR, treating states as billiard balls and ignoring what is inside of them. Hans 
Morgenthau, for example, emphasized that states have the similar nature and will seek 
for power at the expenses of norms and rules.
1
 Kenneth Waltz, however, argued that 
what can explain states’ behavior include those factors at the international level, rather 
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than the domestic levels.
2
 John Mearsheimer, a modern realist famous for his 
pessimistic understanding of great power politics, would also agree to underplay 
domestic politics when analyzing international relations.
3
  
 By treating states as black billiard balls and ignoring the “inside” of states, the 
discipline of IR maintains a distance from that of Comparative Politics, which strives 
to solve those puzzles relevant with domestic politics in different states. However, 
such realist arguments from IR face challenges. Stephen Krasner, for example, 
reviewed the analogies of “billiard balls” and “tectonic plates.”4 As he reviewed, 
while both analogies believe the outcomes of international relations are a function of 
the distribution of power among states, yet, the billiard balls analogy “is concerned 
solely with the political interactions among states;” while the tectonic analogy is 
concerned with “the impact of the distribution of state power on various international 
environments.”5 By reviewing these two analogies, Krasner was trying to identify the 
position of regimes in IR, which was a key argument by those institutionlists in IR. 
Krasner, with his revision to realist theory, was also named by Keohane as a 
“subversive realist,”6 whose theory share some characteristics with realism, 
institutionalism and even constructivism. From billiard balls to tectonic plates, 
Krasner challenged the underestimation of domestic politics of traditional realists.  
 However, in order to account for the variations in international relations, ignoring 
domestic politics is not only insufficient, but also misleading. In order to explain why 
a state sometimes adopts certain foreign policies but not others, it needs to delve into 
the domestic image for explanations. Jack Snyder, for example, argued that domestic 
                                                             
2
 Waltz, K.N. (1959) Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press. 
3
 Mearsheimer, John (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company: New York. 
4 Krasner, Stephen. (1982). “Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous variables.” International 
Organizations, 36-2: 497-510.  
5 Krasner (1982), pp. 498.  
6 Keohane, Robert. (2010). “Stephen Krasner: Subversive Realist.” Prepared for delivery at the 2010 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, 2010.  
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interest groups are those key factors that lead to the overextension of foreign policies 
of major powers in history.
7
 By investigating the domestic politics, scholars are able 
to find out what is the cause of certain foreign policies. After all, foreign policies are 
made and implemented by domestic institutions.  
 On the topic of China’s assertive foreign policy, the Balance of Power policy may 
explain part of the story. With much stronger military powers relative to Japan in 2010, 
China had the capability to act more assertively than before. While this argument is 
not wrong, it does not help to explain China’s foreign policy making, nor does it aid to 
predict future Chinese foreign policy.  
China’s foreign policy is made in response to events at international level, 
however, the government is also facing domestic challenge towards its legitimacy. 
Therefore, the government’s domestic considerations must be factored into the 
analysis of its foreign policy. Moreover, the explanation of relative power for assertive 
change of China’s foreign policy does not reveal the policy making process in China, 
and it tells little about what we can expect in the future. With China’s relative power 
keeps growing, will it be more assertive, or will it possibility calm down? What are 
the government’s calculations behind these assertive policies? These questions seem 
to be unresolved following the logic of the Balance of Power theory, refusing to enter 
the inside of the billiard balls.  
An analysis of the domestic institutions of China’s foreign policy making, 
however, yields knowledge on the Chinese foreign policy making. Such knowledge 
allows us to predict China’s possible future actions. Fravel, for instance, emphasized 
that regime insecurity is the key factor that explains why China is willing to 
compromise on its territorial disputes.
8
 Jessica Weiss, emphasizes the strategic use of 
                                                             
7 Snyder, Jack. (1993). Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Cornell University Press.  
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public opinion in China’s foreign policy making so the government can harvest more 
benefit at the international negotiations.
9
 These are both endeavors to investigate the 
domestic forces that influence China’s foreign policy.  
However, what is missing here is a clear framework that can reflect the nuanced 
interaction between the government and the public in foreign policy making. Nuanced 
interaction includes how the government acts in front of the public, and how the 
public responds to government’s actions during foreign policy making process.  
Fravel’s analysis reveals the concerns government feels from domestic and 
foreign factors, emphasizing on domestic instability. However, it does not reveal how 
Chinese government interacts with its public in a specific dispute. In addition to “fear” 
of insecurity, the government also wants to manage the public sentiment. No 
government is facing threats to regime every day. 
What is helpful for understanding an authoritarian state’s policy making process 
is the dynamic of how government’s decisions are mediated or moderated by domestic 
institutions. Knowledge in this regard not only helps us to understand how decisions 
are made, but also offers insights on the trajectory of future foreign policy making. 
Therefore, what is necessary is not only to enter the black box for domestic 
institutions, but also analyzing how they interact with each other in a specific dispute. 
Easton’s Systems Theory proposed in 1953 seems a suitable model for investigating 
China’s foreign policy making.   
 
II. David Easton’s Analysis of Political Systems 
 In 1953, David Easton proposed the path-breaking “systems theory”, which, as 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Princeton University Press.  
9 Chen, Jessica Weiss. (2008). “Powerful Patriots: Nationalism, Diplomacy, and the Strategic Logic of 
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Easton stated, was valuable for research in the social sciences because it allows 
researchers to “view political life as a system of interrelated activities.”10 Easton’s 
systems theory treats political life as a system of activities, and believes we can 
separate political life from the rest of social activities, at least for analytical purposes.  
 As Easton elaborated on the systems theory in 1965, he believed that system 
analysis sprang from “the fundamental decision to view political life as a system of 
behavior.”11 System analysis is conceptualized on the basis of four main general 
premises: the system, environment, response, and feedback.
12
  These four premises 
delineate the approach of system analysis, and they altogether highlight political life 
as a “system” under influences from “environments” - “a system is distinguishable 
from the environment in which it exists and is open to influence from it.”13 The 
system then responds “with efforts to regulate or cope with stress flowing from 
environmental as well as internal sources”; meanwhile, in the face of stress, the 
system generates feedback “to its actors and decision-makers.”14 System analysis on 
the basis of these four premises allows researchers to focus on political system and 
study how political system persists and works in societies. As Easton stated, “in its 
ultimate system this mode of analysis will enable the investigator to understand more 
fully the way in which some kinds of political system in a society manages to persist 
in the face of stresses that might well have been expected to lead to its destruction.”15 
 Easton’s system analysis of political life is best and widely illustrated with Figure 
3.1, in which the “political system” converts “inputs” into “outputs” within the 
background of the “environment”. The process of conversion takes place within the  
                                                             
10 Easton, David. (1957). “An Approach to the analysis of Political Systems.” World Politics Vol.9, No. 3: pp. 
383-400.  
11 Pp. 23 in Easton, David. (1965). A Framework for Political Analysis. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.  
12 Supra, pp.24-25.  
13 Supra, pp. 24.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Supra, pp. 25.  
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black box of the “political system”, and “outputs” of the process will have influence 
on the “environment” and also help to create more “inputs” to maintain the 
continuous functioning of this system.  
 
 Easton’s systems theory includes three key elements in addressing the mechanism 
of how it works: political system, inputs and outputs. The concept of “political system” 
lies at the center of this process, and it functions as a “black box” that converts “input” 
into “outputs”, which are often policies and authoritarian decisions in political life.  
In order to identify “political system” from other systems in a society, Easton 
pointed out that we need to identify “its fundamental units” and “establish the 
boundaries that demarcate it from units outside the system.”16 In order to distinguish 
a “political system” from the environment, Easton suggested that “the boundary of a 
political system is … by all those actions more or less directly related to the making 
of binding decisions for the society”,17 therefore, all those actions that do not 
“partake this characteristic” will be considered as part of the “environment” outside of 
the political system. 
 Other than the “political system”, “input” is what keeps the political system 
                                                             
16 Easton (1957), pp. 385.  
17 Ibid.  
Figure 3.1 Systems Theory by David Easton (1957) 
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working. “Outputs”, on the other hand, are the consequence of policy process, and 
they determine the impact of the political system on society. The presence of “input” 
and “output” links political system with the environment: while “input” gets political 
system to work, “outputs” generate impacts on society, and also create opportunities 
for generating new “inputs.” 
Easton identified two forms of “inputs” - demands and support. They altogether 
“furnish it [the system] both with the raw material or information the system is called 
upon to process and with the energy to keep it going.”18 Specifically, Easton raised 
two questions over the demands, first, how do demands arise and assume their 
particular character in society? Second, how are demands transformed into issues? 
These two questions actually have revealed a puzzle that policy theorists after Easton 
have been striving to solve, which is, in the public policy domain, why some demands 
get attention while others do not?
19
 As Professor Wang Shaoguang from the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong once commented, “in any society the number of potential 
public issues almost always exceeds the capabilities of the government to process 
them.”20 The study of why and how some policy demands, but not others, win the 
attention from the political system therefore becomes one central theme of policy 
science.  
On the other hand, as another form of “input”, support is also fed into the black 
box of the political system and converted into “outputs”. Easton categorized two 
forms of “support”: a) support can consist of “actions promoting goals, interests and 
actions of another person”; or b) supportive behavior can be offered in the form of 
non-observable external acts. For instance, we can demonstrate support to a political 
                                                             
18 Easton (1957), pp. 387.  
19 Easton (1957), pp. 389.  
20 Wang, Shaoguang. (2008). “Changing Models of China’s Policy Agenda Setting.” Modern China, Vol. 34, No. 1, 
The Nature of the Chinese State: Dialogues amongWestern and Chinese Scholars, I (Jan., 2008), pp. 56-87.  
  
55 
 
candidate by voting (“support with actions”), or as we often say someone is “loyal to 
its party, attached to democracy, or infused with patriotism” (“feelings” or 
“non-observable external action”).21 Furthermore, Easton categorized “support” 
directed to a political system into three elements – support for the community, the 
regime, and the government.
22
 Before the input goes into the “black box” of political 
system, demands and support shall interact: “for the demands to be processed into 
outputs, it is equally essential that the members of the system stand ready to support 
the existence of a political community and some stable rules of common action that 
we call regime.”23 
Where does support come from? Easton identifies two mechanisms to explain the 
source of support. First, the output of the political system “constitutes a body of 
specific inducements for the member of a system to support that system.”24 In this 
way, what is produced by the political system will have impacts on the environment, 
and such impacts help to foster support towards the political system. Second, the 
system maintains the flow of support through a process called “politicization”. Easton 
defined politicization as a process in which members of a society learn about political 
patterns.
25
 Through politicization, an individual learns to play its political role, 
“which includes the absorption of the proper political attitudes.”26 Such a process of 
politicization ensures the continuity of political participation and helps members of 
society to understand what is expected of them and how they should act in political 
life. Easton provided the repetitive communication of norms and goals in almost all 
societies as an example. In any society, through a political socialized process with 
parents, peers as decisive links, as well as “physical symbols such as flags or totems, 
                                                             
21 Easton (1957), pp. 390.  
22 Supra, 393.  
23 Easton (1957), pp. 394. 
24 Supra, pp. 395.  
25 Supra, pp.397.  
26 Ibid.  
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ceremonies and rituals freighted with political meaning,” individuals are educated 
about the political norms and goals of that society.
27
 
In sum, while the outputs of political process can generate inducements for 
members of society to offer “support”, the process of politicization also enables 
members to learn about the rewards and punishments in political life, and absorb their 
own political orientation. Easton also argued that the process of politicization happens 
in almost all societies repetitively in the form of communicating the goals and norms 
to others.
28
 In this sense, the political system not only generates “outputs” that impact 
society, but also serves the purpose of educating. With these two mechanisms, support 
towards the political system is generated and sustained for keeping system working. 
Demands and support are fed into the “black box”, and are then converted into 
“output” in the form of authoritarian decisions, which impacts the environment and 
helps to create more inputs.  
Easton’s systems theory is a milestone in the history of political science. He 
introduced the political science discipline to the concept of system analysis, which 
had been popular in the natural sciences. His theory has encouraged theorists after 
him to solve the puzzles in the policy making process.  
Easton’s theory has been criticized for treating the “political system” as a black 
box – between “input” and “output”, what is inside of the black box called “political 
system”? Later, John Kingdon’s multiple streams framework, for example, helps to 
address this gap by focusing on the process of “transforming inputs into outputs, that 
is, the working of the black box.”29 Kingdon, however, supplemented David Easton’s 
theory by specifying what is inside of the “black box”. According to Kingdon, what 
                                                             
27 Easton (1957), pp. 399.  
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explains policy change is the merging of three “streams”, the problem stream, the 
policy stream and the politics stream. When these three streams converge, as Kingdon 
suggested, it creates a “policy window” for policy change.30 None the less, in my 
project, what is to be understood is the “environment”, and inputs from the public and 
intellectuals to the government and the interactions between the government, 
intellectuals and the public. In this project, I look at their interactions primarily in 
policy stream and some political stream when a policy window opens, but not the 
problem stream. Therefore, Kingdon’s division of three systems may not be 
appropriate for an authoritarian state considering the absence of effective moderating 
institutions.   
Despite of its drawback of ignoring the inside of the “black box,” Easton’s system 
analysis is interesting and useful for analyzing public opinion and China’s foreign 
policy for the following two reasons. 
First, due to its weakness in ignoring the inside constitution of “black box” in 
Easton’s theory, the “black box” is not accurate for democratic forms of government 
where policymaking can only occur after multiple official actors have achieved 
consensus on an action. In the federal government of the United States, for example, 
all three branches of government must concur for a federal law to be enacted and to 
remain legally binding. In an authoritarian state, however, the “black box” metaphor 
is suitable: the political system is distinguished from the “environment” because of its 
opaque decision making process, and also the role of the government as the final 
decision maker not accountable for people with free elections as their counterpart are 
in democracies.  
Easton’s model has seldom (if ever) been applied to an authoritarian form of 
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government, where neither the attainment of consensus between the government and 
the public nor the lack of any legal challenge is a condition of official policymaking. 
This research tests the Easton model in Chinese foreign policy making to determine if 
the original version of the Easton model applies equally well to an institution that is 
officially distanced from the public and involves a non-transparent “secret” policy 
making process unknown to the public. Right now, when it comes to foreign policy 
making, China does not have any established moderating institutions – defined as a 
shared power arrangement between multiple actors where they must reach consensus 
to make policy decisions (see Chapter 4for more information) – some empirical 
evidence suggests that moderating institutions make policy actions less extreme and 
more stable. Has China evolved to a situation where the state must take into 
consideration mediating institutions (before moderating institutions are established)? 
Is there a trajectory for intellectuals and public opinion leaders to become moderating 
institutions? 
Second, Easton’s conception of systems theory allows for the articulation of 
nuances in the policymaking environment. In the case of Chinese island conflicts with 
Japan, there is reason to believe that the environment for foreign policy making is 
profoundly influenced by domestic policy actors because of the strong nationalist 
feelings arising from the hundred years of humiliation described in Chapter 2. This 
research proposes that the policy making environment should be split into two 
domains – foreign and domestic policy – and modeled as a two-level game to explain 
the government narratives in a feedback loop. To what extent are policy actions aimed 
at creating a domestic policy environment that is supportive of foreign policy making? 
This version of the model also captures the interaction between the government and 
the public in foreign policy making. The “black box” does receive “demand and 
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support” from the domestic side, and foreign policy made by the government serves 
the purposes of “satisfying” the demands and securing support from the public 
towards the government. Public opinion still matters in foreign policy making in 
authoritarian states (as will be reviewed in the third part). By converting these 
demands and support into foreign policy, the government can appease the “demands,” 
which actually can lead to domestic turmoil that undermines the government’s 
legitimacy. In this sense, systems theory presents a model that can integrate Putnam’s 
two-level game (as will be reviewed below), with the foreign policy as the output, 
impacting the environment and appeasing the input from the domestic side.  
 
III. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Making 
Public opinion was famously defined by Professor V.O. Key in 1961 as “opinions 
held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed.”31 With the 
development of surveying methods and statistics after 1961, public opinion is now 
more often understood as the collective views of a particular group of population. 
Whether public opinion matters for policy making has been a question perplexing 
generations of scholars. Public mobilizations, however, reflect the public opinion on 
certain occasions.  
Research on the connection between public opinion and foreign policy making 
can be traced back to Kant. As an early democratic peace theorist, Kant posited that 
world perpetual peace can best be achieved by liberal democracies, within which 
public opinion can express freely and therefore exercise influence on foreign policy 
decisions. 
Within International Relations (IR) scholarship, traditional realists like Hans 
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Morgenthau doubted the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. As Morgenthau 
stated, “the rational requirements of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count 
on the support of a public opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than 
rational.”32 Further research on the correlation between public opinion and foreign 
policy suggests the “permissive mood” of public opinion, which according to Gabriel 
Almond, characterizes the fact that public opinion is just passively influenced by 
decisions made by elites.
33
 According to Gabriel Almond in 1960, the “mood theory” 
posits that the public’s “attention to or interest in foreign policy is generally low and 
subject to major fluctuations in times of crisis” and the public attention is “one of 
indifference,” therefore, Almond believes the public is too volatile to provide stable 
support for international commitments of the US government.
34
 In general, 
researches after the World War II on this topic indicate that public opinion has little – 
if any - influence on foreign policy making because it is passively reacting to foreign 
policies made by elites. In 1992, Holsti reviewed the historical evolution of the 
so-called “post-war consensus” on public opinion and foreign policy and offered three 
major theoretical propositions to reflect this body of scholars after World War II: 
“1. Public opinion is highly volatile and thus it provides very dubious 
foundations for a sound foreign policy.  
2. Public attitudes on foreign affairs are so lacking in structure and coherence 
that they might best be described as "non-attitudes."  
3. At the end of the day, however, public opinion has a very limited impact 
on the conduct of foreign policy.”35 
 
With the Vietnam War as a milestone in the field, previous propositions about 
passive reactions of public opinion on foreign policymaking were gradually 
overthrown. In the 1960s, with the escalation of military conflict in Southeast Asia 
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Consensus.” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 4: 439-466. 
  
61 
 
and widespread anti-war protests in the United States, the influence of public opinion 
on foreign policy was reevaluated. In addition, as James Reilly concluded, with the 
development of survey and statistical methods and the acceptance of behavioralist 
approach in social science, researchers were technically capable of evaluating the 
impact of public opinion on foreign policy.  
In 1970, William Caspary criticized Gabrial Almond’s “mood theory” of public 
opinion. Using polls and statistical methods, Caspary found that both the premise and 
the conclusion of mood theory were false. Rather, he revealed that American public 
opinion was characterized by a “strong and stable” permissive mood toward 
international involvements. By emphasizing the strength and stability of “permissive 
mood”, Caspary rejected Almond’s claim that the public pays “unstable” attention to 
foreign affairs – on the contrary, Caspary argued that public mood towards 
international affairs was stable and strong, and varied according to the changes in 
international affairs.
36
 With this argument, Caspary undermined Almond’s conclusion 
that public opinion is not able to provide stable support to foreign policy making 
because its attention is permissive and unstable.  
Also in 1970, Sidney Verba and Richard Brody found that American public 
opinion towards the Vietnam War was more stable and influential on foreign policy 
making than previously thought. The intellectual outcomes of research in the decade 
after the Vietnam War were crystallized by the argument of the “rally around the flag” 
effect. John Mueller discovered that the presidential approval rate will increase by 5-6% 
during events that 1. Are international; 2. Deal with the United States and the 
president; and 3. Are specific, dramatic and sharply focused.
37
 The increase in 
approval rating was explained by the “rally effect”, in which the change in public 
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opinion gets people to “rally around the flag” by demonstrating more support to the 
government and putting aside their political differences.
38
 According to research on 
public opinion and foreign policy after the Vietnam War, the proposition that public 
opinion was “volatile” was undermined.  
After the 1970s, more empirical research oriented towards the influence of public 
opinion on foreign policy making was conducted. For example, in presidential 
campaigns in the US, Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida revealed that the public perceives 
the different stances of candidates over foreign policy issues and their perception 
influences votes in presidential elections.
39
 Therefore, presidential candidates had 
reason to carefully draft their stances on foreign policy issues in front of the public 
who does respond to their appeals. In addition, public opinion has been proved to be 
highly correlated with international affairs. Other than Caspary’s revelation of the 
variance of public opinion towards Soviet Union’s threat, Mueller uncovered the 
positive correlation between public opposition and the curve of rising deaths during 
the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
40
 Bruce Russett and Donald Deluca in 1981 also 
revealed that American public opinion is responding to world events – “or at least to 
their perceptions of world events.”41 Later in 1983 they identified a similar pattern of 
influence international environment has over public opinion in Western Europe.
42
 
On the basis of these explorations and the knowledge that public opinion in 
Western liberal democracies are responding to international events, scholars in this era 
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came to agree that public opinion does have an impact on foreign policy making 
indeed, at least in Western liberal democracies. Therefore, the previous pessimistic 
mood in academia over public opinion’s influence on foreign policy making faded. 
Using statistical analysis, scholars identified high congruence between public opinion 
preference and foreign policy change. For instance, examining public opinion and 
policy data in the US from 1935 to 1979, Page and Shapiro found out that “public 
opinion is often a proximate cause of policy, affecting policy more than policy 
influences opinion.”43 Specifically, they revealed that policy tends to move “in the 
same direction as public opinion most often when the opinion change is large and 
when it is stable - that is, not reversed by fluctuations.”44 Hartley and Russett’s 
research on public opinion and US military spending also proves the consistent 
influence of public opinion on foreign policy.
45
 On the other hand, when making 
foreign policies, elites are usually subjected to the influence of public opinion. As 
Powlick and Katz argued in 1998, officials usually have to anticipate what the public 
preference would be. In order to reach that goal, they usually use their “political 
instinct” to gauge what the public opinion is to become, then “policymakers act within 
their own understanding of the general policy attitude of the public using such 
interpretation as a set of policy constraints.”46 By this, researchers have casted doubts 
towards previous proposition that public opinion has very limited impact on foreign 
policy.  
In the 1990s, the next wave of research on public opinion’s influence on foreign 
policy then turns to focus on how public opinion exercises its influence on foreign 
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policy, which is a topic usually far away from ordinary citizens. As Ole Holsti stated 
in his review of this field since the end of World War II to early 1990s, “we have a 
good deal more systematic evidence describing the state of or trends in, public 
opinion than on how it has affected the actual conduct of foreign affairs.”47 The most 
important question in the field, according to Holsti, was  
“To what extent, on what kinds of issues, under what circumstances, and in 
what types of political systems, if any, does it have an impact on public policy? 
If it has an influence, what are the means by which public attitudes make their 
impact felt by decision-makers?”48 
 
 In the 1990s, the scholarly focus shifted to analyze the mechanism of how public 
opinion influences foreign policy. Empirically, it was acknowledged that in 
democracies, the influence of public opinion on foreign policy is not the same as, say 
pressure groups, mostly because public opinion is more “amorphous or diffuse in 
quality.”49 The explanation of how public opinion, as an institution, influences 
foreign policy of democracies therefore features, primarily, free election and 
autonomous media. With free elections, it holds foreign policy makers accountable for 
the policies they make; and such “accountability” is closely linked with the votes they 
will win (or lose) from the public in future elections. Therefore, as James Reilly 
phrased, democratic leaders’ “fear of punishment” in future election demands them to 
avoid foreign policy choices that will go against anticipated public opinion.
50
 On the 
other hand, autonomous media, as a “filter” that can and will freely cover the policy 
for the public, also allow public opinion to be presented to elites, and thereby play a 
key role in facilitating public opinion influences on foreign policy.
51
 The norms of 
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“substantive democracy”, which includes, but is not limited to, free and fair elections 
and autonomous media, encourage politicians to consider public opinion in foreign 
policy making.  
However, in authoritarian states, where mechanisms of democracies are woefully 
missing, it can lead to speculation that leaders can make foreign policy decision 
without as many constraints from domestic side as in democracies. China does not 
have nation-wide free elections or strong enough political parties that can contest the 
ruling CPC. Likewise, an autonomous media is a relatively recent development. The 
impact of this Chinese environmental context makes for an interesting test of Easton’s 
model. 
In that context, do Chinese public opinion inputs have the expected level of 
influence on foreign policy making as in democracies?  
 
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in China: Fragmented Authoritarianism 
 
 While scholars come to a consensus that public opinion influences foreign policy 
making in liberal democracies, whether public opinion in an authoritarian state like 
China can influence foreign policy is still a topic under exploration.  
In academia, “China scholars” explore and analyze new societal variables in 
explaining Chinese foreign policy making. It must be noted that a big context for this 
discussion is that the “strong man” era was gone: Mao and Deng, who founded the 
communist regime, have passed on their power to younger generations of Jiang and 
Hu. Therefore, in Chinese foreign policy making, models dominated by strong leaders 
are giving space to models that integrate more actors including public opinion. With 
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the absence of “strong men”, the decision making process is more fragmented than 
before.  
 As reviewed in Chapter 2, foreign policy made by the Chinese government 
usually occurs in the black box and is reported as a consensus existing within the 
circles of high-ranking government officials. Since the economic opening and reform 
in 1979, China has witnessed the growth of social groups in numbers and 
development of their influence in public sphere. In addition, the commercialization of 
mass media in China is also impacting decision making on both foreign and domestic 
issues.
52
  
 Because of these changes, the Chinese political regime needs to be redefined for 
more accuracy. For example, David Lampton revealed that China’s foreign policy 
making has witnessed the so-called “corporate pluralization”, which is characterized 
by “the proliferation of organization, groups, and sometimes individuals in the 
policy-making process.”53 The term “corporate” derives from Lampton’s observation 
that many social groups in China are currently participating in political spheres in 
corporatist fashion, being “licensed” by the government.54 This trend, along with the 
deepening globalization, professionalization of decision makers and the stakeholder 
consciousness,
55
 has changed the landscape of the Chinese foreign policy making 
process.  
These trends are taking place, and China scholars have noticed these changes and 
are studying their influence on China’s foreign and domestic policy making. Andrew 
Mertha from Cornell University, for example, in his research on China’s hydropower 
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policy, asserted that China’s political liberalization has gone through the stage of 
“fragmented authoritarianism” (consensus is hard to achieve within the decision 
making circle), to a stage of “fragmented authoritarianism 2.0”, which is witnessing 
more actors in policy decisions in China, including “officials only peripherally 
connected to the policy in question, the media, non-governmental organizations, and 
individual activists.”56 With the participation of these new actors in China’s policy 
making, the situation of policy being malleable to parochial interest has been further 
pluralized.  
 This trend of more open and plural policy making process has also been 
manifested in China’s foreign policy. In 2011, Thomas Christensen from Princeton 
University addressed the issue of assertive foreign policy adopted by China recently 
(as of 2011). The empirical puzzle Christensen tried to solve was, “over the past two 
years, in a departure from the policy of reassurance it adopted in the late 1990s, China 
has managed to damage relations with most of its neighbors and with the United 
States.”57 Christensen rejected the speculation that this policy shift indicated that 
Beijing would change its grand strategy of foreign policy; rather, he argued these 
assertive policies were just responses towards China’s “domestic insecurity.” As 
Christensen argued,  
“In fact, China's counterproductive policies toward its neighbors and the 
United States are better understood as reactive and conservative rather than 
assertive and innovative. Beijing's new, more truculent posture is rooted in an 
exaggerated sense of China's rise in global power and serious domestic 
political insecurity. As a result, Chinese policymakers are hypersensitive to 
nationalist criticism at home and more rigid -- at times even arrogant -- in 
response to perceived challenges abroad.” [Emphasis mine]58 
 
In order to support his argument, Christensen highlighted the voices from 
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domestic side as the key factor that drives China’s foreign policy towards more 
assertive end these years. But where does the “domestic political insecurity” come 
from? Christensen revealed that in China, there has been new development within the 
circle of foreign policy making, within which increasing numbers of bureaucrats have 
entered into foreign policy making, and their presence allows “nationalist pundits and 
bloggers in China find allies in high places.”59In front of this changing constitution of 
foreign policy makers, the Chinese government seems to be “more nervous about 
maintaining long-term regime legitimacy and social stability than at any time since 
the period just after 1989….”60  
Therefore, Christensen gave policy advice to the United States that the best 
approach to respond to China’s recent assertive foreign policy would be “persuasion, 
but not containment.” With China’s rise as an undeniable fact, Christensen 
emphasizes the importance of understanding the domestic factors and concern of the 
government in China’s foreign policy making. According to Christensen, an assertive 
China “can pursue its own interests and, at the same time, reassure other actors.”61        
As an authoritarian state, China has also seen its media commercialized, and this 
change has facilitated public opinion to influence foreign policy. As Susan Shirk 
stated, China’s media revolution has changed the “domestic context for policy 
making.”62 Other than those societal factors mentioned by scholars above, Shirk 
highlighted the influence of more autonomous media in China. According to her, even 
though the Communist government nowadays still implements censorship upon the 
content of media, the commercialization of media has changed the context for foreign 
policy making by encouraging media to “compete for audiences, editors and 
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journalists seek to provide the most exciting news they can from home and abroad, 
pushing right up to the limits set by the censors, and sometimes beyond them.”63 
More importantly, as Shirk analyzed, autonomous media inform the public and create 
a “new, well-informed public opinion on foreign policy.”64 As a consequence, 
government officials are aware that they cannot keep people ignorant as before, and 
with more public attention given to foreign policy, government officials have to be 
attentive to public opinion on foreign policy, “given their anxieties about mass 
protest.”65 In this way, when making foreign policy, the government is driven by 
public opinion, and “foreign policy is becoming a domestic political matter just as it is 
in other political systems.”66 The consequence of the commercialization of media in 
China, therefore, is public opinion exercises more influence on Chinese foreign policy 
than before. Susan Shirk’s earlier book Fragile Superpower in 2007 offered an even 
detailed analysis of what the Chinese government is facing domestically. Even though 
the government does not face challenges from strong moderating institutions, it is 
concerned about its political survival facing the surging public opinion with media 
revolution. 
 In sum, when compared with liberal democracies, it can be concluded that an 
authoritarian China also reserves a role for public opinion to play in its foreign policy 
making. Although China does not have national free and fair elections which hold 
officials accountable for acting against public opinion, its foreign policy making has 
been more pluralistic than before. As David Lampton called the “thickening” of elites 
in foreign policy making,
67
 more actors are participating in Chinese foreign policy 
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making, other than the high-ranking leaders of Politburo. These societal forces, as 
Mertha phrased, demands Chinese foreign policy to reflect more parochial interests 
vertically, which include interests from provincial and local governments and civil 
interest groups below the national government.
68
 During the meanwhile, with the 
commercialization of media, the public is more informed and attentive to foreign 
policy issues, and public opinion therefore puts a constraint on the Chinese 
government’s foreign policy making.  
 
 These researches have uncovered and described the existence of public opinion’s 
influence on Chinese foreign policy making, none the less, an undeniable fact is the 
absence of free elections in China. Although as Susan Shirk and authors in Hao and 
Su’s book premised, the government is afraid of mass protests, let alone possible 
situations “getting-out-of-hand,”69 such a constraint may not be as imminent for 
Chinese leaders as for their counterparts in democracies. In other words, the mass 
public may escalate into turmoil or even revolution, but the chances for it to happen 
are rare – comparing with votes in democracies, the concerns for possible turmoil in 
China may not influence its foreign policy making as much as, say the incumbent 
Democrat president facing protests during an election year.  
 However, this kind of situation the Chinese government is facing makes research 
on public opinion and foreign policy in China interesting. On one hand, the 
government is facing a more attentive public, who expresses and wishes to push for 
policy change with their “demands” (to use Easton’s term); on the other hand, Chinese 
foreign policy makers do not face an imminent punishment for acting inconsistently 
with public opinion. So, to follow Easton’s term, the Chinese government does not 
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lose any “support” when it suppresses the “demands” – actually, the authoritarian 
government is theoretically able to make decisions without considering public 
opinion.  
Therefore, in light of public opinion, we can infer that the Chinese government is 
concerned with “managing” public opinion: on one hand, it cannot ignore a 
well-informed public; on the other hand, it does not want to see the form of 
expression of “public demands” to go beyond the limits and “backfire” on the 
government’s legitimacy and stability. Between these two concerns, it has to carefully 
balance – not to completely quell the public opinion, and not to let it escalate either. A 
wise way to do so is to make concessions to public opinion by answering to their 
“demands” in a way acceptable to the government.  
  
Does Public Opinion Influence the Government or the Opposite?  
Even though the existence of public opinion in China’s foreign policy making has 
been proved by scholars, the direction of the influence is still under debate. In other 
words, does the public opinion influence the government’s decision, or is the 
government’s decision strategically stirring up public opinion?  
Public mobilization is one form of political participation, and it reflects public 
opinion. As Ginger L. Elliott-Teague stated, “individual voting in elections is not the 
only possible form participation may take.”70 Citizen participation may involve 
speech, running for elected office, protesting in streets, or participation in associations. 
Although political participation usually focuses on individual’s participation in 
politics, group participation represents an important form of political participation.  
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Within the black box of domestic politics, the nature of public mobilization in 
China can be “astroturf,”71 fabricated by the government in order to harvest 
international gains. In the island disputes, the astroturf argument would indicate that 
the government and public not only cooperate in mobilization, but also share the 
similar views. More importantly, the government consented to, and supported the 
public mobilization since it will be able to serve the purpose of the government. This 
argument breaks into the discussion of top-down and bottom-up approaches in China 
studies, siding with the top-down approach. The astroturf argument would believe that 
the Chinese government strategically utilize the public mobilizations in order to 
harvest gains in negotiations with Japan. This argument has its validity: the 
government does allow some public mobilization in order to show Japan what 
pressure the government is subject to. However, the government does not necessarily 
share the similar view with the public: while the government strives to maintain 
stability in all incidents, the public wants government to be assertive against Japan. In 
the study of Chinese public mobilization and foreign policy, the astroturf argument 
can be integrated in the top-down approach, which argues that the government can 
and have been strategically utilizing the public opinion for gains in international 
arenas.  
 In China, with the absence of mature moderating institutions, the public 
participates in politics in the form of public mobilization. In his work about public 
opinion and China’s Japan policy, James Reilly from George Washington University 
introduces the concept of “waves of public mobilization” to explain why China 
sometimes takes assertive policies. Reilly tested his hypothesis using China’s Japan 
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policy and found out that when “waves of public mobilization” take place, it is more 
likely for China to adopt assertive foreign policy towards Japan.
72
 Historically, China 
adopted assertive foreign policy between 1985 and 1987, and again from 2002 to 
2005.  
 Reilly defines “waves of public mobilization” with three defining elements: 
- An increase in the strength and prevalence of nationalist public opinion, 
particularly among urban youth. 
-  An increase in political activism by non-state actors, such as petition 
campaigns and public demonstrations. 
-  A rise in sensationalist, nationalist media coverage.
73
  
 
After investigating four cases of China’s Japan policy, including the high-speed 
rail line building in China, Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 2004 Diaoyu 
Islands dispute and Japan’s pursuit of a UN security council seat, Reilly found out that 
“if public mobilization is high, then moderate policy proposals are less likely to 
emerge, are more controversial, and are less likely to be adopted as policy.”74  
 By revealing the connection between public opinion and foreign policy, Reilly 
proved the insufficiency of the “reciprocity” argument in China’s foreign policy, 
which posits that China’s foreign policy is responding to Japan’s policy. Rather, Reilly 
emphasizes the influence of public opinion on foreign policy from the domestic side, 
and in the realm of China’s Japan policy, he believes public opinion has greatly 
pushed for an assertive Japan policy through “public mobilization.”  
However, Reilly also stated that the waves of public mobilization emerge when 
the government holds a “permissive attitude”, as he stated, “a wave of public 
mobilization will only emerge when the state adopts a permissive attitude; and it will 
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end when the state reverses this permissive attitude.”75 By this statement, Reilly 
implies that in an authoritarian state like China, waves of public mobilization actually 
happen when they are tolerated by the government, “initial signals of state tolerance 
create a structural opening for a wave of popular mobilization to emerge.”76In this 
sense, Reilly implies that the government creates the “atmosphere” for assertive 
policy, and public opinion, manifested in the form of public mobilization, legitimizes 
and pushes for assertive policy to be adopted. 
Although Reilly emphasizes the impact from the public on foreign policy making 
in China, he treats the government as an entity managing and controlling public 
mobilization. As he stated, “leaders may initially tolerate, or even tacitly encourage, 
public mobilization as part of factional competition at home or to gain negotiating 
leverage abroad,” however, “permitting public protests is however a risky negotiating 
tactic, since it creates the potential for a bilateral conflict spiral.”77 Therefore, this 
creates the backdrop for Chinese political leaders to manage the crisis in a dilemma 
between mass protests and the possible escalation of the mobilization.  
 Similarly, Jessica Weiss Chen argued that “by allowing nationalist protests 
against foreign states, non-democratic leaders can use domestic politics for 
international gain.”78Chen argued that “anti-foreign protests provide an alternative 
mechanism by which domestic politics can be leveraged in international 
bargaining.”79 Chen tested her arguments on anti-Japanese and anti-American 
protests in China, finding that the government allows public protests, which may “turn 
against the government”, in order to demonstrate the government’s resolve in 
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international bargaining and show how costly it would be to make diplomatic 
concessions. 
 Peter Gries, and Susan Shirk, however, understand the Chinese public’s 
nationalism in a different approach. Instead of viewing the public’s sentiments are 
something strategically manageable by the government (“top-down”), they view the 
sentiments erupting in a bottom-up fashion.
80
 According to this view, the government 
cannot mobilize or control public sentiment that has erupted from the bottom-up, 
rather, the government acts in response to public sentiment. Susan Shirk, especially, in 
addition to mentioning the importance of leadership, emphasized on how internal 
politics of China may “derail” its peaceful rise because the current Chinese leaders 
have to act following the public sentiments. These two approaches of understanding 
Chinese public’s sentiments towards foreign countries, i.e. a top-down approach by 
Reilly and Weiss, and a bottom-up approach embraced by Shirk and Gries, compel 
researchers to study the Chinese public’s sentiment either from the government or the 
public. However, all these scholars do not negate the fact that the Chinese government 
is inculcating patriotic and nationalist education for Chinese students and in its 
propaganda. What is also undeniable is the increasing influence from the public on the 
government’s foreign policy making.  
What previous research in either top-down or bottom-up approaches did not cover, 
however, was the substance of public opinion, and preferences of different actors in 
the disputes. Specifically, how policy narratives, reflecting the opinions of different 
actors, lead to policy actions of the Chinese government, who is facing the dilemma 
of satisfying the demands from a well-informed public and government’s concern for 
mass protests. These narratives are the key to understand the interaction among 
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different actors in Chinese foreign policy making, therefore, to explain why assertive 
policy is taken. 
 
Acknowledging the validity of both sets of arguments, I strive to modify the 
Systems Theory framework to reflect the interaction of actors in Chinese foreign 
policy making, either in the directions of top-down or bottom-up. By revising 
Easton’s Systems Theory, I can integrate these two approaches and show how the 
government “manages” after the public opinion has erupted from the bottom. This 
revised model allows for future research on further integration of both the top-down 
and bottom-up approach. 
 
Turning to the Bottom-Up approach: Models of Chinese foreign policy making.  
As Wang Shaoguang from Hong Kong Chinese University categorized, there 
have been six models explaining policy agenda setting in China.
81
 As he suggested, 
the traditional top-down model is being replaced with bottom-up approach in Chinese 
policy making in general. On foreign policy issues including the Diaoyu islands 
against Japan, where the public pays a great deal of attention and demonstrates 
negative sentiments, the models also help to explain how government responds to 
pressure from the public in foreign policy making. 
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Figure 3.3 Models of the Policy Agenda Setting in China (Wang, Shaoguang 
2008) 
 
 According to Wang, the Closed Door model (I) prevailed in imperial China, when 
the policy issue came from the inner circle of decision makers and sought to exclude 
the influence from non-government actors like intellectuals or public opinion leaders. 
The mobilization model (II), according to Wang, was often adopted during the Mao 
era in China.
82
 The mobilization model, similar to the “closed door” model, is also 
initiated with the decision makers, however, it demands high degree of public 
participation. The mobilization model is adopted by decision makers to gain support 
from a public with strong sense of participation to legitimize the policy. The third 
model, “inside access” (III), however, was advocated by Wang to describe those 
scenarios when “official brain trust” advocates the policy adopted by the decision 
makers. Those “official brain trust” would include, for example, those military 
officers in the General Staff operations room or some reporters from the official 
newspaper. They were described by Wang as the “advisers” to the government: they 
are in the government, but outside of the decision making circle. Under this model, 
they advise to decision makers, and do not bother to win the support from the public. 
Also initiated by “advisers”, the fourth model “Reach-out” (IV) would require the 
policy to be publicized to common citizens. Wang stated that the reach–out model (IV) 
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is “by no means common in China.”83 However, after the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003, China's Medical System Reform Study Group, an 
“adviser” per Wang’s definition, publicized their reports on the vulnerability of 
Chinese medical system, evidenced in the SARS crisis. This report aroused great 
interest among common citizens and the mass media, whose pressure forced the 
government to adjust its policy.  
The last two models, the “outside access” (V) and “popular-pressure” (VI) are 
initiated by common citizens. However, they differ in their needs for public 
mobilization. According to Wang, the “outside access” model “refers to a situation in 
which a citizen or a group of citizens submits suggestions regarding public affairs in 
the form of a letter to central decision makers, excluding complaints or appeals about 
the interests of an individual or a small group.”84 Under this model, citizens 
commence the policy agenda; however, it requires little attention from the public in 
general, because the communication between the citizen(s) and the government will 
be sufficient to set the agenda. The last model “popular-pressure”, however, demands 
the support from the masses to influence the decision making process. This model 
requires high level of public participation to place the issue on the agenda.   
 According to Wang, after the Deng Xiaoping era, what we witness is the rise of 
the “popular-pressure” model, in which the public initiates the policy agenda setting, 
accompanied with a high level of public mobilization. The other five models, however, 
would be replaced by the “popular-pressure” model. As Wang commented, the 
closed-door model (I) was popular in imperial China, the “mobilization” model was 
mostly used in era “with great men”, like Mao and Deng era, when the government 
needed public mobilization to support the implementation policy and the public had a 
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strong sense of participation. Both of these two models are now obsolete. Moreover, 
as Wang argued, “the inside access model is a normal practice, the outside access 
model and the reach-out model occasionally observed, and the popular-pressure 
model frequently used,” what is on its rise is the “popular-pressure” model. Why? 
Wang spent the latter half of his article arguing that the stakeholder consciousness, 
associational revolution, rise of mass media and popularity of internet has brought 
Chinese politics into an era of “popular-pressure”, in which the public is playing a 
more important role than ever before.  
 I would argue the six models analyzed by Wang also apply to some foreign policy 
issues. Wang’s models were raised to explain agenda-setting in China, however, 
empirical examples in the article were mostly domestic ones. However, foreign policy 
issues that can attract public’s attention domestically are obviously different from 
those issues far away from the public’s daily life. In this sense, Wang’s model offers a 
powerful explanatory tool for those foreign policy issues like the Diaoyu Islands 
disputes, upon which the public is easily agitated and therefore their participation will 
make it a domestic issue. With the ubiquitous contemporary anti-Japanese sentiments 
in China as the background, the Diaoyu Islands dispute straddles the boundary 
between foreign and domestic policies. 
 Due to these reasons, we are in an era when Chinese intellectuals’ and public 
opinions cannot be ignored by decision makers. This trend stands in the foreign policy 
sphere as well. Throughout history, domestic movements were initiated or sparked 
with China’s frustration in foreign policy: examples will include the military loss 
towards Manchu in the early 1600s; the loss of the first China-Japan war in 1898; 
Japan annexed Shan Dong after Germany in 1919; Japan took over Hebei province in 
1935. Nowadays, the Diaoyu Islands, as another foreign policy issue, spark “domestic” 
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movements among the government, the intellectuals and the public. 
 In the bottom-up approach, the loose grip of the government on media serves to 
facilitate the influence from the public. Meanwhile, the Chinese government may also 
force the media (even the unofficial media) to not report on certain topics. For 
example, the Southern Metropolitan Daily, an official newspaper published in 
Guangzhou, was forced to not report President Obama’s interview while he was 
visiting China. In this sense, the unofficial media is more accurately to be described as 
playing as a venue, rather than an independent actor. This venue informs the public 
about political events however, it may be blocked by the government even though in 
general the government is loosening its grips on media censorship. The next part, 
however, turns to view the interaction of domestic and foreign politics after certain 
foreign policy is taken. The two-level game is to be integrated to the Systems Theory 
to illuminate China’s foreign policy making.  
 
IV. The Two-level Game and the “Black Box” 
 Observing the international negotiation at the Bonn Summit Conference in 
1978,
85
 Putnam raised the question of how the negotiations were politically 
possible.
86
 His research on the Bonn Summit revealed two things, “first, that the key 
governments at Bonn adopted policies different from those that they would have 
pursued in the absence of international negotiations, but second, that agreement was 
possible only because a powerful minority within each government actually favored 
on domestic grounds the policy being demanded internationally.”87 
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 According to Putnam, whether domestic politics and foreign politics entangle was 
not interesting, because the answer to that question is clearly, “both. Sometimes.”88 
What is interesting and important, however, is how and when does domestic politics 
entangle with foreign politics. In order to explain those deals reached by leaders at the 
Bonn Summit, Putnam believed that “neither a purely domestic nor a purely 
international analysis could account for this episode.”89 
 In order to capture the entanglement between domestic and international politics, 
Putnam raised the “two-level game” “metaphor.”90 The “two-level game” is a model 
that describes the interaction between negotiation at international stage and bargaining 
and persuasion in domestic sphere. It consists of two levels, including, “bargaining 
between the negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement” (Level I), and “separate 
discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement” 
(Level II).
91
 While the level I emphasizes international negotiations, level II focuses 
on domestic persuasion.  
 In the two-level game, Putnam introduced the concept of “ratification” to explain 
how international negotiations can reach agreement. Putnam defined “ratification” as 
a process “may entail a formal voting procedure at Level II, such as the 
constitutionally required two-thirds vote of the U.S. Senate for ratifying treaties,” but 
he used the term “generically to refer to any decision-process at Level II that is 
required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement, whether formally or 
informally.”92 By “ratification”, the government leaders obtain domestic support for 
negotiations at Level I, thus enhances the possibility of success in international 
negotiation.  
                                                             
88 Putnam (1988), pp. 427.  
89 Putnam (1988), pp. 430.  
90 As for the usage of word “metaphor”, Putnam defended on pp. 435. He said, a metaphor is not a theory, 
however, without metaphor, the ideal outcome of research would not have been possible.   
91 Putnam (1988), pp. 436. 
92 Ibid.  
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 Another concept Putnam introduced as an integral part of the two-level game was 
“win-set.” A “win-set” is defined as “for a given Level II constituency as the set of all 
possible Level I agreements that would ‘win’—that is, gain the necessary majority 
among the constituents—when simply voted up or down.”93 The concept of “win-set” 
explains the possibility of agreement at the international stage. Putnam further raised 
several conditions to explain when “win-sets” of a state can maximize, including (1) 
Level II preferences and coalitions; (2) Level II institutions and (3) Level I 
negotiators' strategies. According to Putnam, domestic coalitions and their influence 
impact the negotiator at international level, at the individual level, however, 
negotiators’ strategies also matter for the possibility of agreement at Level I. 
Specifically, the design of institutions required for “ratification” also influences the 
size of the “win-sets,” generally, “the greater the autonomy of central decision-makers 
from their Level II constituents, the larger their win-set and thus the greater the 
likelihood of achieving international agreement.”94 
 Putnam raised the framework in 1988 in an analogy of “metaphor”, and 
welcomed further exploration to enrich it. After 1988, there have been many scholars 
utilizing the “two-level game” for analysis. Peter Trumbore, for example, added 
public opinion as a domestic constraint on negotiation at Level I.
95
 According to 
Trumbore, in the two-level game, there are three factors that are of great importance, 
“(1) the preferences of the public relative to those of decision makers and other 
domestic constituents; (2) the intensity of the issue under negotiation; and (3) the 
power of the public to ratify a potential agreement.”96 With this analysis, Trumbore 
added public opinion as a constraint at Level II stage and influence the likelihood of 
                                                             
93 Putnam (1988), pp. 437.  
94 Putnam (1988), pp. 449. 
95 Trumbore, F. Peter. (1998).” Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level 
Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process.” International Studies Quarterly 42, 545–565. 
96 Trumbore (1998), pp. 548.  
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agreement at Level I. In 2007, Chien-peng Chung utilized the two-level game to 
analyze China’s island disputes, including the Diaoyu Islands, Zhenbao/ Damansky, 
and the Spratly islands.
97
 Chung used the two-level game to explain why some island 
disputes are “shelved” at preliminary talks while the others “were swiftly disposed of 
to the satisfaction of both sides, even after long years of intermittent and fruitless 
negotiations.”98 In this article, Chung highlighted the influence of “sub-state 
nationalist groups on the failure or success to negotiate or resolve a dispute 
settlement,” not only in China but also in the other countries facing territorial 
disputes.
99
  
  
 The two-level game offers a powerful framework for analyzing China’s foreign 
policy actions. The government’s actions at the international stage are constrained by 
its domestic politics, especially on territorial disputes, which can arouse strong public 
mobilization domestically. Meanwhile, the Chinese government does not face mature 
domestic moderating institutions, so it can make decisions at Level I and cite public 
mobilization as evidence without worrying about domestic punishment such as loss of 
votes in the next election. These two arguments on the relationship between 
government and the public opinion in China, raised by James Reilly and Jessica Weiss 
respectively, do not necessarily conflict. The two-level game may capture the nuances 
of interaction between government and the public over territorial disputes, while the 
government is influenced by public opinion, it also cites public opinion for its win-set 
in international negotiation.   
 In addition to fact that Chinese leaders are no longer able to ignore the opinion 
                                                             
97 Chung, Chien-peng. (2007). “Resolving China’s Islands Disputes: A Two-level Game analysis.” Journal of 
Chinese Political Science, vol. 12, no. 1.  
98 Chung (2007), pp. 50.  
99 Chung (2007), pp. 65. 
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from a well-informed and attentive public, the reason why Chinese leaders tolerate 
mass protests on foreign policy issue can also be partially explained by their concern 
of “win-sets” in the two-level game. By allowing public protests and policy narratives 
from the public, the authoritarian government is showing to its counterparts that their 
hands are actually constrained by domestic public opinion on foreign policy issues.
100
 
In 1993, in a meeting with American delegation, a Chinese Politburo committee 
member responded to American suggestion of concession on human rights issues, “I 
do not think I can report what you told me to the Chinese people via television, 
because they would say ….[I am] making China’s policy based on the American 
president, and they would overthrow me. So all I can say to the Chinese people is that 
the Sino-American relationship is very important …”101 The government’s emphasis 
of public opinion in foreign policy may explain the rising influence of public opinion 
on foreign policy from another aspect, i.e. the government’s desire to have some 
public opinion expressed to have more win-set in foreign negotiations.  
 However, both factors explain why public opinion has more influence on Chinese 
foreign policy, i.e. (1) well-informed public opinion and (2) government’s concern for 
maintaining stability at international stage in a two-level game, are evaluated against 
the government’s concern for stability. After all, the government does not want to see 
mass public over foreign policy issues to escalate and destabilize the society, in which, 
people’s protests have to be registered with the authorities before they march into the 
street. Reilly’s 2008 work has revealed the interaction between public opinion and 
China’s foreign policy making via policy mobilization, which is actually tolerated at 
the beginning by the government, but “satisfied” by the government’s adoption of the 
                                                             
100 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International 
Organization 42 (1988): 427–460.  
101 Pp. 15 in Lampton, David. “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is it Changing and 
Does It Matter?” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, ed. 
David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2001): 1-39. 
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policy demands. Again, as many China scholars implied, tolerating mass protests is 
risky for the Chinese government.   
 
Conclusion 
 The Balance of Power may account for part of the story. With China’s military 
power going up, the government has the capability to adopt assertive policies. 
However, this theory ignores the inside of the foreign policy making process, 
therefore it does not sufficiently address why China adopts assertive policy over the 
islands disputes against Japan, but not the one against Vietnam, for example. 
Therefore, this chapter turned to Easton’s Systems Theory and investigate the foreign 
policy making in China.  
Though researchers have been studying the influence of public opinion on foreign 
policy making in both democracies and authoritarian states, there remains a question 
how public opinion, which is manifested in political narratives, leads to specific types 
of foreign policy in authoritarian states. James’ Reilly’s work in 2008 was close to 
answering this question by revealing public mobilization as an indicator of assertive 
policy, however, the question remains on how public opinion influences the 
government’s decision. After all, as David Easton originally explained, policy making 
can occur in a non-transparent “black box,” however, the range of possible actions can 
be constrained by policy inputs that derive from the environment of the official policy 
actors. Likewise, the explanations used to justify policy actions are intended as signals 
to other actors within the policymaking environment. 
“Words” used to convey policy inputs and explain policy outputs are important, 
they are expressed with different purposes and often have consequences. By 
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investigating what words are used and how an issue is narrated differently by different 
speakers using voices that are distinctive and often different from the voice of the 
Chinese government, we can better understand the story behind these words. In this 
project, political narratives from official and unofficial sources over disputed islands 
indicate the interaction among the public, intellectuals and the government, and how 
they lead to different policy actions. A research on their tones, which are to be 
analyzed out of their political narratives, allows to investigate the level of public 
mobilization and to explain the policy actions of China over disputed islands. 
Research on political narratives, or “words” over foreign policy is, therefore, worth 
studying.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter presents the research method of this dissertation, and defines key 
concepts used in the following chapters. It is organized with the following parts. First 
I will present the four research questions of this project, which altogether contribute to 
an answer towards the central research question stated at the beginning of this chapter, 
i.e. the understanding of whether the Easton’s System Theory can be utilized for 
analyzing assertive foreign policy in China. Second part defines those key concepts in 
this project. The third part presents the research methodology of this project. The 
fourth part reports data collection and data analysis method. The conclusion 
summarizes this chapter and also point out possible threats of validity towards this 
research.  
 
I. Research Questions  
 This project tests the applicability of David Easton’s Systems Theory in the 
context of Chinese politics. In order to determine its applicability, I utilize narratives 
from the government, intellectuals and the public as proxies to measure their opinions 
over incidents on the Diaoyu Islands. There are four sub-questions that need to be 
addressed.  
First, is Chinese public opinion different from the state’s position? In order to find 
out the divergence between narratives of the government and the public, narratives 
will be analyzed and labeled for their central arguments. By comparing the narratives 
of government, intellectuals and the public, I will demonstrate their different positions 
over the same incident.  
Second, how does the government respond to public opinion and intellectuals’ 
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narratives (“inputs”) on foreign policy making actions (“outputs”). By answering this 
question, I demonstrate the influence of mediating institutions on China’s foreign 
policy making. None the less, it is hard – if not impossible – to establish solid 
correlation between public opinion and government’s decisions with concrete 
evidence. As will be discussed in the last part of this chapter, I acknowledge this 
difficulty, however, narratives of actors are good proxies for estimating the arguments 
of actors; with analysis considering time lag and changes in policy actions during 
incidents, I can approximate and demonstrate the influence of public opinion on 
government’s decision.  
Third, how does the state use its foreign policy actions to “answer” to the  
“inputs.” When the government adopts foreign policy actions, how well does the 
“output” “appease” the “input” as Systems Theory suggest? Is the public appeased 
immediately, or does the government have to spend extra resources on the domestic 
advocate? This question is crucial for testing the Systems Theory in the context of 
China. During the meanwhile, in Putnam’s two-level game, does the “output” of the 
government impact foreign relations as well? Whether does the government utilize 
public opinion to maximize its win-set at the international stage? As will be revealed, 
while the government cites public opinion, it also utilizes public opinion as a way to 
maintain long-term stability in bilateral relations with Japan,  
Fourth, what does the future hold – are we witnessing the emergence of 
moderating institutions in China? To echo previous work on the topic of domestic 
influence on China’s foreign policy and Wang’s categories of foreign policy making 
models, in the last chapter of my dissertation, I will discuss what will happen in the 
future and emphasize the “stakeholder consciousness” to argue that the “closed model” 
and even the “black box” will be hard for the Chinese government to maintain in the 
  
89 
 
future with a more active public in political spheres, and the development of social 
media. Foreign policy making in China may be in a process of becoming more 
sensitive to public opinion than before, which will be type 5 or type 6 in Wang’s 
categories as summarized in Chapter 3.  
By addressing these four sub-questions, I develop a revised version of Systems 
Theory, which offers a more robust tool for capturing the nuances in Chinese foreign 
policy making.  
 
II. Definition of Key Concepts 
 This part defines those key concepts utilized in analysis. These concepts are 
organized following the Systems Theory.  
 
“Institutions” and “Regimes” 
 First, “institutions” are defined as “a general pattern or categorization of activity 
or to a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized.”1 
Institutions exist at all levels: they can be, as Hedley Bull famously defined, 
“institutions of international society,” which includes international law, balance of 
power, or, an institution can refer to “varied patterns of behavior as marriage and 
religion, sovereign statehood, diplomacy, and neutrality.”2 In comparison, “regime” 
in this project is defined as the mode or system of the rule of the government. In this 
project, the word “regime” is referring to the government types (democratic or 
authoritarian governments), whereas the word “institution” is used in reference to 
                                                             
1 Koehane, Robert. (1988). “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, 
No. 4 (Dec., 1988), pp. 379-396.  
2 Koehane (1988), pp. 383.  
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formally or informally organized arrangements in politics, such as electoral 
institutions or propaganda institutions.  
 The word “regime” is defined by David Easton as “all those arrangements that 
regulate the way in which demands put into the system are settled and the way in 
which decisions are put into effect.”3 Regimes are also called the rules of game. With 
different “rules of games” in policy making, there can be two approaches of making 
policy: an up-down approach, which features the elites in government as the decision 
makers; and a bottom-up approach, in which public mobilization leads to decision 
making. What David Easton emphasized in 1957 was a mixture of these two 
approaches, in any society with “a minimum convergence of attitudes towards these 
fundamental rules – constitutional principles.”4 Easton’s Systems Theory integrates 
the two approaches of decision making by treating decision makers in a black box of 
“political system”, meanwhile, emphasizing the “input” from the public.  
 
“Environment” 
 Second, “policy environment” was treated as monolithic in David Easton’s 
Systems Theory. It was introduced to refer to institutions beyond the “political system” 
and “inputs” and “outputs.” Easton mentioned that “environment” is the backdrop for 
the entire systems theory to process at, and the “output” can impact the environment 
and therefore create more opportunities for “inputs.”  
None the less, as this dissertation argues, the political environment should also be 
understood with two levels, domestic and foreign. With the “outputs” from political 
systems, foreign and domestic environments are both impacted; however, the impacts 
                                                             
3 Easton (1957),pp. 392.  
4 Easton (1957), pp392.  
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on foreign and domestic environments may be different.   
 
“Policy Actors” 
 Third, “policy actors” include the “political system” in systems theory, the public 
and any other actors who can influence decision making process. In this project, 
however, policy actors include three major institutions. The first one is the 
government, in the black box of “political system.” Second, the “mediating 
institutions.” Examined by Berger and Neuhaus in 1977, mediating institutions in 
public policy feature “a way to empower citizens to play a greater role in public 
policy and, subsequently, make them feel less alienated from government.”5 
Mediating institutions can function as a bridge between the government and the 
common citizens. Families, neighborhoods, churches, and volunteer associations, and 
arguably corporations, are all examples of mediating institutions in public policy. The 
third form of “policy actors” includes what I call “moderating institutions.” They are 
those institutions that promote compromise and power-sharing among political parties, 
“these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs.”6 Such a form 
of institution, however, is not established in contemporary China. With the CPC 
dominating the decision making system, the moderating institutions in China are yet 
to be developed.  
 This dissertation therefore focuses upon the interaction between the government 
and the mediating institutions in China. Absence of moderating institutions is one 
                                                             
5 DeHart-Davis, Leisha, Randall Guensler. (2005). “Employers as Mediating Institutions for Public Policy: 
The Case of Commute Options Programs.” Policy Science Journal. 33-4: 675-697. See also, Berger, Peter L., and 
Richard J. Neuhaus. (1977). To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy. Washington, 
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.  
6 Merrill, Samuel III, James Adams. (2006). “The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do 
“moderating” institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?” Public Choice (2007) 
131:413–434.  
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reason why Easton’s Systems Theory needs to be modified in order to be applied in 
the context of China. Without “moderating institutions,” the “black box” of political 
system is able to make decisions directly answering to the demands from the “input”.  
 Mediating institutions in this project are designed to include two major actors, the 
intellectuals and public opinion leaders (POLs). Intellectuals include college 
professors, scholars and members of think tanks affiliated with the Chinese 
government. Their opinions exercise influence over the government’s policy making 
process by providing evidence and analyzing the possible impact of policy outputs on 
the foreign and domestic environment. Specifically, on the Diaoyu Islands dispute, 
intellectuals’ opinions are important to both the government and the public. Their 
findings support (or reject) the government’s claims of sovereignty, and educate the 
public about this dispute. Their existence links the government and the public with 
their intellectual contributions.  
 POLs, however, include those activists (DDM) and opinion leaders, including 
bloggers, retired PLA generals and influential commentators. After all, the dispute of 
the Diaoyu Islands in East China Sea is fairly far away from the public’s daily life. 
Therefore, even though the public may have judgment and sentiment after incidents 
break out, it is the POLs who voice their sentiments first, and then they sometimes 
mobilize the public to hold protest and gatherings. In this project, those activists 
include members of DDM groups, who spend their time and money on 
“demonstrating sovereignty” over the islands. POLs also include those who organize 
protests in major cities. They include some college students and well-known authors 
who comment on the dispute. In this dissertation, I utilize POLs as a proxy to estimate 
the public opinion on the dispute, and when public mobilizations happen, they are 
seen as a direct manifestation of public opinion.  
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 Free media will qualify as a “mediating institution” as well. However, they are 
participating in the policy making process more as a “venue” instead of an “actor.” 
They help the government to voice its opinions to the public and the environment 
(foreign government, for instance), also they help to inform the government about 
public sentiments. In China, we are seeing an increasing influence of the media with 
loose censorship from the government. In this project, media is utilized as a venue for 
transferring the opinions of the public, the intellectuals and the government.  
 
“Policy Inputs” 
 Fourth, “policy inputs” were designed to include “support” and “demand” by 
Easton in his Systems Theory model. These two elements of policy inputs are 
followed in this project. However, in this project, it should be noted how these inputs 
are measured. An empirical obstacle in this project is that media are supervised by the 
government, and the government may force the media not to report certain news. 
Henceforth, in order to measure “policy inputs”, I have to turn to “unofficial” sources, 
which include those media with background or ownership from private owners or 
overseas (as defined below). I examined the protests and propaganda of the activists 
to offer estimation of public opinion. I also utilized the Google Trend and Baidu Index 
(similar to Google Trend, but on data from the biggest Chinese search engine 
Baidu.com)
7
 to investigate public’s and media’s interest over the dispute. Such a 
comparison offers perspectives for understanding what kinds of issues over the 
disputed islands “irk” the Chinese public. Please see the data collection section for 
more details about collecting data.  
                                                             
7 Google retreated from mainland China in 2010, therefore, its access by Chinese internet users was severely 
hampered.  
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“Policy Outputs” and “Policy Preferences” 
 Fifth, “policy outputs” are the products of the political system in Systems Theory. 
They are the outcome of inputs after being processed in the political system. 
Meanwhile, they also impact the environment and create opportunities for more inputs. 
Therefore the system theory will keep functioning permanently.  
 In this project, the policy outputs are the actions the Chinese government takes 
over the Diaoyu Islands against Japan. These policy actions may include, for example, 
protests, sanction or military actions. In this project, these actions are arranged 
according to the level of assertiveness by the Chinese government (0 means the 
lowest level of assertiveness, 5 is the highest), including,  
 0. Status quo: Maintaining status quo, no (re)action. 
1. Low-level protest: Protests primarily by MFA spokespersons; does not involve 
high-ranking leaders (minister of the government or above)  
 
2. High-level protest: Protests and negotiation by government leaders; no further 
actions. 
 
3. “Countermeasures”: In addition to protests, the government undertakes 
actions to “countermeasure” foreign governments, which may include 
suspension of dialogue, and/or cancellation of government contact. 
Regularized patrols, will be considered as an action between “countermeasures” 
and the higher level.  
 
4. Trade sanctions. In addition to “countermeasures,” the government undertakes 
punitive actions in forms of tariff and strict control on import/exports.  
 
5.  Military Intervention. As the highest possible action, the government deploys  
military means to initiate conflict over the disputed islands.  
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Figure 4.1 Hierarchies of Possible Actions of the Chinese Government /policy 
preferences of actors over the Diaoyu Islands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates these five possible actions taken by the government. When 
reacting over the dispute, the Chinese government usually starts from the lowest 
assertiveness option and then escalates into higher ones. 
Meanwhile, Figure 4.1 also demonstrates “policy preferences” of different actors. 
The five types of possible government “policy outputs” are also advocated by policy 
actors before the policy is made. For instance, while the public may advocate 
“military action” as their policy preference, eventually the government may end up 
adopting “countermeasures” as the “policy output”. In this sense, figure 4.1 serves 
dual purposes of presenting possible “policy output” and also options for “policy 
preference.”  
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“Demands” 
 Sixth, included in David Easton’s Systems Theory, the “demands” of “input” 
actually can have different arguments before the “policy outputs” are determined. 
Table 4.1 summarizes all those possible “labels” for arguments indicated in narratives.  
 Specifically, arguments by all actors in China over the Diaoyu Islands can be 
summarized as follows: 
Table 4.1 Labels of Arguments  
Labels                    Notes 
“Sovereign 
argument” 
 
 
       
 
It emphasizes Chinese sovereignty over the disputed 
islands. It can be made based on two aspects 
 
Historical-base
d 
 
emphasis on China’s historical 
occupation, supported by historical 
documents/archives 
 
Legal-based 
 
emphasis on the legal evidence for 
China’s  sovereignty, citing 
international law (law of territory, and 
the law of the sea) 
“Economic 
Argument” 
Emphasis on the economic gains and losses over the 
Diaoyu Islands.  
“Political 
Argument” 
It is not relevant in China since there is only one party in 
the government. However, a “political argument” is made 
when the government emphasizes on the challenge from 
domestic public mobilization. 
It shall be noted, however, some claim that a 
moderating actor (of the people/intellectuals) is emerging, 
my results understate the degree to which foreign policy 
decisions are top-down. But I do suggest that the 
narratives of the mediating actors are influencing the 
government to respond to domestic voices in foreign 
policy.  
“Patriotic 
Argument” 
Emphasis on the national prides and feelings of the 
Chinese people. 
 
 With these labels, the following chapters will compare the three incidents over 
the Diaoyu Islands in 1996, 2004 and 2010, and explain the variation of the 
government’s action in these three incidents, considering the influence from the 
intellectuals and the public. With such an analysis, we can demonstrate the 
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applicability of Easton’s Systems Theory in Chinese foreign policy making.  
 
“Feedback”  
In Easton’s Systems Theory, the policy outputs offer feedback to policy input. 
The feedback answers to the policy input. In the context of China, the feedback loop 
is broken down into three loops.  
The first loop is appeasing. Appeasing indicates that the government uses “policy 
outputs” to satisfy the demands from the policy input box. As will be revealed below, 
with regard to the disputed islands, the government employs assertive policy to satisfy 
the public. Even though the POLs call for the most assertive policy, the government’s 
assertive stances will decrease the likelihood that they criticize the government. With 
an appeasement policy, the government usually adopts a more assertive foreign policy 
to accommodate the public’s call. 
The second form of feedback is quelling. While “to appease” indicates that the 
government employs policy actions to satisfy the advocate of the public, “to quell” 
means the government actively confronts the public’s advocates. By adopting 
“quelling” feedback, the government employs methods to force the public to reduce 
or stop their mobilization. As will be further discussed in Chapter 7, the government 
can either directly quell the input before taking any actions over the disputed islands, 
or to quell the public’s demands after taking some foreign actions.  
The third form of feedback is what I call “institutional memory.” This is the kind 
of feedback that goes across multiple incidents. After an incident happens, how actors 
(the government, intellectuals or the public) have acted and how the foreign country 
challenged the sovereignty will be memorized by all actors participating in the 
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incident. Therefore, in the next incident, the actors will act according to their memory 
of previous incident(s). The “institutional memory” links multiple incidents over the 
disputed islands and educates actors how to pursue their policy preferences. Such 
memory also facilitates the growth of mediating institutions in multiple interactions 
with the government.  
III. Methodology: Narrative Analysis 
 This section presents the methodology of this dissertation. In order to measure the 
opinions of government, intellectuals and the public, and analyze their interaction at 
incidents of the Diaoyu Islands, I employ the narrative analysis as the method to 
estimate their opinions on the same incidents.  
 
On Narrative Analysis 
As Emery Roe stated at the very beginning of her 1989 article, “ narrative policy 
analysis provides a way of analyzing those highly uncertain and complex policy 
issues whose truth-value cannot be ascertained and about which the only thing 
practicing policy analysts know are the stories policymakers use in articulating these 
issues.”8 By undertaking analysis on different narratives over the same policy issue, 
we can better understand the influence of different actors on policy making and 
interpret policy actions as responses to collective environmental inputs. Likewise, 
policy actions can be interpreted to be “feedback” to other actors to signal possible 
avenues of resolving differences in preferred policy actions by creating a shared story 
that is mutually acceptable. As Roe stated, “by focusing on the differential risk 
                                                             
8 Roe, Emery. (1989) “Narrative Analysis for Policy Analysts: A case study for the 1980-1982 medfly controversy 
in California.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 8, No. 2,251-273. 
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perceptions reflected in the stories, narrative policy analysis identifies an important 
area in which conventional policy analysis could have contributed to the 
controversy’s resolution [emphasis mine].”9 
 Narrative analysis focuses on the comparisons of sets of narratives from different 
participants and identifies their perceptions. In Roe’s case studies of medfly 
controversy in California between 1980 and 1982, she identified the “Areal Story” vs. 
the “Ground Story,” which were two policy preferences for methods advocated to 
terminate the medfly crisis. Between these two sets of “narratives”, the areal one was 
advocated by the bureaucracies, whereas the ground one was advocated as a criticism 
towards the “areal story.” In this sense, as Roe stated, these two sets of story were in 
an “asymmetrical opposition.”10 By revealing the asymmetrical positions of these two 
stories, Roe explained why the “Areal story” was eventually employed. She then, 
however, delved into a discussion of how such an asymmetrical position of two sets 
of narratives emerged. Drawing variables from political power [of speakers] and 
interest groups involved, Roe asserted that the two sets of narratives were 
asymmetrical at the very beginning.  
 Why should we care about narratives? As Roberto Franzosi from Trinity College 
of Oxford stated, the answer is simple, because “narrative texts are packed with 
sociological information, and a great deal of our empirical evidence is in narrative 
form.”11 As Franzosi argued, it is the “story”, defined as “the chronological 
succession of events”, that provides the basic building blocks for narratives.12 Thus, it 
is crucial to analyze the story and the context of the story.  
 As a form of speeches, narratives have meanings and consequences. As Wayne A. 
                                                             
9 Roe (1989), pp.251.  
10 Pp. 255 in Roe (1989).  
11 Franzosi, Roberto. (1998). “Narrative analysis - or why (and how) sociologists Should be interested in 
Narrative.” Annu. Rev. Sociol. 24:517-54 
12 Franzosi (1998), pp. 520.  
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Davis stated at the beginning of his book, Meaning, Expression, and Thought, “one of 
the most venerable doctrines in the history of philosophy, linguistics and psychology 
is the thesis that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts 
and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression.”13 This doctrine is termed by 
Davis as an “expression theory of meaning.”14  
Simply put, the expression theory of meaning explores the thoughts behind 
expressions. By studying what and how an actor expresses, scholars can understand 
the meanings and thoughts behind the expression. The philosophical roots for this 
theory can be traced back to Aristotle, who stated that “spoken words are the symbols 
of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words.”15 
However, modern research on speech acts began with John Austin.
16
 In his series of 
lectures, John Austin analyzed the usage of language in detail. Realizing that no 
specific attention has been paid to this topic, Austin tried to decipher the meaning of 
the sentences. According to Austin, sentences either describe, or report (“constative” 
statements)
17
. In addition, there are some sentences that are done by being said, “to 
say something is to do something” (“I bet”, and “I do” at weddings, for instance).18 
These kinds of utterances are named by Austin “performative sentences.”19 This 
distinction offers a philosophical basis for securitization theory, especially since Ole 
Waever makes a very similar statement as Austin did: “the word ‘security’ is the 
act…by saying it something is done.”20 Inspired by Austin, in the discipline of 
philosophy of language, statements, in both oral and written forms, are “distinguished 
                                                             
13 See pp. 1 in Davis, Wayne (2003). Meaning, Expression , and Thought. Cambridge University Press.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Aristotle. De Interpretatione, trans. J.I.Baere. (1941). In the Basic works of Aristotle, edited by Richard 
McKeon, pp. 607-617. New York: Random House. 
16 As Balzacq (2011) stated in his introduction of speech acts, “it is widely recognized that the commitment of 
securitization theory to speech act is inspired by Austin and Searle”.  
17 Pp. 3 Austin, John. (1955). How to do things with words. The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard 
University.  
18 Pp. 12.  
19 PP. 6.  
20 Waever (1995), pp 55.  
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by their possession of semantic content or meaning.”21 The use of languages and the 
meaning of languages have been the theme in the philosophy of language, including 
phenomenological and semantic analysis.  
Analysis of a speech act actually involves multiple “acts”. According to Colin and 
Guldman, “it would be more accurate to speak of different aspects of one and the 
same act; most of these ‘acts’ cannot be performed separately but, given their nature, 
are performed as concomitants to some other types of speech act.”22 This statement 
actually indicates that the goal for speech acts analysis is to explore different aspects 
of the speech. As discussed, Colin and Guldman’s statement actually echoes the 
sociological understanding of securitization theory, which aims at exploring the 
socio-cultural context of the process.
23
  
What is explained by conducting speech act analysis? When analyzing the 
sentences in his lectures, Austin also mentioned the different “acts” in a single 
sentence. Generally speaking, speech act analysis serves the goal of exploring 
answers for questions from three aspects. 
First, what is the message the speech maker is sending? By “articulating 
particular sounds capable of phonetic descriptions,”24 the speech makers send 
messages containing semantic roles. When analyzing speech acts, the first thing we 
can tell is whether this speech is an utterance or a question. We may also know what 
items are being identified in the speech act and what tones are used. 
Second, studying the speech acts reflects the character of the speech makers. As 
Colin and Guldman stated, our everyday conversation “is more implied than is 
                                                             
21 Collin, Finn and Finn Guldmann. (2005). Meaning, Use and Truth: Introducing the philosophy of language. 
Ashgate Publishing Company.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Balzacq (2011), pp. 19-28.  
24 Colin and Guldman (2005), pp. 178.  
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actually said.”25 Therefore, analysts can read between the lines when analyzing a 
speech act to find out who said this, and why they said so in given context.   
The third question that an analysis of speech acts addresses is explicitly phrased 
by Colin and Guldman as, “what did the speaker hope to achieve by saying what he 
did.”26 By analyzing the speech acts, we can reveal the “intentions” and backgrounds 
behind the speeches. For instance, if we ask someone “When are you going to finish 
your homework?” After considering what the statement is about, and between whom 
the conversation takes place, we may find out the intentions of the speaker: has the 
listener postponed the homework for too long? Or is the speaker reminding the 
listener to do his/her homework so the speaker can have some private time/and space? 
By studying the speech acts, we can construct the story behind the speeches.   
These three questions echo what Austin called locutionary, illocutionary and 
prelocutionary dimensions of speech acts.
27
 While the locutionary speech acts 
decipher the meaning of speech acts in a given community, the illocutionary 
dimension of speech acts addresses the specific activity conducted at the speech acts 
(forces of the speaker), and the prelocutionary dimension of speech acts indicates the 
specific effects the speaker is trying to achieve upon the audience.
28
  
 
 As vehicles of meanings and indicators of socio-cultural background, narratives 
are important for understanding actors’ stances on policy issues. In the Diaoyu Islands 
disputes, for example, the government’s narratives usually emphasize historical 
evidence (e.g. China has had the disputed islands for hundreds of years) or legal 
                                                             
25 Supra note 20, pp. 179.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Austin (1962), How to do things with words: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University 1955, 
Oxford: Claredon Press. Searle, John R. (1969). Speech acts: an essay in the philosophy of language. 
Cambridge University Press.  
28 See Mueller (2004), pp. 397. And Searle (1969), Collin and Culdman (2005), pp. 177-180. See also Der Derian , 
James. “Review to Rules, Norms, and Decision: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
InternationaRl elationsa nd Domestic Affairs” by Kratochwil, Friedric (1989). The Journal of Politics, Vol. 53, 
No. 1 (Feb., 1991), pp. 288-289 
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support from international law (e.g. China has undeniable sovereignty over the 
disputed islands according to law), whereas the public usually yells anti-Japanese 
slogans (e.g. boycott Japanese products, or occupy the Diaoyu Islands by military 
means) at incidents. Therefore, towards the same incident, influenced at the same 
external impetus, different actors have different arguments in their narratives.  
 Just like seeing a shape of triangle, different people have different interpretations 
of what the triangle symbolizes. The government, the intellectuals and the public have 
different interpretations of the dispute and use different narratives. To explore the 
socio-cultural and political implications behind these narratives in China will be an 
interesting topic to pursue, exploring the causes of different policy actions in China’s 
foreign policy.  
 What this project will analyze is the interaction of these narratives. By presenting 
and synthesizing the narratives from different actors, I display them in a time line. 
With close analysis of when and how these narratives are expressed in or after 
incidents, I show how narratives from the public and the intellectuals influence the 
government’s decisions, and also how government uses narratives from the other two 
actors for domestic control and international negotiations.  
 
Data Collection 
 Narrative analysis is interested in the story told by actors. Such an interest 
dictates the central role played by speakers and their speeches. However, it is crucial 
to distinguish where the speeches acts come from and on what occasions they are 
expressed. In order words, other than “who said” and “what was said”, “when” and 
“where” are other important elements for narrative analysis. Actually for this project, 
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“where” narratives are made is the most important element during data collection. 
Typical narrative analysis relies on the speech acts of participants on policy issues, of 
governments’ speech acts and/or the narratives from interest groups, NGOs.  
In this project, the ultimate criteria for selecting data sources when collecting data 
is to make sure the narrative is made by the speaker intentionally and carefully, 
therefore the narratives will reflect the position and stance of this actor. For example, 
when collecting government’s narratives over the disputed Diaoyu Islands, it is 
crucial to ensure the data is “official”, therefore, the ideal sources of data will point at 
those “official” media and government reports. These sources are directly issued and 
controlled by the government; therefore they offer credible and reliable information 
on where the government stands on this issue.  
An obstacle of collecting political narratives in 1996 was the lack of electronic 
data available. MFA spokespersons’ speeches are collected on the People’s Daily’s 
website only since 2002 – anything before that year was not archived online. 
Therefore, I collected the data by browsing reports on this dispute. These reports over 
the 1996 dispute mentioned the speeches of MFA and the Chinese government, so I 
collect the government’s words from these texts. 
On public opinion, however, it offers a more abstract body of data than the 
government side for researchers. In order to capture the opinions of the public, I 
identify POLs as a proxy for measuring public opinion. In order to capture the 
narratives of POLs, I collect their narratives in interviews, protests and on websites to 
estimate their positions on the dispute. After all, the goal for collecting data is to make 
sure that these narratives reflect the arguments of the actor.  
 
In this dissertation, possible venues for gathering the government’s narratives 
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over the Diaoyu islands include the following:  
Official Media (Newspapers, TV channel and Magazines). The Chinese 
government and Communist Party of China have several official media, including the 
People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), Xinhua Daily (Xinhua Ribao), and Guangming Daily 
(Guangming Ribao), Qiushi magazine, and China Central Television (CCTV). They 
are all issued or controlled by the Chinese government (or the Communist Party). 
They are considered as the “tongues” of the Chinese government.  
Government Statements. The Chinese government occasionally issue official 
statements on policy issues. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an 
official statement after the release of Mr. Zhan Qixiong in 2010 incident. This 
statement reflects the official stance of the Chinese government.  
Laws, rules and ordinances. The Chinese government’s laws and ordinances 
about the disputed islands are considered as direct expression of the Chinese 
government’s stance over the dispute. For instance, the Law of the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone (1992) was passed by the Chinese government, including the 
disputed Diaoyu Islands as part of China’s territory. This will be considered official 
narratives.  
MFA Press Conference. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs maintains regular press conference, making official statements of the Chinese 
government on various topics. The statements made by MFA spokesperson are 
considered as official, reflecting the opinion of Chinese government.  
Speeches of leaders. When the Chinese government leaders make speeches over a 
specific topic, the speeches are considered as official. For instance, Premier Wen 
Jiabao spoke about the Diaoyu islands dispute after Mr. Zhan was arrested. His 
speeches reflect official narratives (actually from the central decision makers).  
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These venues of official narratives may not be available in every incident. The 
presence of some actually indicates the severity of incident and level of Chinese 
government’s response, for example, leaders made speeches in 2010, but not 1996 or 
2004. The presence of leaders’ speech actually indicates the high level of response 
towards the dispute in 2010.  
 
With respect to intellectuals, there are also several possible venues for gathering 
their narratives on the disputed islands, including, 
“Core Journals”. Chinese academia is featured with a system called “core 
journals” (he xin qi kan), which is a list including academic journals with high rates of 
reference. These are those articles with the biggest influence in Chinese academia. 
Articles published in “core journals” are included as credible narratives of the 
intellectuals. I use the database CNKI to search for articles published on “core 
journals.” CNKI offers an option for filtering out those journals beyond the list.  
CNKI (China National Knowledge Infrastructure) is accessible through the 
Bizzell Library of the University of Oklahoma. As the world’s largest research content 
database in Chinese, CNKI offers several search databases, providing dissertation, 
master’s thesis, newspapers, magazines and government reports from China. Hosted 
by East View Information Service in the US, CNKI offers millions of articles 
published in Chinese each year. CNKI offers bilingual interfaces.  
Books. Similar to “core journals”, academic books are considered as credible 
source for collecting narratives from intellectuals.  
Conferences and Symposium. Intellectuals may also hold conferences and 
symposium over the disputed islands. These are also credible sources for collecting 
their narratives over specific policy issues.   
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Lectures and Classroom discussion. College professors, an important group of 
Chinese intellectuals, also make narratives demonstrating their positions and 
viewpoints of specific policy issues in classes. However, how to obtain their lectures 
notes and have their confirmation on using them in research are two obstacles.  
Textbooks. Textbooks offer another source of credible narratives. However, 
Chinese textbooks are also authorized by the Chinese governments (national or 
provincial), thus, textbook demonstrates the opinion of the government more than that 
of intellectuals. However, intellectuals’ efforts to add certain topics to the textbook 
will be a demonstration of the intellectuals’ opinions.  
 
The biggest challenge comes from gathering narratives from the public. Mostly, 
public opinion is so fragmented and amorphous that it is difficult to measure. 
Therefore, I use POLs as the proxy for estimating public opinion over the islands 
dispute. Venues for collecting their narratives include,  
Websites. POLs, for instance, those DDM activists, maintain their websites for 
propaganda purposes. Their websites often post their own statements. These 
statements are good sources of narratives.  
Interviews. Interviews of these POLs, if available, are good sources for 
understanding their logic and their own interpretation of the meaning of their actions.  
Unofficial media. In contrary to official media, unofficial media are those not 
under the control of the Chinese government’s influence. These “unofficial media” 
may include those newspapers or television channels with overseas backgrounds, or 
unofficial backgrounds. For example, the Phoenix TV based in Hong Kong has 
newspaper, magazines and TV channels in mainland China. Also, the Nandu Weekly, 
for instance, is another example unofficial media, which has made reports in efforts to 
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break the rein of government censorship. Protests are not reported on Chinese official 
media; however, those unofficial media dare to freely report public protests in 
mainland China. Thus, these unofficial media offers ideal source for understanding 
Chinese public opinion. 
 Slogans in protests. With access to unofficial media, I include public’s slogans in 
the dataset. The posters they hold during protests, the advocates they made during 
protests both offer narratives of POLs on the islands disputes.  
 Social media. Actually, social media will be a great source for analyzing the 
public’s responses on the dispute. However, it should be noted that Facebook, Twitter, 
Youtube are banned in mainland China, Chinese internet users have no direct access 
to these websites. Google also retreated from mainland China in 2010. Chinese social 
media include Renren.com and Microblog, plus numerous Bulletin Board Systems 
(BBS). It will be interesting to gather those data and comments on these sources what 
the public posted, which will be a good topic for future research on Chinese public 
opinion. On these three actors, narratives theoretically can be sourced from these 
venues, as summarized in Figure 4.2.  
Table 4.2 Sources of Data Collected (Those venues not used are in bold) 
 
POSSIBLE VENUES 
VENUES 
USED? 
Government 
1. Official Media (Newspapers, TV channel 
and Magazines). 
Yes 
2. Government Statements. Yes 
3. Laws, rules and ordinances No 
4. MFA Press Conference Yes 
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5. Speeches of leaders. Yes 
Intellectuals 
1. “Core Journals” Yes 
2. Books Yes 
3. Conferences and Symposium. No 
4. Lectures and Classroom discussion. No 
5. Textbooks No 
POLs (as 
proxy for 
public) 
1. Websites Yes 
2. Interviews. Yes 
3. Unofficial media Yes 
4. Slogans in protests Yes 
5. Social media No 
  
As noted above in figure 4.2, several “possible” venues are excluded in this 
project.  
 First, laws, rules and ordinances are not used in this project because China has 
not issued any legislation over the Diaoyu Islands since 1996. However, it should be 
noted that regularized patrols by Chinese fishing bureaucracies are mentioned in this 
projects, but they are not included in the dataset for narrative analysis.  
 Second, for the intellectuals, conferences and symposiums are not used in this 
project, because there is not sufficient data available on conferences or symposium by 
intellectuals. Their findings on the disputed islands, however, have been published on 
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core journals. Therefore, it will be redundant to go to conference or symposiums. 
 Third, lectures and classroom discussions are not available for this research.  
 Fourth, textbooks are excluded in this project because textbooks for compulsory 
education (1
st
 in primary to junior high) are also approved by the government. 
Therefore, the opinion of intellectuals in textbooks has been “trimmed” by the 
government.  
 Fifth, social media for public opinion has also been abandoned due to lack of 
availability. However, as noted in Chapter 8, it will be an interesting source for future 
research.  
 
Narrative Analysis in Chinese Language 
 After the criteria for data collection are established, I collect data for analysis. I 
employed java software called Yoshikoder in the analysis.
29
 Yoshikoder offers a 
strong tool for analyzing Chinese text. Developed by the Identity Project at Harvard's 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Yoshikoder offers a powerful 
multilingual analysis tool for creating dictionaries and counting the frequencies of 
texts input.
30
 Yoshikoder has also been proved to be a powerful tool for analyzing a 
large amount of Chinese texts.
31
 
 However, despite of its multilingual interface for analysis, Yoshikoder does not 
break texts in Chinese. Mandarin Chinese is a language without space (word break) 
                                                             
29
 For more information, see http://www.yoshikoder.org. And also Laver, Michael and John Garry. (2000). 
“Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts”. American Journal of Political Science. 44(3): pp. 619-634. 
This software has been utilized in content analysis in multilingual contexts. Recently, Yoshikoder has been used 
by scholars to analyze content in Chinese media and government reports. See Carlson, Allen, Mary Gallagher, 
Kenneth Lieberthal and Melanie Manion. (2010). Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and 
Filed Strategies. Cambridge University Press. 
30 For more information, see http://www.yoshikoder.org. And also Laver, Michael and John Garry. (2000). 
“Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts”. American Journal of Political Science. 44(3): pp. 619-634.  
31 See Sullivan, Jonathan and William Lowe. (2010). “Chen Shui-Bian : On independence”. The China Quarterly. 
610-639. Also Chen, Yuwen. (2011). “Quantitative Content Analysis of Chinese Texts?: A Methodological 
Note.” Journal of Chinese Political Science. 16:431-443.  
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between phrases. Unlike English, a Chinese sentence has no space other than 
punctuations between words.
32
 Therefore, Yoshikoder’s analysis of Chinese text is 
often “non-native”, for example, it will consider two characters together as a word, 
even though there is no such usage of these two characters in modern Chinese 
language.  
Therefore, the most important aspect of using the software to count word 
frequency in Chinese is word break. Yoshikoder assumes that the words in the text 
have been separated with space. This can be done, however, on a website called 
Hyland (http://www.hylanda.com/product/fenci/tiyan/.) After checking for several 
times, this website separates Chinese phrases satisfactorily.  
After “breaking” Chinese texts into understandable phrases, Yoshikoder is able to 
recognize the Chinese text the same as well as English text (with word breaks). In this 
way, Yoshikoder becomes powerful in analyzing Chinese language.  
In order to illustrate the frequency of words used in texts, there is useful software 
and websites that allow generating word clouds. I used Tagxedo to generate word 
clouds in this dissertation, appreciating its outstanding capability in recognizing 
Chinese language to present visual illustration of the “tones” of those texts.  
Here is an example of my analysis using Hyder, Yoshikoder and Tagxedo for 
narrative analysis. I choose the speech of Hilary Clinton on the South China Sea, with 
both Chinese and English texts.  
In addition to showing how these methods are used in narrative analysis, I also 
plan to show the readers how I clear out the “noisy” narratives during analysis. For 
                                                             
32 For instance, two sentences expressing the same meaning:  
       English: I am studying in the library.  
       Chinese: 我正在图书馆学习。  
   Even though the words in Chinese sentence is exactly corresponding to those in English sentence, however, 
instead of the space between each two words in English sentence, the Chinese language does not have space 
between words. This trait of the Chinese language makes it difficult for computer to recognize exactly what words 
are used without spaces between. 
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example, in the Diaoyu Islands, the frequent mentioning of the word “Diaoyu Islands” 
is not surprising. Similarly, those prepositions in Chinese like “of” “at”, or words like 
“and” are also discarded since the purpose of this analysis is to find out the central 
theme and tone of these texts. 
 
An Example of Analysis: Hilary Clinton’s Speech on the South China Sea 
 In order to exemplify my approach and method for analysis, I use the official 
press statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on July 22, 2011 over the South 
China Sea as a sample for analysis. They are both collected from official websites. 
For the sake of comparison, I divide the page into two columns, with Chinese on the 
right, and English on the left.
33
  
 
STEP 1. Data Collection 
Figure 4.2 TEXTS Sample  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
Office of the Spokesperson 
July 22, 2011 
2011/1230 
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY CLINTON 
The South China Sea 
 
We commend this week’s announcement that 
ASEAN and China have agreed on implementing 
guidelines to facilitate confidence building measures 
and joint projects in the South China Sea.  This is an 
important first step toward achieving a Code of 
Conduct and reflects the progress that can be made 
through dialogue and multilateral diplomacy.  We 
look forward to further progress. 
The United States is encouraged by this recent 
agreement because as a Pacific nation and resident 
power we have a national interest in freedom of 
navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime domain, 
美国国务院 
发言人办公室 
2011 年 7 月 22 日 
2011/1230 
国务卿克林顿发表声明 
关于南中国海 
 
美国赞赏东盟（ASEAN）和中国本星期宣布就执行有
关指导方针达成一致意见，以促进建立信心的措施和
在南中国海的联合项目。这是朝着达成行为准则的方
向迈出的重要的第一步，反映了通过对话和多边外交
能取得的进展。我们期待取得进一步进展。 
 
 
最近这项协议令美国感到鼓舞，因为作为一个太平洋
国家和常驻大国，在南中国海的航行自由、自由进入
亚洲海域、维护和平与稳定及尊重国际法涉及我们的
                                                             
33 The text can be retrieved from Department of State website at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168989.htm. For Chinese version can be retrieved from Bureau of 
International Information Programs, under the Department of State, offering multilingual version of US 
government 
statements(http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/chinese/texttrans/2011/07/20110724091009x0.2711712.html#axzz1w
fZ8KyKB).  
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the maintenance of peace and stability, and respect 
for international law in the South China Sea.  
We oppose the threat or use of force by any 
claimant in the South China Sea to advance its 
claims or interfere with legitimate economic 
activity.  We share these interests not only with 
ASEAN members and ASEAN Regional Forum 
participants, but with other maritime nations and the 
broader international community. 
The United States supports a collaborative 
diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the 
various disputes in the South China Sea.  We also 
support the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.  But we 
do not take a position on the competing territorial 
claims over land features in the South China 
Sea.  We believe all parties should pursue their 
territorial claims and accompanying rights to 
maritime space in accordance with international law, 
including as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention.  
The United States is concerned that recent 
incidents in the South China Sea threaten the peace 
and stability on which the remarkable progress of the 
Asia-Pacific region has been built.  These incidents 
endanger the safety of life at sea, escalate tensions, 
undermine freedom of navigation, and pose risks to 
lawful unimpeded commerce and economic 
development.  
In keeping with the 2002 ASEAN-China 
Declaration, each of the parties should comply with 
their commitments to respect freedom of navigation 
and over-flight in the South China Sea in accordance 
with international law, to resolve their disputes 
through peaceful means, without resorting to the 
threat or use of force.  They should exercise 
self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would 
complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and 
stability including, among others, refraining from 
taking action to inhabit presently uninhabited islands, 
reefs, shoals, cays, and other features, and to handle 
their differences in a constructive manner.  
The United States encourages all parties to accelerate 
efforts to reach a full Code of Conduct in the South 
China Sea.  
We also call on all parties to clarify their claims 
in the South China Sea in terms consistent with 
customary international law, including as reflected in 
the Law of the Sea Convention.  Consistent with 
international law, claims to maritime space in the 
South China Sea should be derived solely from 
国家利益。 
 
 
我们反对在南中国海提出索求的任何一方为实现其索
求以武力相威胁或使用武力，或干扰正当的经济活动。
我们不仅与东盟成员和东盟地区论坛参与方，而且与
其他海洋国家和更广泛的国际社会共同拥有这些利
益。 
 
 
美国支持提出索求的所有各方为解决在南中国海的各
种争端采取相互合作的外交程序。我们还支持 2002 年
东盟-中国的“南海各方行为宣言”。但对于涉及南中
国海地貌特征的互有争议的各种领土争端，我们采取
不偏向任何一方的立场。我们认为所有各方都应根据
国际法，包括 1982 年海洋法公约体现的内容，寻求各
自对领土的索求及附带海域空间的权利。 
 
 
 
 
最近在南中国海发生的事件危及作为亚太地区取得显
著进展之基础的和平与稳定，美国为此表示关注。这
些事件危及海上生命安全，加剧紧张局势，破坏航行
自由，并对合法、不受阻碍的通商活动和经济发展构
成威胁。 
 
 
 
根据 2002 年东盟-中国发布的宣言，有关各方都应遵守
各自作出的各项承诺，根据国际法尊重南中国海的航
行自由和飞越上空的自由，通过和平方式解决争端，
不以武力相威胁或使用武力。对于进行可导致争端复
杂化或升级并影响和平与稳定的活动，各方应自我克
制，其中包括不采取行动占居目前无人居住的岛屿、
礁石、浅滩、沙洲和其他特征的地物，并以建设性的
方式处理相互间的分歧。 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
美国鼓励各方加速努力，达成全面的南中国海行为准
则。 
我们还呼吁各方根据习惯国际法，包括海洋公约法体
现的内容，阐明各自在南中国海的索求。根据国际法，
对南中国海海域空间提出的索求应完全派生于按地貌
特征提出的正当索求。 
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legitimate claims to land features.  
 
 
 
STEP 2. “Break” Chinese Texts. 
 By using Hylanda, the Chinese text receives a“break” between every two words. 
The outcomes are as follows. 
“美国 赞赏 东盟  和 中国 本 星期 宣布 就 执行 有关 指导 方针 达成 一致 意见 ， 
以 促进 建立 信心 的 措施 和 在 南中国海 的 联合 项目 。 这 是 朝着 达成 行为 准
则的 方向 迈出 的 重要 的 第一步 ， 反映 了 通过 对话 和 多边 外交 能 取得 的 进
展 。 我们 期待 取得 进一步 进展 。  
 最近 这项 协议 令 美国 感到 鼓舞 ， 因为 作为 一个 太平洋 国家 和 常驻 大国 ， 
在 南中国海 的 航行 自由 、 自由 进入 亚洲 海域 、 维护 和平 与 稳定 及 尊重 国
际法 涉及 我们 的 国家 利益 。  
 我们 反对 在 南中国海 提出 索求 的 任何 一方 为 实现 其 索求 以 武力 相 威胁 
或 使用 武力 ， 或 干扰 正当 的 经济 活动 。 我们 不仅 与 东盟 成员 和 东盟 地区 
论坛  参与 方 ， 而且 与 其他 海洋 国家 和 更 广泛 的 国际 社会 共同 拥有 这些 
利益 。  
 美国 支持 提出 索求 的 所有 各方 为 解决 在 南中国海 的 各种 争端 采取 相互 合
作 的 外交 程序 。 我们 还 支持 2002 年 东盟 - 中国 的 “ 南海 各方 行为 宣言 ” 。 
但 对于 涉及 南中国海 地貌 特征 的 互 有 争议 的 各种 领土 争端 ， 我们 采取 不 
偏向 任何 一方 的 立场 。 我们 认为 所有 各方 都 应 根据 国际法 ， 包括 1982年 海
洋法 公约 体现 的 内容 ， 寻求 各自 对 领土 的 索求 及 附带 海域 空间 的 权利 。  
 最近 在 南中国海 发生 的 事件 危及 作为 亚太地区 取得 显著 进展 之 基础 的 和
平 与 稳定 ， 美国 为此 表示 关注 。 这些 事件 危及 海上 生命 安全 ， 加剧 紧张 局
势 ， 破坏 航行 自由 ， 并 对 合法 、 不 受 阻碍 的 通商 活动 和 经济发展 构成 威
胁 。  
 根据 2002 年 东盟 - 中国 发布 的 宣言 ， 有关 各方 都 应 遵守 各自 作出 的 各项 
承诺 ， 根据 国际法 尊重 南中国海 的 航行 自由 和 飞越 上空 的 自由 ， 通过 和平 
方式 解决 争端 ， 不 以 武力 相 威胁 或 使用 武力 。 对于 进行 可 导致 争端 复杂
化 或 升级 并 影响 和平 与 稳定 的 活动 ， 各方 应 自我 克制 ， 其中 包括 不 采
取 行动 占居 目前 无 人 居住 的 岛屿 、 礁石 、 浅滩 、 沙洲 和 其他 特征 的 地
物 ， 并 以 建设性 的 方式 处理 相互 间 的 分歧 。  
 美国 鼓励 各方 加速 努力 ， 达成 全面的 南中国海 行为 准则 。  
 我们 还 呼吁 各方 根据 习惯 国际法 ， 包括 海洋 公约法 体现 的 内容 ， 阐明 各
自 在 南中国海 的 索求 。 根据 国际法 ， 对 南中国海 海域 空间 提出 的 索求 应 完
全 派生 于 按 地貌 特征 提出 的 正当 索求 。” 
 
 It should be noted that these space between words are not used in Chinese 
language. The purpose for breaking these words is solely for the convenience of 
analysis with software.  
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STEP 3 – A. Analyze the Text 
 By putting them in Tagxedo, the outcomes are as follows before clearing out any 
redundant words.  
 
Figure 4.3 English Word Cloud (Sample)  
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Figure 4.4 Chinese Word Cloud for Clinton’s Statement (Sample)  
 
 
Putting them in Yoshikoder, the word frequency analysis yields the following 
result (The left column, “English”, is added manually).  
Table 4.3 Yoshikoder Analysis of Word Frequency in Chinese (Sample) 
(Excerpted words that appeared three times)  
 
English Word Count Proportion 
“of” 的 36 0.087  
“South China 
Sea” 南中国海 10 
0.024  
“and” 和 9 0.022  
“We/us” 我们 8 0.019  
“all parties” 各方 7 0.017  
“demands”  索求 7 0.017  
“at” 在 6 0.015  
“and/with” 与 5 0.012  
“ASEAN” 东盟 5 0.012  
“International 
Law” 国际法 5 
0.012  
“according to “ 根据 5 0.012  
“freedom” 自由 5 0.012  
“no/not” 不 4 0.010  
“dispute” 争端 4 0.010  
“based on” 以 4 0.010  
“peace” 和平 4 0.010  
“should” 应 4 0.010  
“or” 或 4 0.010  
“raise/advocate” 提出 4 0.010  
“military power” 武力 4 0.010  
“the United 
States” 美国 4 
0.010  
  Total:144 Total: 0.349 
 Note: Proportions do not add up to 1. Proportions are rounded to 3 decimals. 
South 
China Sea 
Demand 
And  
We/us 
Int’l law 
All parties 
of 
ASEAN 
At 
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STEP 3 – B. Clear-out the “noisy” words.  
 As the Word Cloud and Yoshikoder frequency box showed, there are several 
words that are meaningless for us to understand what this text is about. For instance, 
the word “of” ranked the most frequently used word (36 times), however, it does not 
help the readers to understand the text. Similar, “and/with”, “at” “and” “according to” 
are all those words disposable for understanding this text. Also, the word “we/us” are 
removed because this text demonstrates the concern of the United States, therefore it 
is not unexpected to use first-person. Therefore, these words are cleared out from the 
Yoshikoder box. Meanwhile, Tagxedo allows removal of words and the regeneration 
of a new word cloud. Thus, we have a cleaned version of figure 4.6 and 4.7. 
 
Figure 4.4 (1) Chinese Word Cloud for Clinton’s Statement– Cleaned 
 
  
Similarly, Yoshikoder box is removed for those “noisy” words, which do not have 
meaning for analyzing the tone of this text.  
Table 4.3 (1) Yoshikoder Analysis of Word Frequency in Chinese (Sample) 
(Excerpted words that appeared three times) - Cleaned  
 
English Word Count Proportion 
“South China Sea” 南中国海 10 0.0242  
“all parties” 各方 7 0.0169  
“demands” 索求 7 0.0169  
South 
China 
Sea 
Demand 
Int’l law 
All parties 
ASEAN 
Freedom Peace 
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“ASEAN” 东盟 5 0.0121  
“International law” 国际法 5 0.0121  
“Freedom” 自由 5 0.0121  
“Dispute” 争端 4 0.0097  
“Peace” 和平 4 0.0097  
“Raise/advocate” 提出 4 0.0097  
“Military power” 武力 4 0.0097  
“the United States” 美国 4 0.0097  
 Note: Proportions do not add up to 1. Proportions are rounded to four decimals. 
As the clean version of the Yoshikoder table and word cloud indicate, there are 
several terms highlighted by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: international law, 
ASEAN, international law and freedom. Now what we need to do is to choose the 
phrase(s) relevant with the research and read the word in context to find out what the 
“story” is behind the words.  
 
STEP 4. Analysis of the Words.  
 Take the phrase “international law” for example, we can find out the five places 
where Clinton mentioned “international law.” At this stage, it becomes crucial to 
translate the sentences back to English to analyze what the speaker is talking about.  
 
Table 4.4  “International Law.” - Example 
 Chinese Context for “int’l law”  English Translation 
1.  …维护 和平 与 稳定 及 尊重 国际法 
涉及 我们 的 国家 利益 
It is to our national interest to 
maintain regional peace and stability 
and respect international law… 
2. 我们 认为 所有 各方 都 应 根据 国际
法 
We believe all relevant parties shall 
comply with international law… 
3.  根据 国际法 尊重 南中国海 的 航行 
自由 和 飞越 上空 的 自由… 
each of the parties should comply with 
their commitments to respect freedom 
of navigation and over-flight in the 
South China Sea in accordance with 
international law… 
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4.  我们 还 呼吁 各方 根据 习惯 国际
法…阐明 各自 在 南中国海 的 索求 
We also call on all parties to clarify 
their claims in the South China Sea in 
terms consistent with customary 
international law… 
5.  根据 国际法 ， 对 南中国海 海域 空间 
提出 的 索求 应 完全 派生 于 按 地
貌 特征 提出 的 正当 索求 
Consistent with international law, 
claims to maritime space in the South 
China Sea should be derived solely 
from legitimate claims to land 
features. 
  
If a researcher is interested in the position of the United States on the South China 
Sea from a legal perspective, these five sentences can offer good evidence for 
investigating what relevant international law are in the South China Sea, what 
relevant with international law has been said before by the US government, and what 
are those arguments by, say, the Chinese government or the Philippine government, 
over international law in this dispute, etc. - depending on which direction the 
researcher is to follow.  
 None the less, from the clean version in Table 4.3(1), readers can tell from those 
high-frequency words that the United States was calling “all parties” to comply with 
international law, and the US wanted to maintain peace in this region. What is the US 
concerned about? The “freedom” of navigation and over-fly in the South China Sea. 
So who is threatening the freedom of navigation and over-fly of the US in this region? 
Starting from the table of high-frequency words, this research can go far.  
 At last, this finding from the Chinese text can be compared with the original 
English version by Hilary Clinton. Since the speech was made originally in English, 
comparing with the English text will help to make sure there are no words lost in 
translation (figure 4.3). If the original texts are in Chinese (which is the case in this 
project), such a comparison is not possible.  
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IV. Threats of Validity  
 As mentioned before, this project measures the stance of the government, 
intellectuals and the public in three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands. Following the 
method and approaches, are their stances measured correctly?  
 Validity is defined as “the adequacy of descriptive and causal inference.”1 
Specifically, it includes internal validity, external validity and measurement validity. 
This section focuses on threats towards internal and measurement validity. The 
external validity, which is also called generalizability, is to be evaluated in Chapter 8.  
 Measurement validity concerns the “scope to which the scores produced by a 
given measurement procedure meaningfully reflect the concept being measured,” and 
internal validity is defined as “the degree to which descriptive or causal inferences 
from a given set of cases are correct for those cases.”2 
 While this research may not be subject to severe threats in measurement validity, 
there are several serious threats to internal validity that need to be considered.  
 First, the Chinese government as a unitary actor in policy process is a threat. In 
other words, the opaque decision making process and the absence of debate of 
decision makers in China make the measurement of the Chinese government’s stance 
“homogenous”, therefore, the researchers can only estimate the government’s stances 
from multiple sources. The impact of public opinion on the government’s decision 
making is “estimated” instead of confirmed.  
 Second, as part two of this chapter stated, labeling actions of the government 
according to perceived severity of the government’s action is biased, and they are not 
uncontestable. In this sense, these labels may also suffer from threats to “reliability” – 
another researcher may label them differently.  
                                                             
1 Brady, Henry and David Collier. (2004). Rethinking Social Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
2 Brady and Collier (2004), pp. 292 & 295.  
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 Third, when analyzing the convergence of these narratives and making 
conclusions on how public opinion influences the government’s actions, there remains 
“grey zones” which prevent researchers from drawing affirmative conclusions on the 
influence. These “grey zones”, caused by the opaque decision making process and 
absence of effective moderating institutions in authoritarian state, cloud the 
interaction between the public and the government.  
 Internal validity, in comparison to external validity, is concerned about the 
strength of the causal mechanism. Unfortunately, the impact of public opinion on the 
government’s policy making has been a topic hard to make affirmative assertions, 
especially in an authoritarian country like China. However, even though the 
approaches and measurements in this project suffer from these threats, they still offer 
a solid “proxy” for understanding public opinion, intellectuals’ opinion and the 
government stance on the same issue. A comparison of them in three incidents allow 
us to advance our understanding of Chinese foreign policy making, and an analysis 
across time (1996 to 2010) enable readers to understand the changes in Chinese 
foreign policy making in the past two decades.  
 
Conclusion 
 In the entire dissertation, Chapter 4 is designed to offer tools and define concepts 
for further analysis of cases. After presenting relevant background information and 
reviewing pertinent literature with topic for this project, Chapter 4 introduces the 
method of narrative analysis. By analyzing narratives of the government, intellectuals 
and the public over the same incidents, I compare their different arguments and 
analyze how they converge. This chapter also defines those key concepts in this 
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project. By offering a typology of Chinese foreign policy actions over disputed 
islands, I rank the possible actions of the Chinese government according to the 
government’s assertiveness. In order to exemplify the method used in this project, I 
chose the speech of Hilary Clinton to demonstrate the approach of analysis in 
subsequent chapters.  
The following four chapters are organized to conduct analysis on narratives in 
these three incidents. Chapter 5 analyzes the government’s actions in the three 
incidents. Chapter 6 investigates the narratives of all three actors. Chapter 7 analyzes 
the findings in chapter 5 and 6. And finally, Chapter 8 concludes the entire 
dissertation. 
At this stage, it should be highlighted that the purpose for analyzing narratives is 
to test the applicability of David Easton’s Systems Theory in the context of Chinese 
foreign policy making, with the Diaoyu Islands as an example. Easton’s theory does 
not specify narratives, but narratives are important. They indicate the opinion of 
actors, and when they are made and heard demonstrates the influence of actors. By 
analyzing narratives, we can better understand the interaction between “input” and the 
“political system”, and also the “output” and “environment.”  
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CHAPTER 5 DIAOYU ISLANDS – GOVERNMENT POLICY ACTIONS 
I. On the Diaoyu Islands 
 
The Diaoyu Islands consist of several uninhabited islands, covering an area of 7 
square kilometers (1,700 acres) in total. However, as “islands”, they symbolize an 
area called the “Exclusive Economic Zone” (EEZ) as big as 200 nautical miles in 
diameter centering the island, where rich reserve of oil and natural gas was discovered 
in 1970s.
1
 These islands locate in the middle way of Taiwan, mainland China and 
Japanese Ryukyu Island (Okinawa). With about 120 nautical miles to Taiwan, 230 
nautical miles to Okinawa, and 330 nautical miles to Mainland China, the Diaoyu 
Islands occupy an important location. Because of the rich oil reserve and crucial 
geographical location, the Diaoyu Islands have been claimed by all three parties 
(Taiwan, Mainland China, and Japan) for economic and security concerns. Currently, 
the Diaoyu Islands are de facto administered by Okinawa, Japan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 See Diaz, Leticia; Barry Hart Dubner and Jason Parent. (2007) “When is a Rock an Island – Another Unilateral 
Declaration Defies Norms of International Law”. Michigan State Journal of Int'l Law.: 519-555. 
Mainland China 
Taiwan 
Okinawa 
Ishigaki  
island 
Figure 5.1. Location of the Diaoyu Islands 
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Table 5.1 Distances from Diaoyu Islands 
Note: 1 Miles = 1. 609 KM 
 
 
The Diaoyu Islands dispute is of great importance to China-Japanese relations, 
and it is likely that this dispute might escalate into regional conflict considering 
frequent confrontations on these islands. At the transition of Chinese leadership in 
2012, this dispute is a window for determining where Chinese foreign policy towards 
Japan and other neighbors will lead. A historical analysis reveals the root for current 
dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. The history of the Diaoyu islands dispute overlaps 
with the hundred years of humiliation as presented in Chapter 2. This overlap between 
these tiny islands and Chinese history perhaps partially explains why this dispute 
attracts so much attention from the China’s point of view. 
An important event in the history of the Diaoyu Islands dispute happened in 1895, 
when the Chinese government (Qing - Manchu) and Japan ended the Jiawu 
China-Japan war with the Shimonoseki Treaty. According to this treaty, the Chinese 
government (Qing) ceded to Japan the island of Taiwan and “all islands pertaining or 
belonging to it”; such an ambiguous language in traditional Chinese has been one 
explanation for the current dispute
2
: a key issue is whether the phrase “islands 
pertaining or belonging to Taiwan” was meant to include the Diaoyu Islands.  
                                                             
2 Denk, Erdem.(2005) “Interpreting a Geographical Expression in a Nineteenth Century Cession Treaty and the 
Senkaku Island”. The international journal of Marine and Coastal law 20-1.: 97-117. 
From Diaoyu to  Distances 
Mainland China 180 Nautical Miles (NM) / 330 Kilometers (KM)/ 205 Miles  
Taiwan (ROC) 90 NM               / 170 KM           / 105.6 Miles 
Isigaki Islands  
(Nearest Japanese island)  
90 NM               / 170 KM           / 105.6 Miles 
Okinawa  225 NM              / 410 KM           / 254.8 Miles 
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According to the Chinese government (including the Taiwanese government), 
Taiwan, along with pertaining and belonging islands, inclusive of the Diaoyu Islands, 
were ceded to Japan in 1895. With the end of the World War II, all ceded territory was 
returned to China and placed under Chinese jurisdiction under the provision of 1943 
Cairo Declaration, 1945 Potsdam Proclamation and 1952 the Treaty of Peace with 
Japan.
3
 
However, in 1972, the United States returned Ryukyu Islands to Japan, which had 
been under US trusteeship since the end of World War II. The Diaoyu Islands were 
also included to be “returned” to under Japanese jurisdiction the same year, which 
evoked protests of Chinese communities in the United States.
4
 In the same year, 
Japan established formal diplomatic relation with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), and derecognized the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taiwan. From 
then on, the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands has been between two states, Japan and 
China (inclusive of Taiwan).  
Despite of the special relations between the PRC and ROC government in Taiwan, 
the claim of the ROC over the Diaoyu Islands has been supported by the PRC 
government by saying that “the Diaoyu Islands are inherent territory of China, and 
they belong to the Taiwan Province of China.”5 Considering the de jure sovereignty 
of PRC over Taiwan, the dispute could be seen as bilateral between China and Japan. 
Three Eras in the History of the Dispute 
With the signing of the Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895, and the abolishment of this 
                                                             
3 Pan, Zhongqi. (2007).“Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: 
The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective”. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 12-1. Pp. 
71-92.  
 See also the speech of current Taiwanese leader Ma Ying-jeou in 2005 when he was the mayor of Taipei, 
available at http://youtu.be/sMO3s0IU3wU.  
4 Pan( 2007).  
5 Su Wei, Steven. “The Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update”. Ocean Development & 
International Law, 36 (2005): 45-61. 
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treaty after the end of World War II (1945, when Taiwan was returned to China) as 
two milestones, the history of the dispute can be divided into three phases. The first 
phase is before 1895. The Shimonoseki Treaty, in which ambiguous words were used 
in ceding Taiwan and pertaining islands to Japan, started the second phase, from 
1895 to 1945. The third phase is after World War II, when the Shimonoseki Treaty was 
abolished in 1945. China believes that the Diaoyu Islands were ceded to Japan in 
1895, and were under the Japanese control from 1895 to 1945; and these islands 
should have been returned to China in 1945 along with those territories ceded in 
1895.
6
 
On the other hand, Japan interprets the history quite differently, claiming that the 
Diaoyu Islands were not part of the territory ceded to Japan in 1895.
7
 Rather, these 
islands had been terra nullius before 1885, when Japanese first landed on these 
islands and claimed them as Japanese territory. Japan justifies its sovereignty by citing 
international law over terra nullius, claiming that Diaoyu Islands had not been part of 
the islands ceded to Japan in 1895. Henceforth, its sovereignty is protected by 
international law and should not be contested by other states.
8
 On the contrary, by 
quoting historical documents showing the discovery of the Diaoyu Island much earlier, 
China firmly holds the belief that the Diaoyu Islands had been ruled by China before 
1895 because of historical possession and international law recognition of effective 
control.  
 
 
 
                                                             
6 See the discussion of the Diaoyu Islands Dispute on The People’s Net, at 
http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/191606/202393/.  
7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands”, available 
at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html.  
8 Ibid.  
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Table 5.2: Three Eras and Key Events in the History of the Diayou Island 
Dispute 
 Years Events 
 
ERA I 
 
 
 
 
1895 
- Jiawu War between China (Manchu Government) and 
Japan. China lost. 
- Shimoniseki Treaty was signed. Taiwan, and “all islands 
pertaining or belonging to it” were ceded to Japan.   
 
 
ERA II 
1912 The Republic of China (ROC) was founded.  
1920 The Chinese government wrote a letter to Japanese 
government, and thanked them for helping Chinese 
fishermen near “Japanese Diaoyu Islands.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ERA 
III  
1945 - Japan surrendered. World War II ended.  
- Taiwan was returned to China.  
- Okinawa (including Diaoyu Islands) was under the 
trusteeship, controlled by the US.  
1949  - The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded.  
- ROC moved to Taiwan.  
1952 - ROC signed the Treaty of Peace with Japan.  
- Shimonoseki Treaty (1895) was abolished.  
1970  Large reserve of oil was discovered near Diaoyu Islands.  
1972 - China (PRC) normalized relationship with Japan.  
- Both sides agreed to “set aside” the Diaoyu Islands 
dispute.  
- Defense Diaoyu Movement (DDM) emerged among 
overseas Chinese.  
 
 
 Regarding the Diaoyu Islands, China (including Taiwan) and Japan have different 
interpretations of history as summarized above. China believes that the Diaoyu 
Islands were included as part of “all islands pertaining or belonging to Taiwan” in the 
Shimonoseki Treaty (1895), which were returned to China in 1945. Therefore, China 
has been reiterating its sovereignty “since ancient times” on many occasions. Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has stated clearly via several spokespersons that 
the Diaoyu Islands had been Chinese territory before 1895, and Japan occupied them 
after they conquered Taiwan.  
 Japan however, does not agree. As their Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, they 
believe the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands in Japanese) were terra nullius before the 
Shimonoseki Treaty, and Japan discovered them and exercised effective control, 
1895 
1945 
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“these islands were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores Islands which 
were ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty of China in accordance with Article II of 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki which came into effect in May of 1895.”9  
 The claim of sovereignty by China and Japan is illustrated in Figure 5.2 below. 
 Figure 5.2 - Decision Tree for Determining the Diaoyu Islands’ Sovereignty 
 
As the decision tree above illustrates, if the islands were ceded in 1895, then they 
should have been returned in 1945, or they have always been Chinese territory since 
they were first discovered; if they were not, whoever had the sovereignty before 1895 
has the islands now.  
 From the Chinese perspective, these islands were either ceded to Japan in 1895, 
or never ceded but occupied by Japan with force around 1895. Such an interpretation 
of history sets the tones for Chinese political narratives once bilateral clashes happen 
over these islands.   
 However, it shall be noted that the graph above is a purely legal argument about 
sovereignty in history. Even legal disputes seem to offer a suggestion on whom the 
disputed islands belong to, the dispute still arises frequently nowadays. In order to 
                                                             
9 “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands”, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html.  
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understand the dispute and understand China’s foreign policy actions, therefore, it is 
necessary to adopt narrative analysis as the approach.  
 
II. Crises and Policy Actions of the Chinese government 
Regarding the Diaoyu Islands, there have been three crises in the past 20 years. 
They happened in 1996, 2004 and 2010 respectively. In1996, the Chinese government 
was most passive, in 2004, the Chinese government was more assertive than in 1996 
and demanded Japan to release arrested Chinese activists. In 2010, China adopted the 
most assertive policy so far. The following paragraphs will elaborate China’s actions 
in these three incidents.  
1996: Japan demonstrated effective control, China reacts with low-level Protests 
An important background before the 1996 incident was the crisis over the 
Taiwan Strait in March 1996. When Taiwan had its first democratic election, China 
held military tests over the Taiwan Strait to deter the Taiwanese leader from pursuing 
an independent path. Then Chinese president Jiang Zemin commanded massive 
missile test over Taiwan, pushing the Northeast Asia onto the verge of war. The crisis 
ended without a clear winner. Elected Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui did not explicitly 
advocate his independence proposition until 1999. Another important thread of fact 
was the signing of Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security in Tokyo.
10
 In the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis, the Chinese leader demonstrated utter assertiveness: military actions. 
However, in the Diaoyu Islands dispute several months later, such assertiveness was 
not present. 
In 1996, the crisis began with the Japanese Youth League (JYL) erecting beacons 
                                                             
10 “Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance in the 21st century.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html. 
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on the Diaoyu Islands. On July 14, 1996, a right-leaning group, the JYL landed on the 
Diaoyu Islands and erected a placard of a Japanese flag, to demonstrate Japanese 
sovereignty over the disputed islands. After their actions, on July 18, the Chinese 
government stated that it was deeply concerned with the situation over the Diaoyu 
Islands and such actions severely violated Chinese sovereignty. However, Japan 
responded with a more assertive stance over the Diaoyu Islands.  
 On July 20, the Japanese government announced the 200 NMs of water centering 
on the Diaoyu Islands as Japanese Exclusive Economic Zones. Later on the 28th, 
following this announcement, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned the 
Taiwanese government not to allow Taiwanese fishermen to enter the territorial sea of 
EEZ of the Japanese Diaoyu Islands.  
 On August 4, then Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto demanded the 
Japanese Coast Guard to defend the Diaoyu Islands. Two weeks later, on August 18 
three Japanese individuals landed on the Diaoyu Islands from Okinawa, erecting a 
wooden Japanese flag.  
 On August 28, Japanese foreign minister, Yukihiko Ikeda, visited Hong Kong. He 
stated explicitly that the Diaoyu Islands are Japanese territory. Moreover, he refused 
to answer the request of Hong Kong labor unions for compensating World War II 
victims. On the same day, Hong Kong’s Federation of Trade Unions organized mass 
protest for the Diaoyu islands, protesting against the blatant statements made by the 
Japanese foreign minister over the disputed islands. 
 On August 29, the Japanese Coast Guard, which had been demanded by the Prime 
Minister to guard the Diaoyu Islands, blocked and searched a Taiwanese fishing boat. 
During the meanwhile, mass protests in Hong Kong against the statements of the 
Japanese foreign minister continued, and the sentiment spread to mainland China. The 
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Chinese government took actions. Chinese MFA spokesperson, Mr. Sheng Guofang 
criticized the statements of Japanese foreign minister in Hong Kong, and claimed that 
the actions taken by Japanese rightist groups and individuals were “directly correlated” 
with Japanese official stance on this issue. In other words, on behalf of the Chinese 
government, Mr. Sheng pointed out that it was the Japanese official stance on the 
Diaoyu Islands dispute that encouraged Japan’s groups and individuals to land on the 
islands and demonstrate sovereignty.  
 On August 30, the Chinese official newspaper, the People’s Daily published an 
article titled as “Do not do stupid things, Japan!” In this article, the author 
summarized the agreement made by Deng and the Japanese government in 1972 and 
1978 about setting aside the dispute, and warned affirmatively that Japan should not 
anger Chinese on the Diaoyu Islands disputes, “not a single Chinese will give up even 
just an inch of territory.”11     
 On September 1, students from the Fudan University in Shanghai published “the 
letter to all students”, criticizing the government’s soft position towards Japan, and 
called for a gathering on September 18.  
 Meanwhile, a political activist named Tong Zeng wrote a letter to President Jiang 
Zemin, calling for more assertive actions against Japan. He requested President Jiang 
send troops to the Diaoyu Islands and destroy Japanese beacons. Mr. Tong Zeng was 
an attorney in practice, and he was famous for his strong position against Japan, 
including advocating the return of Chinese relics in Japan and compensations for 
Chinese victims during World War II. Weeks after sending his letter to President Jiang, 
Mr. Tong Zeng established the first Defend Diaoyu Movement Organization in 
mainland China, the China Federation of Defending Diaoyu (CFDD). Mr. Tong still 
                                                             
11 “Do not do stupid things, Japan!” People’s Daily 1996-8-30.  
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remains active in 2012. His often-quoted dream of “flying a kite on the Diaoyu 
Islands” makes him the icon of Chinese DDM activists. 
 However, Japan was not deterred by mass protests in China and Hong Kong. On 
September 5, Japanese Consul in General in Hong Kong stated that Hong Kong 
residents would need a Japanese visa to visit Diaoyu Islands. On September 9, 
Japanese Youth League landed on the Diaoyu Islands again and erected a new beacon.  
 In September, Hong Kong and mainland China DDM escalated. DDM activists 
rented a boat and sailed to Diaoyu Islands, in an attempt to land on the Diaoyu Islands 
to demonstrate Chinese sovereignty over the islands. With waves of landing on 
Diaoyu Islands movements, the Chinese government on September 20 warned Japan 
that it should stop blocking the Chinese DDM boat, because “any casualty of Chinese 
protestors (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) will lead to mass anti-Japanese protests 
in China.”12  
 Obviously Japan did not agree with China. On September 26, Hong Kong DDM 
activist Mr. Chen Yu-xiang and other DDM activists jumped into water 200 feet from 
the Diaoyu Islands when their boat was blocked by the Japanese Coast Guard. They 
planned to swim to the islands to demonstrate Chinese sovereignty, unfortunately, Mr. 
Chen drowned. On the 29
th
, more than 50,000 people gathered in Hong Kong, 
commemorating Mr. Chen.  
 On October 1, Japanese Prime Minister stated that there was no dispute over the 
Diaoyu Islands for Japan, meaning, Japan has indisputable sovereignty over the 
islands. 
 These key events in the 1996 incidents are summarized below in Table 5.3.  
 
                                                             
12 MFA Statement on 1996-9-20.  
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Table 5.3 Chronological Summary of 1996 Diaoyu Islands Crisis (Chinese 
Actions in Bold) 
 
Dates Events 
7-14 Japanese Youth League (JYL) erected beacons on the disputed islands to 
demonstrate Japanese sovereignty. 
7-18 In MFA statement, China is “deeply concerned about Japan’s actions over 
disputed islands,” claiming that is a violation of Chinese territorial 
sovereignty. 
7-20 Japan announced 200NM water of Diaoyu Islands as Japanese EEZ,  
7-28 Japan warned Taiwan not to allow fishermen enter the territorial water of Diaoyu. 
8-4 Japanese Prime Minster commanded Japanese Coast Guard to guard Diaoyu.   
8-18 Three Japanese from Okinawa landed on Diaoyu and erected a wooden Japanese 
flag. 
8-28 
 
1. Japanese foreign minister visited HK, stating that Diaoyu is part of Japan.  
2. After the visit of Japanese foreign minister and his statement on sovereignty, 
HK Federation of Trade Unions waged a mass protest against Japanese occupation 
of Diaoyu.  
 8-29 1. A Taiwan fishing boat was blocked and searched by Japanese Coast Guard. 
2. Chinese MFA spokesman, Sheng Guofang, on behalf of the Chinese 
government, commented on the statement of Japanese foreign minister, 
claiming it “irresponsible”. He also believed that those Japanese rightist 
groups had support from Japanese government.  
8-31  1. “Do not do stupid things, Japan!” was published on the People’s Daily.  
2. Tong Zen initiated a movement gathering supporter’s signature. In his letter to 
Chinese president Jiang Zemin, activists requested Chinese government to destroy 
the Japanese beacon on Diaoyu Islands with military force. Supporters included 
CCP members, students, veterans and workers.  
9-1  Graduate Students from Fudan University in Shanghai posted “A letter to all 
Students”, criticizing the inaction of Chinese government and inviting 
participation of a gathering on 9-18. This movement was supported by college 
students nationwide.  
9-3 1. Chinese premiere stated that “there was no wiggle room” on territorial 
disputes. 
2. Japan Kyodo News reported the presence of Chinese exploration boat near 
the Diaoyu Islands. 
9-5 1. Japanese Consul in General in Hong Kong stated that Hong Kong residents need 
Japanese visa to visit Diaoyu Islands.  
2. In response, mass protest was held in Hong Kong, against Japanese Consul’s 
statement on the same day. 
9-6 DDM Protest escalated in Hong Kong, with more participants. A global DDM was 
organized by HK DDMists. 
9-8 Mass protests against Japanese occupation of Diaoyu Islands were held in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China. Formal DDM groups were organized in 
mainland China. Eight Taiwan media planned for landing on Diaoyu, one 
succeeded. 
 134 
 
9-9 Japanese Youth League landed on Diaoyu and erected a new beacon.  
9-10 Japanese government stated that erection of beacon is a “private business”, over 
which the government cannot interfere.  
9-11 Chinese MFA reaffirmed that Diaoyu is part of China’s territory, and China’s 
action near the islands was perfectly legal.  
9-14 15 More than 30,000 Chinese in North America signed for DDM. 
Another DDM in Hong Kong, with more than 15,000 participants. 
9-18  65
th
 anniversary of Japanese occupation of Northeast China. Global mass protests 
in major cities.  
9-19 Chinese MFA stated that Japan shall abide by the 1972 Communiqué of 
Establishment of Diplomatic relations and 1978 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship 
9-20 Chinese Foreign minister commented on the DDM, stating that any casualty 
of Chinese protestors (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) will lead to mass 
anti-Japanese protests in China.  
9-22 Mass DDM protest in Hong Kong, Taipei, Vancouver, LA and NYC 
9-23  Japanese government showed a letter from Chinese government in 1920, in which 
China recognized Diaoyu Islands were part of Japanese territory.  
9-24 Chinese FM met with his Japanese counterpart in New York about the 
Diaoyu Islands. No agreement was made. Same day, Hong Kong DDM boat 
was blocked by Japanese coast guard. 
9-26 Hong Kong DDM activists went to Diaoyu Islands, and they jumped into the water 
3 NM from the islands. Chen Yuxiang drowned. 
10-1 Japanese Prime Minister stated that Japan’s territorial disputes do not include 
Diaoyu Islands; reaffirming Japan’s sovereignty.  
1997-4-23 Japanese government announced that they will arrest any DDMist in Diaoyu’s 
territorial sea. 
1997-5-6 1. Three Japanese congressmen landed on Diaoyu. 
2. In response to Japanese congressmen’s provocative landing, Chinese 
foreign minister summoned Japanese ambassador in China.  
 
 After China summoned the Japanese ambassador, the Japanese prime minister 
commented on the landing of Japanese congressmen on the Diaoyu Islands was 
“regrettable.” The Chinese government did not take further actions. The crisis of 1996 
ended without a clear ending point.  
A chronological summary of events in late 1996 demonstrates the excitements 
and sentiments among the Chinese at Japanese action over the islands. However, with 
the death of Mr. Chen Yuxiang, the DDM became an even more urgent issue between 
China and Japan. High-ranking government officials of China and Japan discussed 
this issue and the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands could not be “shelved” as it was 
planned to in 1978 between Deng and then Japanese Prime Minister – it requires the 
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Chinese government to act. However, facing waves of public mobilization, the 
Chinese government remained passive. With these events as raw data, I will proceed 
to analyze the Chinese government’s policy actions.  
Based on open and verifiable sources, the Chinese government’s actions in the  
1996 incident employed protests and negotiation primarily. Among all those incidents 
summarized in Table 5.3, there are several policy actions taken by the Chinese 
government (Figure 5.3, “Actions in Detail” are taken from Table 5.3). 
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Figure 5.3 provides a chronological timeline with demarcations for the Chinese 
and Japanese actions and events. The letters in boxes denote the policy action taken 
by the Chinese government. Those circles on the vertical line, however, symbolize 
“actions” by the Japanese government. Looking at the actions from both sides, we can 
see a clear action-reaction relationship between those events. As the table illustrates, 
for instance, when the Japanese Youth League erected a beacon on the Diaoyu Islands 
(circle 1), the Chinese government was “deeply concerned” (square box A). Also, 
when the Japanese foreign minister affirmed Japanese sovereignty of the islands in 
Hong Kong (circle 2), the Chinese government reacted with an MFA statement 
(square box B), articles on People’s Daily (square box C), and the Premier meeting 
with his Japanese counterpart (square box D).  
Also in the table of Figure 5.2, the far right column includes the nature of these 
policy actions. As shown, these policy actions were mostly in the form of protests and 
warning, without further supportive actions. The policy actions were peaceful in 
nature. There was no expression that strongly deters or threatens the Japanese 
government (even the article on the People’s Daily, as will be analyzed in the next 
chapter). To analyze these policy actions by China, China’s policy action in 1996 
crisis was mostly, protesting.  
 At the beginning of this incident, on July 18, China stated that it was “deeply 
concerned” by the action of the JYL.  
On August 28, when mass protests took place in Hong Kong, the Chinese MFA 
criticized the Japanese government as “irresponsible” for making such statements in 
Hong Kong.  
September 3 and 11 witnessed the MFA making statement defending China’s 
sovereignty, words adopted were mild and demonstrated China’s determination. 
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September 19, 20, 24 also witnessed the Chinese government’s statement, but no 
assertive policy was taken. Even after the death of Mr. Chen Yuxiang, China made no 
strong statements towards Japan.  
 It is worth noting, however, on September 3, the Kyodo News reported the 
Chinese exploration boat near the Diaoyu Islands. This can be seen as a strong pose 
for defending the Diaoyu Islands. However, there was no further report on this from 
the Chinese government. What can be inferred is, at least, the Chinese government 
does not want to show its strong position on this issue to its people. Rather, it wants to 
maintain the dispute “controllable” by simply making protests against Japan. There is 
no wonder some graduate students from Shanghai criticized the Chinese government 
being “too soft” towards Japan in the dispute.  
  
 As an article published on the website of an official academe, the anonymous 
author reported disputes over the Diaoyu Islands until 2004. This article reported that 
the Chinese government did not approve application on September 13, 1996, and Mr. 
Tong Zeng, the DDM activist, was indirectly ousted from Beijing, in the form of a 
job-related relocation, after his active participation in DDM. These records may tell 
something about the government’s concern for domestic protests. However, their 
authenticity cannot be verified, therefore, say, Mr. Tong Zeng’s relocation cannot be 
proved related with the DDM.  
 To sum up, in 1996, the government was challenged by both Japan and the 
domestic public. Japan was aggressively defending its sovereignty, and therefore, 
challenging China’s claims. Meanwhile, the public criticized the government’s weak 
stance against Japan. China was mostly passively responding to Japan’s actions.  
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2004: China Demanded the Release with High-Level Protests and Japan 
Cooperated 
 In the history of the Diaoyu Islands dispute, 2004 was an important one in that it 
witnessed the first landing by Chinese on the islands. At 6:26 am on March 24, 2004 
seven Chinese DDM activists landed on the Diaoyu Islands successfully. After staying 
on the islands for ten hours, they were arrested by the Japanese Coast Guard and 
detained in Okinawa. The seven DDM activists were released on March 25 after the 
Chinese MFA protested against Japan.  
 After the 1996 incident, the DDM boomed and their successful landing on the 
Diaoyu Islands was bound to happen sooner or later. Chinese government, however, 
did not intervene the incident until the seven DDM members were arrested by 
Japanese Coast Guard.  
 On August 25, 2003, the beacons erected in 1996 were repaired by the JYL, with 
the authorization of the Japanese government. Their landing aroused anger from 
China’s side. On August 27, mass protests were held in Hong Kong to protest the 
landing of the JYL. In September, protests were held in North America to support 
DDM. The Chinese government did not make any comments on their protests.  
 Before the incident in 2004, on October 9, 2003, DDM members from mainland 
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan rented a boat and sailed to the Diaoyu Islands from 
Xiamen. Their boat was blocked by the Japanese Coast Guard several hundred feet 
from the Diaoyu Islands; they returned without successfully landing.  
 On December 26-28, the first conference of Chins’s DDM was organized in 
Xiamen, on which they passed the “Declaration of DDM.” With more than 30 
participants from China, the North and South Americas, this conference was a 
gathering of global Chinese DDM members. 
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 In January 2004, another attempt was made to land on the Diaoyu Islands. It 
failed with Japanese Coast Guard’s block.  
 On March 24, 2004, the third attempt to land on Diaoyu Islands succeeded. After 
staying on the islands for ten hours and demonstrating Chinese sovereignty, they were 
arrested by the Japanese Coast Guard and detained in Okinawa. On the same day, in 
Beijing, mass protests were held outside of Japanese embassy. Hong Kong DDM 
groups also protested at Japanese Consulate in General.  
 On March 25, the Chinese government joined into the incident. Then Chinese 
Vice Foreign Minister, Mr. Dai Bingguo summoned Japanese ambassador in China 
and protested Japanese arrest of seven DDMists. Also, in regular MFA Press, 
spokesperson Mr. Kong Quan criticized Japanese arrest of Chinese citizens for 
landing on the Diaoyu Islands.  
 On March 26, Japan released seven DDM activists. The incident ended.  
 The 2004 incident had the Defense Diaoyu Movement (DDM) come forward and 
become known to ordinary citizens. In this sense, the landing on Diaoyu Islands made 
the DDM well-known and enhanced the influence of DDM activists among the 
public.  
Table 5.4 Key Events in the 2004 Incident 
Dates Events 
2003-8-25 Japanese Youth League landed on the islands to repair beacons 
erected in 1996. 
8-27 August 27, mass protests were held in Hong Kong to protest the 
landing of JYL. 
10-9 October 9, DDM members from mainland China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan rented a boat and sailed to the Diaoyu Islands from 
Xiamen. Failed with Japanese blocking. 
12-26 December 26-28, the first conference of Chinese DDM was 
organized in Xiamen.  
2004-1 Another attempt of landing on the islands failed with Japanese 
block. 
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3-24  Successful landing on the islands. 
3-35 Vice Foreign Minister summoned Japanese ambassador in China. 
Protested.  
3-26 Arrested DDM members were released.  
 
 The action and reaction of this incident between the Chinese and Japanese 
governments were fairly simple when shown on a timeline.  
 
Figure 5.4 Japanese actions and the Chinese government’s reaction in 2004 
crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
No. Dates Japanese action No.  Dates Chinese 
Action 
Policy 
Action 
Label 
1 2004-
3-24 
Arrested DDM 
activists 
    
   A 3-25 Vice Foreign 
minister 
protested in 
person 
High-level 
 
2 3-26 Release.      
 Despite of the simplicity of this incident and prompt solution, the 2004 incident is 
an important one because it marked the increasing salience of the DDM in China, and 
also the increasing influence of popular activist on the Chinese government. In 2004, 
however, China is more active than in 1996 and responded quickly to demand Japan 
to release the arrested Chinese citizens. The incident ended quickly.  
3-24 3-25 3-26 
1 
A 
2 
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2010 Japan Arrested Chinese Fisherman and China’s “Countermeasure” Policy 
On September 7, 2010, when fishing in the waters near the Diaoyu Islands, Mr. 
Zhan Qixiong and his crew were arrested by the Japanese Coast Guards. The Chinese 
captain resisted by ramming his boat against the Japanese Coast Guards’ boat. Later 
that day, the local Okinawan government announced Mr. Zhan and his crew as 
“intruders to Japanese territory”, and stated that Japanese domestic law would be 
applied onto Mr. Zhan.
13
  
In the following sixteen days, the Chinese government responded to the arrest 
with unusually strong objections. On September 7, Chinese ambassador in Japan 
protested the arrests of Mr. Zhan. Two days after the arrest of Mr. Zhan, on September 
9, China’s MFA made remarks on this incident, reiterating the “undisputable 
sovereignty” China possessed on these islands, supported by the occupation of these 
islands as China’s “inherent territory” “since ancient times.” In addition, it strongly 
condemned the “illegal arrest” of Mr. Zhan, because China believed that Mr. Zhan 
was actually fishing in Chinese Diaoyu Islands’ water. The Chinese MFA demanded 
the “unconditional release of Mr. Zhan.” 
On September 10, the Chinese foreign minister summoned Japanese ambassador 
twice a day. On the same day, China also announced suspension all high-level visits to 
Japan. Chinese State Councilor Dai Binguo summoned the Japanese ambassador at 
midnight, demanding unconditional release of the Chinese fisherman. 
After criticizing Japan in the regular press on September 16, the Chinese 
government announced it would adopt a series of countermeasure policies if Japan not 
releases Mr. Zhan. On September 19, China adopted countermeasure policies against 
Japan, including the suspension of all provincial-ministerial level dialogue and 
                                                             
13 The Telegraph, “Tensions between China and Japan rise over disputed gas field”, 2010-9-17. 
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meetings, pausing bilateral meetings on aviation cooperation, and postponing a 
conference on China-Japan cooperation over coals, and Chinese tourists to Japan were 
also impacted. China also denied visa to a Japanese cultural exchange group, who 
actually was invited by Chinese government months before.
14
 As Professor Gao Hong, 
Associate Dean of the Institute on Japan Studies, CASS remarked, such 
“countermeasures” against Japan were “unprecedented in the past 38 years”, since 
China established a formal diplomatic relationship with Japan in 1972.
15
 
After the countermeasure policy was adopted, on September 21, Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao made a speech in New York when he was meeting with overseas Chinese. 
He reiterated the official position of the Chinese government on the dispute over the 
Diaoyu Islands, in addition, he made unusually strong objection to Japan, stating that 
Japanese holding of Mr. Zhan was “illegal and unreasonable” and it “aroused the 
anger of all Chinese people at home and abroad.” He urged Japan to release the 
detained captain immediately and unconditionally, and stated explicitly that China 
would “take further steps” if Japan did not release Mr. Zhan,16 because this incident 
was absolutely caused by Japan. This statement not only summarized the position of 
China on the dispute, and also elaborated what “indisputable sovereignty” means – 
Japan’s arrest of a Chinese citizen on the water near the Diaoyu Islands was illegal 
because these islands are Chinese territory. What is more important is that the Premier 
of China stated in public that “further steps will be taken if Japan does not release the 
Chinese captain.”17  
                                                             
14 See MFA Remarks on September 27, 2010. Also See MFA summary of China-Japan Relations at Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Website, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/. 
15 Several major Chinese media reported about the “Countermeasures.” See Reuter for neutral report, at 
http://cn.reuters.com/article/CNTopGenNews/idCNCHINA-3040620100919. 
16 See “温家宝总理要求日方释放中方船长的讲话”. (Speeches of Premier Wen Jiabao asking for the release of 
the Chinese captain arrested by Japan), September 21,2010. Video available at http://youtu.be/lFHmXkpnhk0 and 
www.diaoyuislandschina.com. See the full text of Premier Wen’s speech, available at 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/wenjiabao65lianda/content-2/detail_2010_09/23/2609438_0.shtml. 
17 Ibid. 
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During the meanwhile, after the arrest of Mr. Zhan, mass protests occurred in 
China: September 8 in Beijing; and September 13, in Hong Kong. In the 16 days after 
the arrest, mass protests with more than 1,000 protestors took place in major cities of 
China, including Beijing, Tianjin, Xi’an, Hong Kong and Taipei. Ten days after Mr. 
Zhan was arrested, September 18 was the anniversary of the Japanese occupation of 
Northeastern China in 1931, which is remembered by the Chinese as the day Japan 
invaded China. Mass protests were held targeting against Japanese embassies, and 
Japanese stores in China, and participants burned the Japanese flag and yelled 
anti-Japanese slogans.  
On September 24, Japan released Mr. Zhan and the Chinese government sent a 
private jet to bring him home. In major Japanese cities, mass protests took place after 
Mr. Zhan was released by Japan. Similarly to China, their logic was because the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were part of Japan’s territory.    
On September 27, China announced regular patrol of the Diaoyu Islands.    
 
Table 5.5 Events in 2010 Crisis 
Dates Events 
9-7 1. Chinese Fisherman, Mr. Zhan Qixiong and his crew were arrested for fishing in 
water near the Diaoyu Islands.  
2. Chinese ambassador in Japan protested against this arrest. 
9-8 Protest in Beijing, outside of Japanese embassy.  
9-9 Chinese MFA demanded unconditional release of Chinese fisherman.  
9-10 Chinese FM summoned Japanese ambassador in China. Chinese government 
leader postponed his plan of visit to Japan 
9-12 Chinese State Councilor Dai Binguo summoned Japanese ambassador again 
at midnight, demanding unconditional release of Chinese fisherman.  
9-13 In HK, mass protests were held to protest against Japan. 
9-16 MFA spokeswoman criticized Japanese government in public. 
9-19 Countermeasures were adopted. Bilateral political, economic and cultural 
exchange were suspended.  
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9-21 Chinese Premier made strong speech against Japan in NY.  
9-24 Arrested fisherman, Zhan Qixiong was released. 
9-27 China announced its plan for regular patrol around the Diaoyu Islands. 
 To summarize, the Chinese government’s policy action is 2010 was highlighted 
by intensive protests, backed up by “countermeasures”.  
 147 
 
 
 148 
 
 After the arrest, the situation reflects the long-term confrontation over these 
islands between the two governments and also the general public from two states. 
Chinese government also took much stronger stance against Japan after the incidents 
happened than in 1996 or 2004.  
Comparing the events and actions in this table to those of 1996 reveals that 
Chinese government policy actions in 2010 were more systematic and assertive. In 
general, China takes the initiatives in 2010, whereas Japan did not make any further 
actions after arresting Mr. Zhan. Compared with Chinese government’s policy action 
in 1996, its action to the 2010 crisis was more intensive in protests, involving MFA 
protests, and high-level officials protests and the summons of the Japanese 
government officials.  
The policy actions in 2010 were more active: without many actions from the 
Japanese side, China adopted a series of actions towards Japan, most importantly; it 
employed the “countermeasure” punitive policy to protest against Japanese arrest of 
Chinese fisherman. To sum up, the Chinese government’s policy action is 2010 was 
highlighted by intensive protests, backed up by “countermeasures.” 
  
 Conclusion 
To compare the policy actions of the Chinese government in the three incidents, it 
can tell that the Chinese government has made progress in managing the crisis 
towards Japan since 1996. As illustrated in 1996, the Chinese government was mostly 
reacting to Japanese actions. Japan was taking the initiatives in demonstrating its 
“effective control” over the disputed islands, while China was passively responding to 
each action Japan took. Also, in 1996, the government was mostly adopting the 
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approach of protesting. The protests were mostly low-ranking and passive in response 
to provocative actions. The government did not seem to have a systematic plan to 
react to Japan’s demonstrations of sovereignty. 
 As a continuation of the 1996 incident, the incident was abrupt and short. It 
started with the arrest of seven DDM activists who successfully landed on the islands. 
With Chinese government’s high-rank protest, these activists were soon released. 
Chinese government adopted high-level protests in this incident by starting with the 
Chinese vice-foreign minister summoned the Japanese ambassador nine times.  
 In the 2010 incident, however, the Chinese government was more active. It also 
protested, and after Japan refused to release the arrested fisherman, the Chinese 
government adopted the so-called “countermeasure” policy, which is more assertive 
than any previous actions. In other words, the Chinese government escalated in the 
policy action ladder to the third rank, where the countermeasures were taken.  
 
Table 5.6 Summary of China’s actions in 1996, 2004 and 2010 
YEAR JAPAN’S ACTIONS CHINA’S POLICY ACTIONS  
1996 Demonstrated Effective Control Low-level to high-level protests 
2004 Arrested Landing DDM 
activists 
High-level Protests 
2010 Arrested Chinese Fishermen High-level Protests to 
Countermeasures 
 
 In the language of the Systems Theory, in these three incidents, the “outputs” of 
these three incidents were different. Actually, they varied from low to high in 
assertiveness from 1996 to 2010. What accounts for this variation? The Systems 
Theory points at the “inputs” for explanation. But what are in the box of “inputs”? 
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CHAPTER 6 POLICY NARRATIVES 
As I concluded in Chapter 5, the government’s policy over the Diaoyu Islands in 
1996, according to the categories of the reactions of Chinese foreign policy, was 
dominated by low-level protests: the government did protest against Japan, but the 
words used mostly emphasized on history, and the protests were not systematic or 
assertive. Compared with 2004 and 2010, the Chinese government’s policy actions in 
1996 were mostly reactive; in response, spurred by the narratives of individual POLs, 
the public demonstrated its anger and anxiety over the dispute.  
However, what were the narratives of the government, intellectuals and the POLs 
in 1996, 2004 and 2010 respectively? An analysis of political narratives from these 
actors can more robustly explain variation in policy actions, and whether and how 
government’s foreign policy making accommodates the public sentiments.  
 
 This chapter will analyze policy narratives over the Diaoyu Islands from three 
perspectives, the Chinese government, intellectuals, and Public Opinion Leaders 
(POLs), which include the DDM activists who give policy advice to the government. 
By displaying what they said and did in the three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands in 
1996, 2004 and 2010, I explore their different arguments and policy action 
preferences on what China should do over the Diaoyu Islands disputes. After 
presenting their narratives, Chapter 7 will comparatively analyze the interactions 
among these three kinds of policy actors and summarizes different patterns of 
interaction among the government, the intellectuals and the POLs, following the 
framework of Easton’s Systems Theory. 
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I. 1996: Passive Government and Active Public 
The Diaoyu Islands dispute reached a peak in 1996 following a series of actions 
by Japan over the disputed islands. During the dispute, the Chinese government, as 
shown in previous chapter, passively reacted to Japanese actions. Lasting for more 
than one month, the 1996 dispute witnessed the public criticizing the Chinese 
government’s foreign policy, and also the government’s passive reactions - driven by 
Japanese policies over the Diaoyu islands.  
 I draw the data for the narrative analysis from available government statements 
and announcements, as well as articles on the official newspaper of People’s Daily. As 
stated in Chapter 4, these narratives are to be analyzed for their “tone” by finding the 
high-frequency words and analyzing the texts behind these words. By exploring and 
analyzing the context of these words, I show the attitude of different actors in the 
dispute, and further compare the different roles played in the crisis in 1996, 2004 and 
2010.  
 
Government Official Narratives - “In history, Okinawa does not include the 
Diaoyu.”   
 As summarized in previous chapter, the Chinese government’s actions are 
excerpted below. Highlighted in text are key words that signal the narrative of the 
Chinese government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 152 
 
Table 6.1 China’s Actions in 1996 Crisis (in bold) 
7-18 In MFA statement, China is “deeply concerned about Japan’s actions over 
disputed islands,” claiming that is a violation of Chinese territorial 
sovereignty. 
8-29 1. A Taiwan fishing boat was blocked and searched by Japanese Coast Guard. 
2. Chinese MFA spokesman, Sheng Guofang, on behalf of the Chinese 
government, commented on the statement of Japanese foreign minister, 
claiming it “irresponsible”. He also believed that those Japanese rightist 
groups had support from Japanese government.  
8-31  1. “Do not do stupid things, Japan!” was published on the People’s Daily.  
2. Tong Zen initiated a movement gathering supporter’s signature. In his letter to 
Chinese president Jiang Zemin, activists requested the Chinese government to 
destroy the Japanese beacon on Diaoyu Islands with military force. Supporters 
included CCP members, students, veterans and workers.  
9-3 1. Chinese premiere stated that “there was no wiggle room” on territorial 
disputes. 
2. Japan Kyodo News reported the presence of Chinese exploration boat near 
the Diaoyu Islands. 
9-11 Chinese MFA reaffirmed that Diaoyu is part of China’s territory, and China’s 
action near the islands was perfectly legal.  
9-19 Chinese MFA stated that Japan shall abide by the 1972 Communiqué of 
Establishment of Diplomatic relations and 1978 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship 
9-20 Chinese Foreign minister commented on the DDM, stating that any casualty of 
Chinese protestors (inlg Hong Kong and Taiwan) will lead to mass 
anti-Japanese protests in China.  
9-24 Chinese FM met with his Japanese counterpart in New York about the Diaoyu 
Islands. No agreement was made. Same day, Hong Kong DDM boat was 
blocked by Japanese coast guard. 
1997-5-6 1. Three Japanese congressmen landed on Diaoyu. 
2. In response to Japanese congressmen’s provocative landing, Chinese foreign 
minister summoned Japanese ambassador in China.  
 
 These comments and responses towards Japan’s actions center on several key 
words, “deeply concerned” “irresponsible” “legal (for China to conduct exploration)”. 
These narratives criticized Japan’s actions over the Diaoyu islands and also held Japan 
responsible for the crisis over the Diaoyu Islands.   
 Another source of information that reflects the Chinese government’s official 
position during this crisis includes the two articles published in the People’s Daily on 
August 31 and October 18, titled as “Do not do stupid things, Japan!” (August 31, 
1996) and “On the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands” (October 18, 1996). These two 
articles were published in the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China 
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(CPC), and they demonstrate the official position of the central leadership of the 
Chinese government.  
 The article “Do not do stupid things, Japan!” was published when the conflict 
over the islands was escalating, the tone of the article was more assertive than the 
other published on October 18. In this article “Do not do stupid things, Japan!”, the 
author started from the recent provocative actions of the Japanese Youth League (JYL) 
over the Diaoyu Islands and the support from the Japanese Prime Minister for JYL. 
These narratives lead to the conclusion that Japan was trying to occupy China’s 
Diaoyu Islands. Then it turns to the history of the dispute, claiming that China and 
Japan had agreed to “shelve” the dispute for future discussion. The main argument of 
this article, however, as indicated in the title, was to warn Japan not to anger 
neighboring states with provocative actions. As the article mentioned, “it is not a 
separate incident that Japan is acting provocatively over the Diaoyu islands. Rather, 
this is a consequence of recent trend in Japan’s rightist politics and eagerness to 
demonstrate its power.”1 The article emphasizes the concern of China towards 
Japan’s reviving militarism, which had hurt the neighboring states during World War 
II. As a conclusion, the article reminded China and also the other countries in East 
Asia to be “aware of new trends of Japanese foreign policy” and try to prevent Japan 
from doing “stupid things” like its recent actions over the Diaoyu Islands.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Original text as “日本在钓鱼岛问题上向中国主权挑战，决非偶然，而是日本国内政治右倾、对外炫耀实
力的必然表现.” People’s Daily -1996 -8-31.  
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Figure 6.1 Word Cloud for Article about Japan and the Diaoyu Islands Dispute 
(Published on People’s Daily 1996-8-30) 
 
 
 This article was written in a tone of caution and it linked this issue with other 
atrocities Japan committed during World War II. It ends up with reminding all Asian 
countries to be cautious of recent trends of Japanese foreign policy, which have been 
leaning towards the aggressive end. As the word cloud indicated, “territory” and 
“sovereignty” were most often mentioned, emphasizing the factual belief that China 
has the sovereignty over the territory. Not surprisingly, other than these two words, 
“Japan”, “China” and “Diaoyu islands” were often mentioned.  
Table 6.2 Yoshikoder Analysis for Article on the People’s Daily ((Published on 
People’s Daily 1996-8-30). 
 
English Word Count Proportion 
China 中国 23 0.035  
Japan 日本 21 0.032  
Diaoyu Islands 钓鱼岛 15 0.023  
Territory 领土 13 0.020  
Islands 岛屿 8 0.012  
Issues/Problems 问题 7 0.011  
Sovereignty 主权 6 0.009  
Taiwan 台湾 6 0.009  
People 人民 5 0.008  
Relationship 关系 4 0.006  
State 国家 3 0.005  
Power 实力 3 0.005  
Return 归还 3 0.005  
Government 政府 3 0.005  
Defense 防卫 3 0.005  
Affiliated 附属 3 0.005  
  Total:126 Total 0.195 
Note: Proportions do not add up to 1. Proportions round to 3 decimals. 
Territory 
Sovereignty 
China 
Diaoyu Islands 
Japan 
Islands 
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 After the crisis in 1996 calmed down, another article was published in the 
People’s Daily, titled as “On the Sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands” (October 18). 
This article has been mentioned again during the 2004 crisis by the MFA 
spokesperson Kong Quan and therefore can be seen as the official position of the 
Chinese government on the Diaoyu islands sovereignty dispute.
2
 In this article, a 
historical argument was made again to reiterate that the Diaoyu Islands were not part 
of Okinawa.  
 This article comprises two main parts. The first is about the history of the Chinese 
discovery of the Diaoyu islands; the second, on the history of how Japan occupied the 
Diaoyu islands. A word cloud analysis of this article indicates that “Ryukyu [or 
Okinawa]” is the word that most frequently mentioned.  
Figure 6.2 Word Cloud for Article about Japan and the Diaoyu Islands Dispute 
(Published on People’s Daily on October 18, 1996) 
 
 As the word cloud indicated, other than “Japan”“China” and the “Diaoyu Islands,” 
the word “Ryukyu” was the most frequently mentioned words.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
2 On March 25, 2004, MFA spokesperson Mr. Kong Quan mentioned this article when addressing the question opn 
the history of the Diaoyu Islands. He recommended to read this article published on the People’s Daily in 1996.  
Okinawa Ryukyu 
China 
Diaoyu 
Islands 
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Table 6.3 Yoshikoder Analysis for Article on the People’s Daily (Published on 
People’s Daily 1996-10-18). 
English Word Count Proportion 
China 中国 38 0.024  
Diaoyu Islands 钓鱼岛 37 0.024  
Ryuku 琉球 30 0.019  
Japan 日本 28 0.018  
Territory 领土 19 0.012  
Islands 岛屿 11 0.007  
Issues/problems 问题 10 0.006  
Sovereignty 主权 9 0.006  
Taiwan 台湾 7 0.005  
Then/at that time 当时 6 0.004  
Government 政府 6 0.004  
People 人民 5 0.003  
Missionary for 
conferring titles 册封使 5 0.003  
Ming Dynasty 明朝 5 0.003  
Since 以来 4 0.003  
Relations 关系 4 0.003  
Archipelago 列岛 4 0.003  
State 国家 4 0.003  
Qing Dynasty 清朝 4 0.003  
Record 记载 4 0.003  
Diaoyu Islands 钓鱼屿 4 0.003  
Affiliated 附属 4 0.003  
  Total:248 Total:0.162 
Note: Proportions do not add up to 1. Proportions round to 3 decimals. 
 
With “Japan” mentioned 28 times in this article, the word “China” was mentioned 
38 times, the “Diaoyu Islands”, 37 times, the word “Ryukyu” was mentioned 30 times. 
Considering this incident was about the Diaoyu islands, the high frequency of 
mentioning “Ryukyu” is interesting.  
 In this article, the ancient kingdom of “Ryukyu” was mentioned to emphasize the 
fact that the Diaoyu Islands never belonged to Ryukyu. Therefore, when Japan 
annexed the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1884, and changed its name to “Okinawa”, the 
Diaoyu Islands should not have been included.  
 The article then reviewed the history of Japan “stealing” the Diaoyu Islands since 
1895. The main argument of this article was that China has historical evidence to 
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support its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Following the categories of different 
arguments mentioned in Chapter 4, government speeches in 1996 emphasized 
“history.”  
According to the label of arguments arranged in Chapter 4, the government’s 
arguments were sovereignty-historical and sovereignty-legal, they also included some 
political arguments by reminding Japan about possible domestic protests in China.  
 
Intellectuals: “Historical evidence” 
 While the government insists its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands in history, 
Chinese intellectuals focused on the historical evidence to support China’s sovereignty. 
A key word during and after the 1996 incident was the name of a Japanese scholar 
called “Kiyoshi Inoue.”  
 On October 10, 1996, Japanese historian Kiyoshi Inoue republished his book On 
the Sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands. In this book, Mr. Inoue reiterated that the 
Diaoyu islands had been Chinese territory since ancient times, and recently Japanese 
actions over the disputed islands indicated the revival of Japanese militarism. In 1997, 
China soon published this book and Professor Inoue was widely cited by Chinese 
scholars. After the 1996 incident, China published Inoue’s book, supporting China’s 
sovereignty over the islands. Chinese scholars have conducted research over the legal 
aspects of the Diaoyu Islands dispute, and supported the claim of the government. 
 Using CNKI Academics, I found 143 articles on “core journals” from 1995 to 
2012 over the topic of “Diaoyu Islands”.3 After teasing out those articles about 
literature and announcements, I had 113 articles directly over the topic of Diaoyu 
                                                             
3 Core journals are those journals listed by Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China for their 
influence and citation. The latest list is available at http://www.llas.ac.cn/upload/core%20journals.htm#shk.  
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Islands. The number of these articles in different years is distributed as follows.  
 
Figure 6.3 Number of Core Journal Articles on the Diaoyu Islands.    
 
    As the graph indicated, there were three peaks of articles on core journals in the 
past 18 years. One was in 1996, in which year the demonstrations of Japanese 
effective control led to mass protests among the Chinese. The second was in 2004, 
when the burgeoning DDM eventually led to a successful landing on the disputed 
islands and also the arrest by the Japanese government. The third peak happened in 
2010, when the arrest of Chinese fisherman near the Diaoyu Islands caused mass 
protests in more than a dozen of Chinese cities and led to the “countermeasures” 
policy action adopted by the Chinese government.  
 I categorized those articles into four groups: history, legal, politics and policy. I 
used the following criteria when categorizing articles. Those articles about the 
historical evidence of Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu islands will be included in 
the “history” category; those emphasizing international law will be included in the 
“legal” category. An article studying the Diaoyu Islands in China-Japan relations will 
be included in the “politics” in category (example: the Diaoyu islands’ impact on 
bilateral relations); whereas those articles in the “policy” category are about the 
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governance of the Diaoyu Islands, including fishing, mining etc.  
 In general, all of these 113 articles share the agreement that China’s sovereignty 
over the disputed islands is supported by historical and legal evidence. Then, those 
articles in the “politics” and “policy” categories move forward to analyze specific 
problems in politics or policy aspects. Articles in the “policy" category often convey 
economic arguments, emphasizing on the benefit of the disputed islands and how to 
manage them. 
 
Figure 6.4 Number of different categories of Articles published in 1996  
 N=13 
 As the figure shows, historical articles were second to political articles which 
analyze the impact of the dispute on China-Japan policy in numbers. In 1996, Dr. Liu 
Jiangyong published an article in the Journal of Japanese Studies, presenting 
systematically the historical evidence supporting China’s sovereignty over the 
disputed Diaoyu Islands. In this article, Dr. Liu endorsed China’s official statements 
and echoed the articles in the People’s Daily, arguing for China’s sovereignty over the 
Diaoyu Islands. Different from the two articles published on the People’s Daily, Dr. 
Liu rejected the sovereignty claims of Japan. He summarized the following Japanese 
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claims of its sovereignty, including, 1. The Diaoyu Islands had been terra nullius 
before 1898; 2. The Diaoyu Islands were never explicitly mentioned in the treaties to 
return to China; 3. China never objected including the Diaoyu islands within the 
Okinawa trusteeship; 4. Japan occupied these islands “first” as terra nullius, and 5. 
China had admitted that the Diaoyu Islands were Japanese territory in 1920 in a letter 
to the Japanese government, thanking them for rescuing Chinese fishermen trapped 
near the “Japanese Senkaku Islands.”4  
 Dr. Liu rejected all this evidences for Japanese sovereignty. By presenting 
historical evidence in the 14
th
 century until the middle 19
th
 century, Dr. Liu rejected 
the claim that the Diaoyu Islands were terra nullius. Moreover, by emphasizing the 
Shimonoseki Treaty and the cession of Taiwan to Japan in 1898, he rejected the 
validity of using a 1920 newspaper as evidence. Rather, he argued that this was a 
period Japan colonized Taiwan and occupied all its affiliates.  
 Dr. Liu’s article resembles the article published on the People’s Daily on October 
18, 1996 in many ways, including the structure, evidence and central argument. 
However, Dr. Liu supported his argument by rejecting all the evidence Japan provides, 
emphasizing the lack of validity of Japanese claims over this islands. In addition, Dr. 
Lv Yiran and an anonymous article published in the Beijing Archive in October 1996 
also summarized historical evidence supporting China’s sovereignty.  
On the other hand, domestically, the Chinese government may have adopted some 
policy actions that tried to appease domestic DDM.5 However, due to the nature of 
this kind of ordinance, it is hard to find public reports or verify their authenticity. 
However, from an article by anonymous author on the website of “Modern China 
Studies” [近代中国研究], the records of the Chinese government’s appeasement of 
                                                             
4 Liu, Jiangyong. “On the issue of Diaoyu Islands’ sovereignty.” Journal of Japanese Studies, 1996-6. 13-28.  
5 “历年保钓事件记载” (Chronological Record of DDM) available at website of Modern History Research of 
China Academe of Social Science . (http://jds.cass.cn/Item/7454.aspx).  
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domestic mass protests can be found. The website is owned by China Academe of 
Social Science (CASS), which is an official think tank.6  
 
 In sum, these academic articles offer support for the Chinese government’s claim 
of sovereignty, believing that China has actually governed these islands in history.  
When we consider the 1996 dispute, the narratives of the intellectuals do not 
differ from those of the Chinese government. The intellectuals used these narratives to 
serve and to expand the historical narratives of the government. Compared with the 
government’s passive and reactive response to Japanese policies during this crisis, and 
academia’s calm and systematic support of government’s claims from historical 
perspective, the narratives from the public in 1996 were noisier and aggressive. 
According to the label for arguments in Chapter 4, the arguments of intellectuals in 
1996 were mostly sovereignty-historical and sovereignty-legal. These narratives were 
very similar to those of the government and they offered support towards the 
government’s claims. 
 
POLs: Military Means  
 In 1996, after the incident took place, the voice of the POLs amplified the fury of 
the public towards Japan. The wave of public mobilization in 2004 developed the 
Defend Diaoyu Movement (DDM) in mainland China, and led to the successful 
landing of DDM on the Diaoyu Islands in 2004. In this sense, the 1996 incident 
offered an incentive for DDM in mainland China to emerge and grow.  
 The DDM can be traced back to a group of Chinese students from Taiwan in the 
United States in the 1970s. When the US announced the return of Okinawa along with 
                                                             
6 Modern China Studies ( http://jds.cass.cn/Item/7454.aspx). 
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the Diaoyu Islands to Japan, a group of Chinese student held protests in Washington 
DC.  
Figure 6.5 Protests in DC against “returning” Diaoyu Islands to Japan, 1971 
 
 
According to the interview of DDM activists in the 1970s, Mr. Wang Xiaobo and 
Mr. Lin Xiaoxin, both of whom were doctoral students in physics in the US, learned 
about the planned return of the Diaoyu Islands with Okinawa to Japan. They 
published a special edition of “Defending the Diaoyu Islands” in the Science Monthly 
Journal, a journal published by Taiwanese students in the United States. These 
students called for a protest in Washington D.C. on January 30, 1971, against 
America’s return of the disputed islands to Japan. When they held the second protest 
in April 1971, they were told by the United States that the Diaoyu Islands were 
considered part of Okinawa, therefore, and should be returned to Japan. As Mr. Liu 
Xiaoxin said, “when we heard this news, we were very frustrated.” 7 In 1971, when 
students heard about the possible change of American policy towards the People’s 
Republic of China, 
8
 those students who supported the ROC regime and the PRC 
regime diverged and the Defense Diaoyu Movement in America diminished.  
In Taiwan, however, the DDM continued without much divergence in ideology. 
                                                             
7 “The origins of Defense Diaoyu Movement.” 2010-12-03 on Sanlian Life Weekly  [三联生活周刊]. 
8 Dr. Henry Kissinger visited China secretly in December 1970, and the US would support PRC joining the United 
Nations in late 1971.  
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As Mr. Wang Xiaobo recalled, in April, 1971, students at Taiwan University gathered 
to organize a DDM protest. Taiwan in 1971 was under the Kuomingtang authoritarian 
government, the university authority refused to permit public protests. Students 
distributed posters on the campus of National Taiwan University, stating, “the 
territory of China can be conquered, but never be surrendered; Chinese people can be 
slaughtered, but never be humiliated.”9 Finally, the protest was consented by the 
authority, and the protests were held against the decision of US government to return 
Japan the Diaoyu Islands, one participant was Mr. Ma Yingjeou – then Taiwanese 
president from 2008 to 2012, reelected for his second term in 2012.  
 
Figure 6.6 DDM protest in Taipei, 1971. (Slogan says, “Defend Diaoyu Islands”) 
 
 
The DDM in Taiwan survived the authoritarian regime until 1996, with its 
patriotic advocates protected by the government. However, as Mr. Wang Xiaobo 
recalled, the Kuomingtang government governing Taiwan in the 1970s, were also 
afraid to see mass protests, even for patriotic purposes like defending the Diaoyu 
Islands. Authoritarian governments seem to have similar logic. That was the case for 
ROC government in 1996, as evidenced by the ban on protests by college students in 
                                                             
9 “中国的土地可以征服，而不可以断送；中国的人民可以杀戮，而不可以低头.” 
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Beijing. Similar concerns exist nowadays in mainland China, and its interaction with 
DDM in mainland China has been complicated.  
When the Japanese Youth League announced the erection of beacons on the 
Diaoyu Islands, the DDM in China developed following the government’s reactions, 
and the DDM pushed the government to adopt more assertive approaches in response 
to Japan.  
The earliest gathering of the DDM was in August 1996, in Hong Kong. When the 
Japanese foreign minister visited Hong Kong on August 28, he restated that the 
Diaoyu Islands were part of Japan, and refused to offer apologies for comfort women 
and victims during World War II, Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) 
organized a mass protest on the same day.  
On August 31, Mr. Tong Zeng, a long-time activist with a dream of “flying kite 
on the Diaoyu Islands” organized a mass signing movement, petitioning Chinese 
president Jiang Zemin to send troops to the Diaoyu Islands, to tear down the beacons 
and “take back” China’s Diaoyu Islands.  
On September 1, graduate students from Fudan University, Shanghai hung 
posters on campus, denouncing the Japanese actions over the Diaoyu Islands and also 
criticizing the Chinese government’s weak responses towards Japanese provocation. 
This poster called for a gathering on September 18, the day memorizing China’s loss 
of the Northeastern three provinces in 1931. A poster on campus stated “Beat the 
Japanese militarism.” Students urged the government to adopt military methods to 
resolve the dispute. Also on September 1, Tong Zeng submitted a letter to the Chinese 
president calling for military actions over the disputed islands. 
On September 6, 31 Chinese journalists petitioned the government, requesting 
the government send troops to the Diaoyu Islands. On September 7, ten anti-Japanese 
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heroes from Northern China’s Helongjiang Province during the World War II 
petitioned the government, requesting China send troops to take back the Diaoyu 
Islands, swearing they were ready to fight against Japanese “once more.” 
On September 8, the China Federation for Defending Diaoyu Islands was 
founded in Beijing, with Mr. Tong Zeng as the president. It advocates military means 
for solving the Diaoyu dispute. 
On September 11, 1996, several thousand Chinese citizens petitioned the 
Chinese government, urging it to send troops to take back the Diaoyu Islands.  
On September 13, more than three hundred student of Peking University 
gathered on campus, urging the Chinese government to be more assertive over the 
Diaoyu Islands, urging China to send troops to tear down the lighthouse erected on 
the Diaoyu islands, and defend its sovereignty over the disputed islands.    
On September 15, more than six thousand Hong Kong residents gathered in 
Hong Kong to protest Japanese actions over the Diaoyu Islands. On September 18, 
about six thousand Hong Kong residents gathered in Hong Kong, convocations of 
similar size were also held in major cities in mainland China. On September 20, 
Peking University forbad students’ protesting. September 26, Mr. Chen Yuxiang 
drowned in water near the Diaoyu Islands.  
After the death of Mr. Chen, the 1996 incident came to a pause. Public and 
large-scale protests did not take place until 2004, when Mr. Tong Zeng’s China 
Federation of Defending Diaoyu Islands successfully landed on the disputed islands.  
To sum up, a key argument of the DDM in 1996 was military means. They were 
asking for the Chinese government to be assertive and urging it to adopt military 
means to resolve the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. They held protests, signed 
petitions to urge the Chinese government to adopt military means to resolve the 
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dispute and “take back” the Diaoyu Islands from Japan.  
According to the label of arguments as summarized in Chapter 4, the arguments 
of the POLs in 1996 were “patriotic”, with military actions as a preferred policy 
advocated by the DDM activists. 
 
II. 2004: Increases in Assertive Foreign Policy  
 The incident in 2004 can be seen as a continuation of the 1996 crisis. After the 
crisis over the Diaoyu Islands in 1996, which was mostly initiated by Japanese 
provocations, Defense Diaoyu Movement grew in Hong Kong, mainland China and 
Taiwan. In mainland China, headed by Mr. Tong Zeng, the DDM made a plan to land 
on the disputed Diaoyu Islands. As a response to previous Japanese actions of 
building beacons, they wanted to demonstrate Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu 
Islands. As Mr. Li Nan, a long-time DDM activist stated in an interview, “what we are 
doing now will add bargaining chips for China in future negotiations over the Diaoyu 
Islands.”    
 In 2004, the activities of DDM forced the Chinese government to confront Japan 
over the Diaoyu Islands. The incident in 2004 can be viewed as a continuation of the 
1996 crisis, which sparked the DDM in mainland China, and led to the successful 
landing of China Federation of Defending Diaoyu (CFDD) on the disputed islands in 
March 2004. When the Japanese Coast Guard arrested seven DDM activists, a 
diplomatic crisis happened between China and Japan. The arrest angered the Chinese 
public and also the Chinese government. After the Chinese government initiated 
intensive foreign negotiations, Japan released the arrested DDM activists two days 
after the crisis began. 
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 This incident is far simpler than the ones in 1996 or in 2010. In 2003, the 
Japanese Youth League landed on the Diaoyu Islands again to repair the beacons they 
erected in 1996. This action stimulated the movement of defending Diaoyu Islands in 
mainland China. With the China Federation of Defending Diaoyu established in 1996, 
Mr. Tong Zeng and his members strived to land on the Diaoyu Islands and display 
Chinese sovereignty over the disputed islands. On October 9, 2003, DDM activists 
rented a boat and sailed from Xiamen to the Diaoyu islands; they were blocked by the 
Japanese Coast Guard in water about three hundred feet from the Diaoyu Islands. This 
attempted landing failed. Another attempt in January 2004 also failed. The third 
attempt on March 24, 2004 was successful: seven DDM activists landed on the 
disputed islands. In 2004, the DDMs initiated the actions of defending the sovereignty. 
Their actions were patriotic in nature. Unlike 1996, they did not challenge the 
government.  
 
Government Narratives: “Chinese Territory.”  
 Shortly after the arrest of seven DDM activist on the Diaoyu Islands, on March 
24 afternoon, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Yesui summoned charge 
d'affaires of Japanese embassy and protested against the arrest of Chinese citizens on 
Chines Diaoyu Islands. Vice Minister Zhang Yesui stated, “the Diaoyu Islands have 
been China’s territory since ancient times, China has indisputable sovereignty over 
these islands. The Chinese government and its people have determined resolve and 
willingness to defend its territorial sovereignty.” In addition, he also commented that 
the arrest of seven DDM activists was a severe violation of Chinese sovereignty and 
of the human rights of Chinese citizens, therefore, it is a very “serious incident”. “We 
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urge Japan to release detained Chinese citizens immediately and unconditionally.”10  
 On the same day, the Chinese ambassador in Japan, Mr. Wu Dawei also protested 
at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign affairs; he pointed out, “Japan should release the 
detained Chinese citizens immediately. If the situation worsens, Japanese government 
will have to assume the responsibility for worsened bilateral relationship.”11  
 Again, on the same day, MFA spokesperson Mr. Kong Quan spoke at a regular 
MFA press event about this incident, after discussing the landing of seven Chinese 
citizens, he stated, “the Diaoyu Islands have been Chinese territory since ancient 
times. We always strive to solve the dispute through peaceful negotiation. We urge 
Japan to calm down when handling this incident, and not to harm these activists.
12
 
The next day, March 26, 2004, seven activists were released by Japan. The incident 
ended almost as soon as it just started.  
 The government has two major arguments in the statements. 
 First, the Diaoyu Islands are part of China’s territory “since ancient times,” which 
is a sovereignty-historical argument. As mentioned before, this has been the Chinese 
government’s core argument since 1996. Second, Japan must release the arrested 
Chinese citizens immediately. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
10 “China MFA negotiates with Japan for detained Chinese citizens on the Diaoyu Islands.” 
2004-3-25,( http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t80597.htm)  
11 Ibid.  
12 MFA Spokesperson’s speech on 2004-3-24.   
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Figure 6.7 Word Cloud for Government’s Speeches after 2004 Incident 
 
 Yoshikoder’s frequency count yields the following result (after removing 
propositions and “China” “Diaoyu Islands” and “Japan”).  
 
Table 6.4 Yoshikoder Analysis of Government’s Speeches after 2004 Incident 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Proportions of frequent words do not add up to 1. Proportions round to 3 
digits.  
 
English Word Count Proportion 
“Territory/territorial” 领土 5 0.029  
“Sovereignty” 主权 3 0.018  
“People” 人民 3 0.018  
“Citizens” 公民 3 0.018  
“Islands” 岛屿 3 0.018  
“Government” 政府 3 0.018  
“Japanese side” 日方 3 0.018  
“Severe/severity” 严重 2 0.012  
“personnel” 人员 2 0.012  
“inherent” 固有 2 0.012  
“security” 安全 2 0.012  
“that is/so” 就是 2 0.012  
“strong” 强烈 2 0.012  
“we/us” 我们 2 0.012  
“detain/arrest” 扣留 2 0.012  
“board on” 登上 2 0.012  
“since ancient times” 自古以来 2 0.012  
“demand/request” 要求 2 0.012  
“affiliates” 附属 2 0.012  
  Total 47 Total:0.281 
Sovereignty 
Territory 
People 
Citizens 
Govern-
ment 
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These statements do show an emphasis on “territory”, as shown in their speeches, 
the word “territory” is used as follows, “China’s inherent territory,” “defend China’s 
territorial integrity,” “China’s territory of Diaoyu Islands,” “China’s territorial 
integrity,” and “inherent territory since ancient times.”  
In sum, opposed to 1996, the Chinese government had a much stronger sense of 
“territory” over the Diaoyu Islands. In 1996, the Chinese government emphasized 
historical evidence for its sovereignty, but in 2004, it is more explicitly stated that the 
Diaoyu Islands were China’s territory, assuming the historical evidence is true and 
self-explanatory. According to the label of arguments, the government’s narratives in 
2004 were in the “sovereignty” category, without a clear emphasis on historical or 
legal evidence. 
 
Intellectuals: “Historical and Legal evidence was undeniable.” 
 As the graph of the number of articles from 1994 to 2010 shows, the second peak 
appeared in 2004, when the DDM successfully landed on the Diaoyu Islands and 
government swiftly resolved the dispute in two days.  
 In 2004, quite a few articles were published in Chinese core journals. Within the 
12 journal articles published in 2004, 3 were about history. Compared with 1996, we 
see a big increase in the “policy” category, with more scholarly interest on how to 
govern the Diaoyu Islands to exercise China’s sovereignty over these islands. Despite 
of the small number of articles in total, this change indicates a shift of interest on the 
dispute among Chinese intellectuals from history to the policy issue over the Diaoyu 
Islands. In 2005, a year after the 2004 incident over the Diaoyu Islands, this fad over 
the Diaoyu islands on core journals was soon replaced by the dispute between China 
 171 
 
and Japan over the oil exploration the East China Sea, Chunxiao Gas and Oil Field. 
Figure 6.8 Categories of Articles Published in 2004 over the Diaoyu Islands.  
 N=12  
 Within these articles, Dr. Shi Jiazhu from FudanUniversity’s research on the 
Diaoyu Islands and current Sino-Japan relations was very interesting in summarizing 
all the actions of the Japanese government since the end of World War II over the 
Diaoyu Islands and pointed out that Japan had been trying to demonstrate its legal 
sovereignty by emphasizing de facto control over the Diaoyu Islands. He warned the 
government to be aware of this trend in order to prevent Japanese government from 
achieving their goal regarding the Diaoyu Islands.
13
 
  Historical and legal analysis has been a theme of the Diaoyu Islands research 
since 1996 in Chinese academia. Inheriting Dr. Inoue from Japan, Chinese scholars 
support the government’s assertion of sovereignty by elaborating the “historical and 
legal” evidence supporting China’s sovereignty. However, the data and articles 
available in 2004 showed that Chinese scholars are more interested in “politics and 
policy”: articles were published on the China-Japan relationship and China’s Ocean 
Policy. These articles are related to the Diaoyu Islands, but gave more emphasis on 
practical issues of public policy and bi-lateral relations with Japan. However, 
                                                             
13 Shi, Jiazhu. “Diaoyu islands dispute and Sino-Japan relationship.” Journal of Mao Zedong-Dengxiaoping 
theories. 2004-4.  
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whatever topics Chinese scholars were working on, none were against China’s 
sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. According to the label of arguments in Chapter 4, 
Chinese intellectuals’ narratives over the Diaoyu Islands in 2004 were “economic” 
and “sovereignty (historical/legal)”. 
 
POLs: Patriotism  
A group of people from the general public answers the government’s assertions of 
sovereignty with their actions. These people are distinguished by their enthusiastic 
and emotional actions over the Diaoyu Islands and they play a critical role in 
justifying China’s sovereignty in the dispute. These people function as the “critical 
masses” in supporting China’s claim over the Diaoyu Islands, and their actions invoke 
great concerns for both parties in the dispute. These people include those activists of 
the Defending the Diaoyu Islands Movement (“Bao Diao Yun Dong”, “DDM” 
afterwards), activists who organized the protest against Japan after the arrest of Mr. 
Zhan, and also the “netizens” (net-citizens) steadfastly defending China’s sovereignty 
by using the Internet to comment on this dispute.  They support the government’s 
assertions with actions, and believe that China has had the Diaoyu Islands “since 
ancient times,” which is an argument emphasizing historical discovery and inchoate 
title in history. 
Since the opening of mainland China in the late 1970s, the DDM boomed there. 
During and after the 1996 incident, DDM activists from mainland China, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan came together and began to demonstrate sovereignty near and on the 
Diaoyu Islands several times. An important goal for these activists to demonstrate 
Chinese sovereignty is to land on the Diaoyu Islands. 
 173 
 
DDMs are organized by people with enthusiasm over the Diaoyu Islands, often 
they do not have support from the government nor any government background; 
rather, they raise funds by themselves, rent boats and plan for the trips to the Diaoyu 
Islands. In an interview with the DDM activists, the leader of the DDM in mainland 
China organized a trip to the Diaoyu Islands in June 2003, shortly after the Japanese 
government announced it “rented” the Diaoyu Islands from a Japanese citizen 
claiming the ownership of these islands.  
 
According to Li Nan, a leader of the DDM in mainland China, they arranged a 
trip for landing on the Diaoyu Islands on June 22, 2003. They rented a fishing boat 
and had the captain take them to the Diaoyu Islands; however, 12 out of the 15 
participants were not experienced sailors. Their plan of landing on the islands was 
interrupted by the blockade of the Japanese Coastal Guards, who circled Li Nan’s ship 
and announced that “this is Japanese territory.” Li Nan responded to them by shouting 
back that they were actually travelling in Chinese territory. However, they had no 
experience or technology to break through the blockade of the Japanese Coast Guard. 
When they returned to China, they were greeted with local people holding flowers, 
treating them as heroes, and “the authorities” affirmed their actions.14 
The DDM activists’ third endeavor on March 24, 2004 led to a successful landing 
on the Diaoyu Islands. However, after ten hours, and making signs of “Chinese 
occupation” on the Diaoyu Islands, the 7 DDM activists were arrested by Japan, and 
they were detained for a day on Okinawa. According to Li Nan, when they were 
detained in Okinawa, they were asked whether they had governmental background, 
                                                             
14 This narrative comes from a secondary source, the interview of Mr. Li Nan, the organizer of the DDM landing 
on the Diaoyu islands in 2003. The interview and reports are available at 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2010-12-03/171321578935_3.shtml. Originally, this interview is published in 
Sanlian Life Weekly [三联生活周刊]，on 2010-12-3, titled as “Landing on the Diaoyu Islands: the Glory and 
Hardship of DDM Volunteers.” 
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and they refused to answer, because Li believed that “they were illegally arrested by 
foreign military forces on Chinese territory.”15 Speaking of their expensive and 
dangerous actions, Li Nan made a statement on behalf of all activists in his DDM 
group,  
“What we are doing now will add bargaining chips for China in future 
negotiations over the Diaoyu Islands.”16  
 
Unfortunately, Li Nan did not specify how their landing would lend more 
credibility to the Chinese assertion of sovereignty in the future. During his interview, 
Li affirmed that the Diaoyu Islands have been Chinese territory, on the basis of history 
and international law.  
What is interesting in Li Nan’s narrative is, when they landed on the Diaoyu 
Islands, they spent ten hours establishing signs of effective control. As analyzed, 
China’s assertions are not legally sound mostly because China does not have evidence 
that demonstrates effective control. The DDM activists’ actions are actually 
intentionally helping to defend China’s assertion by erecting signs of effective control. 
This might be what Li Nan meant when he said their behavior will add bargaining 
chips for China.  
Figure 6.9 Successful Landing of the DDM on the Diaoyu Islands in 2004 
 
Between 2003 and 2004, the mainland Chinese witnessed a lot of propaganda 
                                                             
15 In the interview of Mr. Li Nan, and his recall of their detain in Okinawa.  
16 Original text as “通过自己的努力给国家增加未来谈判的砝码”。  
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about the DDM groups and read much about their efforts to land on the Diaoyu 
Islands, all activists were praised by the media for their patriotism. However, 
defending the Diaoyu Islands is just one mission of the DDM groups.  
The act of landing on the Diaoyu Islands symbolized the peak of the Defending 
Diaoyu Islands Movement, however, it can also be seen as an ending of the DDM – 
after a successful landing, DDM activists found themselves hard to move forward. As 
Mr. Li Nan said in his interview, in 2003 and 2004, what DDM activists had was “the 
purest enthusiasm.”17 Another DDM activist, Mr. Li Yiqiang, who sold all his 
property and business to support 2003-2004 DDM activities, quoted a Taiwanese 
DDM activist, “if Defending Diaoyu Movement is TV series, successful landing on 
the islands is the end of the show.”18 Therefore, after the successful landing in 2004, 
DDM activities in Mainland China have become much “quieter” with much less 
radical activities.  
After seven DDM activists were detained by Japan, protests were held in Beijing 
outside the Japanese embassy on March 25. On the same day, the Chinese government 
protested against Japan nine times on March 25. The incident ended soon with Japan 
releasing the detained DDM activists on March 26, 2004.  
 
Due to the lack of interviews with the DDM, other than the one with Mr. Li Nan, 
who was interviewed in a report about the DDM in the past 40 years, there has not 
been sufficient text data for analyzing their key words. However, it is not hard to 
detect their patriotism from their website and their documents published. For instance, 
in the Declaration of DDM passed in December 2003, right before the 2004 crisis, a 
key words analysis yields the following word cloud 
                                                             
17 “Landing on the Diaoyu Islands: Dreams and Sufferings of the DDM Activists.” 2010-12-03 on Sanlian Life 
Weekly  [三联生活周刊]. 
18 Ibid.  
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Figure 6.10 Word Cloud for Declaration of DDM in December 2003. 
 
 The most often mentioned words are “China” “we/us” and “nation”.  
Table 6.5 Yoshikoder Analysis for Declaration of DDM in December 2003. 
English Word Count Proportion 
Chinese Nation 中华 15 0.015  
We 我们 9 0.013  
Declaration 宣言 8 0.012  
Principles 原则 7 0.010  
Movement 行动 7 0.010  
Goal 宗旨 6 0.009  
Japan 日本 6 0.009  
mutual 相互 6 0.009  
Diaoyu 钓鱼岛 6 0.009  
Nation 民族 5 0.007  
Decedents 儿女 4 0.006  
Cooperation 协作 4 0.006  
Initiator 发起人 4 0.006  
Such as 此类 4 0.006  
Position 立场 4 0.006  
Actions 行为 4 0.006  
  Total :99  Total: 0.136 
  Note: Proportions of frequent words do not add up to 1. Proportions round to 
3 digits. 
 
 A close reading of their website and their statements shows that the nature of 
patriotism is clearly demonstrated from their speeches. On the website of the 
Non-governmental Defending Diaoyu Islands Council,
19
 the introduction of the 
Diaoyu Islands centers on the Chinese sovereignty of the islands, meanwhile, their 
                                                             
19 Their official website at www.cfdd.org.cn.  
WE/US 
Chinese 
nation 
Nation Declaration 
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statement also specifies that this council has the responsibility to “reveal the evils 
Japan has conducted during the wartime.”20 Also it can be noted from their website 
that the DDM is linked with other issues: the website of the Non-governmental 
Defending Diaoyu Islands Council also posts the memorial articles for the victims in 
Nanjing Massacre in 1937, Sichuan Earthquake in 2008, and comfort women during 
World War II. These elements indicate the patriotic nature of the DDM. On the 
website of another DDM group based in Hong Kong, the Action Committee for 
Defending the Diaoyu Islands, the actions of defending the Diaoyu Islands are also 
presented with the Nanjing Massacre, Compensation to comfort women and other 
issues relevant to Japanese atrocities during World War II. 
These websites and the statements of the DDM groups deliver a message that 
defending the Diaoyu Islands is a way of demonstrating patriotism, and in addition, 
among many atrocities China has suffered from Japan, the Diaoyu Islands dispute is 
just one incident among many.  
Such an issue-linkage of the Diaoyu Islands with the memory of sufferings during 
World War II sets a tone for the Diaoyu Islands dispute. That is, the dispute over the 
Diaoyu Islands, like all the other incidents during World War II, is another example 
that the “other” of the dispute – Japan, is threatening “us” as Chinese. This tone for 
the dispute, as reflected from the DDM groups, suddenly erupted and materialized 
after the arrest of Mr. Zhan in September, 2010.  
 
 To sum up, the 2004 incident began with the DDM and forced the Chinese 
government to challenge Japanese occupation over the Diaoyu Islands. Before the 
incident, the DDM in mainland China has flourished and developed. After their 
                                                             
20 Text available at http://www.cfdd.org.cn/html/6/n-6.html.  
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successful landing on the disputed islands, the 2004 incident broke out. However, 
with the Chinese government’s swift response, the seven detained DDM activists were 
released two days after they were arrested on the Diaoyu Islands.  
 The narratives of the POLs in 2004, according to the label of arguments, are 
“patriotic” in nature. Different from what happened in 1996, POLs in 2004 did not 
confront the government directly in their narratives.  
 
Aftermath of the 2004 Incident 
 As James Reilly recorded over the same incident, the Chinese government soon 
began to contain public sentiment after detained DDM activists were released. 
According to Reilly’s interview with one of the seven activists in Shanghai, when they 
were sent back to China, they “were taken into custody immediately upon their return 
to China, denying them a public reception in Shanghai or Beijing,” even though there 
were hundreds of people welcoming them at the airport for their heroic actions on the 
Diaoyu Islands. Then, the Chinese government showed appreciation to Japan for 
releasing the detained Chinese citizens quickly. A bilateral relationship was then 
brought back to the path.  
 
III. 2010: Arrested Fisherman and Assertive Government 
 
The incident in 2010, sparked with the arrest of Chinese fisherman, Mr. Zhan 
Qixiong, crystallized the interaction of three streams of sentiments among the 
government, intellectuals and the public. With the swift response of the government, 
China took the initiative in handling the crisis, the public followed with mass protests 
against Japan, but no voices against the government. The intellectuals later aided the 
 179 
 
Chinese government’s claim with research and studies in legal and historical 
disciplines.  
As shown in the past chapter, within this incident, what was not seen in the two 
previous incidents was the “countermeasures” policy taken by the government, which 
can be seen as a manifestation of Chinese assertive foreign policy. Compared with 
previous two incidents, the Chinese government took strong policy actions against 
Japan in 2010. What explained the countermeasure policy is one of the puzzles to be 
solved with this analysis. What roles have the political narratives played in pushing 
for such a policy is the other puzzle.  
We can speculate when asking about why an assertive policy was adopted in 
2010 might indicate that the Japanese government was more steadfast in 2010 than in 
2004: in 2004, Japan released the seven DDM activists the next day after China 
protested. In 2010, however, Mr. Zhan had been detained by Japan for 12 days (from 
September 7) until China adopted the countermeasures policy on September 19. 
Therefore, it may lead to a conclusion that China’s assertive policy was a reaction to 
Japan’s unwavering stance in 2010. None the less, a counterfactual analysis of the 
2004 incidents – if Japan did not release the DDM activists that soon - may also 
equally render consequences like the crisis in 1996, in which the Chinese government 
was reacting passively to Japanese initiatives. In this sense, a narrative analysis of the 
government’s narratives becomes the key to distinguish any difference in the Chinese 
government’s attitudes in these three incidents.  
 
Official Narratives from the Government: “It is illegal!”  
As presented in Chapter 4, data on the government’s narratives are collected 
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from the following three sources, the MFA press, leaders’ speeches (if any), and 
official newspapers. Texts from these sources are collected to reflect the official 
opinion of the government towards the crisis.  
The MFA speeches after the 2010 incidents are summarized as follows. On the 
same day Mr. Zhan was arrested (September 7), MFA spokeswoman Jiang Yu 
responded that “China has been deeply concerned” with the situation, and protested 
against Japan. She also emphasized that the Diaoyu Islands have been Chinese 
territory since ancient times, and the Japanese Coast Guard should not have patrolled 
in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands.  
On September 9, Jiang Yu was asked more questions on the incidents. She stated 
that “this incident is highly sensitive and serious” and China demanded the immediate 
release of the arrested Captain and his crew, “to prevent the issue from escalating.”21 
In addition, she makes three points in her press statement. First she warned the 
Japanese government that a failure to handle this issue properly will negatively impact 
the China- Japan relationship. When asked whether China will take further actions 
after this issue, she dodged the question by saying “we have protested formally 
against Japanese government.” Second, she called it unacceptable, ridiculous, illegal 
and invalid to apply Japanese law to the case of Mr. Zhan. Third, she confirmed that 
Chinese government has sent patrolling boat to the Diaoyu Islands.  
On September 10, Ms. Jiang lodged on official protest against Japan’s refusal to 
release Mr. Zhan. In addition, she announced that the scheduled meeting between the 
Chinese and Japanese governments over the East China Sea would be postponed.  
On September 12, when asked about undertaking Japanese jurisdiction over Mr. 
Zhan, Ms. Jiang again demanded the immediate release of Mr. Zhan. Also, she stated 
                                                             
21 9-9- 2010 the People’ Daily.  
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that “any actions taken by the Japanese government over Mr. Zhan and his boar are 
illegal, invalid and in vain.” 
On September 13, when Japan released Mr .Zhan’s crew, but not Mr. Zhan, Ms. 
Jiang stated that the Chinese government had protested multiple times and China 
urged Japan to release Mr. Zhan as soon as possible.  
On September 17, Ms. Jiang announced the Chinese government was sending 
more patrolling boats to the disputed waters to “protect the maritime interest of 
China.” 
On September 19, another MFA spokesperson, Mr. Ma Chaoxu made the 
statement over possible “countermeasures” if Japan did not release the arrested 
Chinese fisherman.  
On September 20, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya gave another 
notice to the Japanese ambassador over the possible “countermeasures” if Japan does 
not release Mr. Zhan. He emphasized that this incident had been initiated by Japan 
and has aroused a severe impact; how the incident will develop depends on the 
decision of the Japanese government.  
On September 21, Ms. Jiang Yu affirmed her demand to release Mr. Zhan, in 
addition, she emphasized, China will never give up on issues related to territorial 
sovereignty, and China has firm and absolute resolve and willingness to defend its 
territory and sovereignty.  
On September 22, Ms. Jiang Yu explained the “countermeasures” taken. She said, 
“the Japanese government insisted on applying its domestic jurisdiction over Mr. 
Zhan, which is a severe violation and challenge to Chinese sovereignty. This action 
has angered Chinese people and severely hurt China-Japan relationship. We have to 
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make necessary reactions.”22 
On September 25, one day after Mr. Zhan was released, Chinese MFA made an 
official statement reaffirming Chinese sovereignty over the islands and criticized 
Japan’s arrest of Mr. Zhan for fishing in water of the Diaoyu Islands. On the same day, 
the MFA demanded an apology and compensation from the Japanese government for 
arresting Mr. Zhan.  
On September 28, the MFA spokesperson again, confirmed the Chinese regular 
patrol of the Diaoyu Islands, because “the Diaoyu Islands have been traditionally used 
by Chinese fishermen.”  
By the end of September, the incidents came to a conclusion, though Japan 
refused to offer any apologies or compensation for Mr. Zhan.  
 
With these statements in Chinese text, I conducted an analysis of these 
statements. By importing all these statements (excluding redundant words like 
“China” ,”Japan” or “Diaoyu islands”, the word cloud in Chinese appears as follows 
Now, with this setup and the word cloud – equaling the argument of a more 
assertive foreign policy is sustained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
22 2010-9-22, the People’s Daily.  
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Figure 6.11 Word Clouds for Chinese Official Statements in September2010 
(MFA statement and Announcement)  
 
Meanwhile, analysis of Yoshikoder yields the following table in word frequency 
(after taking out words like “Japan”“China”“Diaoyu Islands” and propositions).  
Table 6.6 Yoshikoder Analysis for Chinese Official Statements in September2010 
(MFA statement and Announcement) 
Notes: Proportions of frequent words do not add up to 1. Proportions round to 3 
digits.  
  
As revealed, in these texts, a key word is “illegal”[非法]. In these statements, 
this word has been used in the following combinations: 
 
English  
Words Count 
Proportion 
(rounded to 3 
digits_) 
“Illegal” 非法 16 0.014  
“Sea” 海域 14 0.013  
“Fishing boat” 渔船 14 0.013  
“Territory” 领土 14 0.013  
“Fishermen” 渔民 12 0.011  
“sovereignty” 主权 10 0.009  
“immediately/immediate” 立即 10 0.009  
“strong/strongly” 强烈 9 0.008  
“captain” 船长 9 0.008  
“serious/severe” 严重 8 0.007  
“situation” 事态 8 0.007  
“unconditional” 无条件 8 0.007  
“relationship” 关系 6 0.005  
“inherited” 固有 6 0.005  
  Total:144 Totaled: 0.129  
Illegal 
Severe 
Issue 
Territory 
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Table 6.7 Context for the Word “Illegal/Illegally” in Chinese official narratives.  
Date Context 
9-7 China protests against Japan’s “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman. 
9-9 Japan’s “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman has angered Chinese 
public. 
 Japan’s attempt of applying its domestic law onto Chinese fisherman is 
unreasonable, “illegal” and invalid.  
9-10 Japan’s attempt of hold Mr. Zhan under Japanese jurisdiction is 
ridiculous, “illegal” and invalid.  
9-12 China strong objects the “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman …  
 China believes the arrest was “illegal”, invalid and in vain.  
9-13 Since the “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman, the Chinese government 
has protested several times. 
 Worldwide Chinese denounce the “illegal” action of Japan.  
 Till today (9-13), Japan is still “illegally” detaining Chinese fisherman.  
9-19 Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya expressed anger and concern over 
Japanese “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman. 
9-21 Japan’s “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman has negatively impact 
China-Japan relations.  
9-22 Japan’s “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman … is blatantly violation of 
Chinese sovereignty.  
 Japan’s “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman has violated the 
agreements between China and Japan on resolving disputes through 
dialogue and the spirit for mutual benefits.  
 Till today, Japan is still “illegally” detaining Chinese fisherman.  
9-25 [In the official announcement of MFA] 
Japan “illegally” arrested and detain 15 Chinese fishermen, and held the 
captain till September 24 has aroused anger of the Chinese government 
and also its public.   
 Any arrest, detain, search and attempt to apply Japanese jurisdiction on 
Chinese fisherman is “illegal” and invalid. Japanese government must 
apologize and compensate China for this incident.  
 
The other high-frequency words, like “territory” (12), “sovereignty” (10), 
“immediately” (9) are all directly related with the incident per se. In other words, the 
incident of the arrest of Chinese fishermen was about “territory” and “sovereignty”, 
the Chinese government’s demands were clear after the incident happened – Japan 
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should “immediately” release Chinese fisherman. However, the often-mentioned word 
of “illegal/illegally” indicates that the government believes the Japanese action was 
“illegal”. And this is a word that was not seen in the previous two incidents.  
According to the label of arguments, as summarized in Chapter 4, the 
government’s narratives in 2010 were “sovereignty-legal” in nature. Different from in 
1996 and 2004, the government has shifted its focus from historical evidence to legal 
claim over the disputed islands.  
 
Intellectuals: “Historical Occupation” – China has the legal claim.  
 I analyze the topics found among the articles published in 2010 and 2011. Within 
the 33 articles published in 2010 and 2011 over the Diaoyu Islands, 3 were about the 
history of the Diaoyu Islands (2 about historical evidence, 1 about the DDM). 10 
articles were about legal issues in the Diaoyu Islands dispute. 5 articles were about 
“policy”, within which, 3 were about the Chinese policy over the Diaoyu Islands 
(fishing policy, education policy, and islands governance). The majority (15) of those 
articles were about the politics behind the Diaoyu Islands.  
Figure 6.12 Amount of Articles by Topics between 2010 and 2011 
 N=33 
 Among these 33 articles, I chose those directly related to the dispute in 2010, but 
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ignored those on policy and political analysis. They include all articles in the legal 
and historical category, and one article about the Japanese foreign minister, who was 
accused of being responsible for the confrontation near the Diaoyu Islands in 2010.  
By focusing on these articles, I wish to capture the opinion of Chinese intellectuals 
towards the dispute.  
 An analysis of the abstracts of these articles yields a word cloud as follows 
Figure 6.13. Word Cloud for Academic Articles Abstracts Published on Chinese 
“Core Journals” in 2010 and 2011 
 
 
Analysis of the word frequency in Yoshikoder offers result as follows.  
Table 6.8 Word Frequency Count for Academic Articles Abstracts Published on 
Chinese “Core Journals” in 2010 and 2011 
 
English Words Count Proportion 
“Sovereignty” 主权 10 0.013  
“Effective” 有效 8 0.011  
“Dispute” 争端 7 0.009  
“Principles” 原则 7 0.009  
“Control” 控制 7 0.009  
“Islands” 岛屿 6 0.008  
“China” 我国 6 0.008  
“States” 国家 5 0.007  
“International 
Law” 国际法 5 
0.007  
“Islands from 
continent” 离岛 5 
0.007  
‘Territory” 领土 5 0.007  
“Relationship” 关系 4 0.005  
“Taiwan” 台湾 4 0.005  
  Total: 79 Total: 0.103 
Note: Proportions of frequent words do not add up to 1. Proportions round to 3 
Effective 
Control 
Sovereignty 
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digits.  
 
 Among these high-frequency words, “effective” and “principles”, along with 
“international law” were most often mentioned. These words reflect the nature of 
these academic articles in vindicating the Chinese government claim by offering legal 
and historical analysis.  
 These articles are analyzed by a close reading. By closely reading these articles, 
three main central arguments can be categorized.  
 First, Japan’s claim is not legal. These academic journal articles discussed about 
the “effective control” principles, which was a key argument adopted by Japan to 
defend its sovereignty. China discovered these islands first, and China has exercised 
effective control over these islands. As Professor Qu analyzed, the “effective control” 
principle applies only when a state has continuous, uncontested and sufficient control 
over the territory. Testing against these requirements, he concluded Japan’s claim 
based on “effective control” does not stand.23  
Second, China’s claim is supported by historical evidence. Basically, China’s 
evidence and historical documents have established solid legal ground for its 
sovereignty. As the article published in World Knowledge, Japanese scholar Yasushi 
Inoue has conducted research and concluded that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to 
China.
24
 In another article, with the rediscovery of a famous book, “Fusheng Liuji”, 
the fashion of collecting evidence has come to its peak.   
Third, these articles also agree that the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands is a key 
issue between China and Japan. Whether this issue can be resolved will have great 
impact on bilateral relations and regional stability. Almost all scholars agree that a 
                                                             
23 Qu, Bo. “Effective Control in Islands disputes.” Modern Legal Studies. 2010-1: 144-151.  
24 “Yasushi Inoue: Diaoyu islands belong to China.” World Knowledge 2010-19: 21-23. See also KANG Yongqiu, 
(2010) “Preface of War of Taiwan Strait and Li Jingsong，Magistrate of Taiwa at the Time of Yiwei Period.” 
Journal of Hunan University of Science ＆ Technology 13-6: 130-133.  
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peaceful resolution of the dispute will benefit both China and Japan – this is a position 
consistent with that of the government.  
In sum, intellectuals are offering intellectual products to support the government’s 
position. More scholarly work has focused on the “legal” issue behind the dispute. By 
conducting research on international legal principles, they revealed why Japan’s 
arrests of Chinese fishermen and claiming sovereignty over the islands were “illegal”, 
whereas the Chinese government’s claim was perfectly legal, historically and legally. 
These findings are supportive of the Chinese government’s claim of sovereignty and 
demands for releasing the arrested Chinese fisherman. 
According to the label of arguments, the narratives of the intellectuals in 2010 
were “sovereignty-legal” in nature.  
 
POLs: Patriotism  
 Compared with statements from the government and intellectuals, political 
narratives from the public are more fragmented and require more creativity to gather. 
As stated in Chapter 2, I adopt several streams to measure the political narratives and 
attitudes from the public.  
 First, interviews and statements made by DDM activist, including interview about 
them, their statements available, any documents they offer, including the Declaration 
of Worldwide DDM passed in late 2003, which have been analyzed in two previous 
incidents.  
 Second, cyberspace: compared with 1996 and 2004, in 2010 personal usage of the 
Internet has developed in China and the public can express their opinions freely in 
cyberspace despite of the government’s aversion towards mass protests in the streets.  
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 Third, the slogans of the public during mass protests: this source of data is to be 
gathered mostly from media that report mass protests.  
 In 2010, however, the major source for data collection is from the slogans of the 
public during mass protests and their actions. The government actually constrained 
public mobilization after Mr. Zhan was arrested; on the other hand, public 
mobilizations in several major cities did turn violent riots that hurt the public.  
 After the 2010 incident took place, the Chinese public’s interest over the Diaoyu 
Islands dispute skyrocketed. As shown in the Baidu Index
25
, searches for the “Diaoyu 
Islands” in this Chinese search engine rose steeply.  
 
 
Figure 6.14 Users’ and Media Attention According to Baidu Index.  
 
 As the graph shows, in late 2010, the “level of users’ attention” rose exponentially. 
Correspondingly, the lower tier reflects the “level of media attention,” in 2010 when 
this level also reached a high peak. 
                                                             
25 Baidu Index is a service provided by China’s biggest search engine company. In many ways, it resembles 
Google trends. However, it focuses on the Chinese search engine and is geared towards Chinese internet users. 
Google, however, has retreated from China since early 2010.  
Level of Users’ Attention 
Level of Media Attention 
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 In the graph, however, it is interesting to note that in mid-2008, the level of media 
attention was high, however, the users’ attention on this dispute was influenced only a 
little bit. In June 2008, the Japanese House of Representative announced a “watch” by 
Japanese congressmen in a plane over the disputed islands. Chinese media gave quite 
a few reports on the Japanese action, but it did not arouse the interest of the public. A 
possible reason for that is the public, after experiencing the high level of conflict in 
1996 and 2004, had a lack of interest towards Japan’s unilateral fly-over action, 
considering that action mostly symbolic.  
 Unfortunately, this feature of Baidu offers data only from July 1, 2006. Therefore, 
a comparison of 2004 was unavailable. However, Google Trends offers a good 
supplement before it retreated from China in 2010.  
 
Figure 6.15 Users’ and Media Attention over the Diaoyu Islands from Google 
Trends 
 
 
 While the low peak in 2010 can be explained by the retreat of Google from China 
in early 2010, another high peak in 2006 was interesting (this was omitted from Baidu 
Index because the Baidu Index begins in July 1, 2006). The label E, which is key 
 191 
 
media reports identified by Google, was about the military exercises between Japan 
and America.
26
 However, this report was made on April 4, 2006, and the report was 
made on a rarely-known media called E-north. Therefore, this may not be the cause of 
high peak in 2006. However, an analysis of the DDM reveals that in late 2006, the 
DDM from mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan waged another attempt trying to 
land on the Diaoyu Islands, but failed because of the intervention of both the Chinese 
and Japanese governments.
27
 However, the plan to land did not escalate into any 
conflict or any arrests.  
 
 On the other hand, the DDM activists organized to protest against Japan. 
According to the post of China Federation of Defending Diaoyu on its website, on 
September 13, several DDM activists organized in Xiamen, calling for more 
participants to “fish in water near Chinese Diaoyu Islands.” However, other than 
several pictures in this post, no reports were found on their actions. According to a 
report of these DDM on BBC, Mr. Li Nan, the leader of DDM, said that their 
application was “very likely” to be rejected by the authorities.28  
Meanwhile, POLs enlarged to include more members in addition to those DDM 
activists. Mass protests were organized to support Mr. Zhan in major cities in China. 
However, they soon turned out to be a mass protest against the Japanese government 
and the Japanese atrocities during World War II. This negative sentiment reached its 
peak 11 days after Mr. Zhan was arrested – September 18, the anniversary of the 
Japanese occupation of Northeast China. It is believed that this protest was initially 
organized by college students online, and when it started in several major cities, 
                                                             
26 2006-4-4, “Japan may adopt military means to occupy the Diaoyu Islands by escalating its military plan.” At 
Enorth.com. http://www.enorth.com.cn  
27 See the website of Chinese Federation of Defend Diaoyu, at 
http://www.cfdd.org.cn/html/75/125875-type-image.html. 
28 “Defending Diaoyu Federation: Protest by sailing in the disputed water” BBC News 2010-9-16.   
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including Beijing, Shanghai, and Chengdu, the protestors displayed slogans including 
“Return us the Diaoyu Islands”, “Release Chinese Captain”, “Diaoyu Islands are ours” 
and “Boycott Japanese products.”29In Chengdu, protestors attracted new participants 
in the street. In Chengdu and Xi’an, however, a large amount of protestors later 
became rioters that wanted to destroy anything relevant to Japan.
30
 They went beyond 
their cause of defending the Diaoyu Islands, throwing rocks towards supermarkets and 
department stores with Japanese names, even Japanese restaurants run by Chinese 
owners. Municipalities soon sent police to regulate the protests.
31
 
 In 2010, public narratives were a reflection of Chinese negative sentiment 
towards Japan, not only on the Diaoyu Islands, but also on all the memories the 
Chinese people have against Japan. Such an extremely negative sentiment is reflected 
in their slogans during the protest. 
 In Xi’an, protesters held the signs of “Return us the Diaoyu Islands,” and 
“Boycott Japanese products.”  
 In Chengdu, protesters burned Japanese flag and purposefully desecrated its flag 
(see Figure 6.7). In Hong Kong, protesters asked for the immediate release of Mr. 
Zhan Qixiong.  
 Other than calling for the immediate release and return of the Diaoyu Islands, 
these protestors linked this incident with the bad memory Chinese had against Japan. 
Therefore, “Chinese people cannot be humiliated” (in Hong Kong), “Boycott 
Japanese Products” (Figure 6.8), and “Never give up an inch of territory” or “Never 
forget September 18” (Figure 6.8). These slogans share the patriotism and the public’s 
negative sentiment towards Japan – a sentiment that can be traced back to 1898, when 
                                                             
29 Ibid.  
30 2010-10-17 Wenwei Po, published in Hong Kong, text available at 
http://paper.wenweipo.com/2010/10/17/YO1010170001.htm. Titled as “Tens of thousands held Anti-Japanese 
Protest in mainland China.” See also MFA remarks on these protest on 2010-10-16.  
31 Ibid.  
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Japan defeated China for the first time and asked for Taiwan and its affiliates 
(arguably inclusive of the Diaoyu Islands) and an astronomical amount of 
compensation.  
 The public’s narratives, according to the label of arguments, are still “patriotic” in 
nature. But they went beyond the disputed islands, including other issues China had 
and is having against Japan.  
Figure 6.16 Protests in mainland China and Hong Kong, Taiwan after Chinese 
fisherman was arrested near the Diaoyu Islands (Reuter Pictures) 
 
 
 
      
 Other than DDM activists, there are other actors functioning as POLs, including 
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popular commentators and retired PLA generals. Retired PLA generals are, as always, 
standing against any possible encroachment of Japan on Chinese territory. A retired 
PLA general in an interview said he would be willing to fight against the Japanese to 
defend the Diaoyu Islands “at all expenses.”32 Popular commentators, however, make 
statements criticizing both Japan and also the Chinese government, emphasizing the 
latter. For example, Han Han, a young popular commentator, expressed feelings more 
towards the Chinese government than on the dispute. He commented that the 
government of China is actually much softer towards Japan than towards its own 
people. What the government is worrying about is domestic stability, and is always 
willing to censor any postings that may jeopardize the Chinese government’s 
legitimacy.
33
 On Chinese cyberspace, numerous blogs have posted on why Japan and 
China are determined to fight another war. Mr. Shi Haibin, another famous 
commentator on social and political issues in China, mentioned in his own blog that 
the Diaoyu Islands dispute is a conspiracy of Japan, and the Chinese government, 
according to Mr. Shi, was wrong in deciding to “shelve” the Diaoyu Islands dispute.34 
 These commentators are mostly critics on China’s social and political issues. 
Different from the DDM activists, who focus on the Diaoyu Islands dispute, these 
commentators often link the frustration of China in foreign policy issues with the 
social problems the Chinese people suffer, such as corruption, and the isolation of the 
government from the common people. Reading the blogs of Shi and Han clearly 
yields a satirical taste that colors the dispute while criticizing the government isolating 
itself from people in a “black box.” Therefore, their comments, while interesting in 
offering narratives on the islands dispute, can more accurately be described as 
                                                             
32 “Jie fang jun jiang ling cheng baodiao shi erci kangzhan.” See 
(http://news.ifeng.com/mil/taiwan/detail_2012_07/10/15909108_0.shtml) 2012-7-10.  
33 See this article at Han Han’s blog at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4701280b0100lcum.html (only Chinese 
version).  
34 See this article at Mr. Shi Hanbin’s blog at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4b02a21a0100m2q0.html.  
 195 
 
critiques to Chinese social problems on the opportunities found in the islands dispute 
incidents.  
 
Aftermath of 2010 incident: No Reports and Busy College Students 
The attitude of the Chinese government towards mass protest was ambivalent. On 
one hand, China does not allow free protest; on the other hand, however, mass 
protests against foreign governments are often allowed – but only to an extent 
manageable by the authorities. After protests in 2010, none of the official newspapers 
reported these protests, even now, there is very limited information on these protests 
from the media in mainland China. On the other hand, Chinese authorities prevented 
students from participating in the protests. Universities in Sichuan and Xi’an told 
students to stay on campus during the weekends and register when they had to leave 
school.
35
  
However, these protests by the public have demonstrated their support for the 
Chinese government on the Diaoyu Islands. It is hard to conclude that their protest 
was “mobilized” by the Chinese government, however, it is safe to conclude that 
China’s consistent argument on the Diaoyu Islands has offered a solid legitimate 
background for the enthusiastic young “critical masses” to demonstrate their 
patriotism, which is necessarily against Japan in the dispute of the Diaoyu Islands. In 
2010, the activists’ actions complemented and offered public support to China’s 
assertions after the government was assertive.  
 
                                                             
35 “Control Anti-Japan Protest, Most Universities had ‘closed’”. Voice of America News, 2010-10-23. 
http://www.voanews.com/chinese/news/20101023-school-anti-japan-105593108.html 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter presents the narratives of three actors in three incidents over the 
Diaoyu Islands. By presenting and labeling their narratives, I strive to show the 
different attitudes of the government, the intellectuals and the POLs. Several 
preliminary conclusions can be drawn here.  
 First, the government has turned out to be more active in disputes after 1996. In 
1996, the Chinese government’s policy actions were mostly reactive and passive, 
driven by Japanese actions. In 2004, when Japan arrested Chinese activists, the 
Chinese government responded with strong voice. In 2010, China’s government 
initiated the countermeasures against Japan when Japan did not release the detained 
Chinese fisherman. As an empirical fact, from 1996 to 2010, the Chinese government 
has been more active and assertive on islands disputes.  
 Second, the intellectuals are always supportive of the government – even though 
their narratives often come after the foreign policy has been taken due to the nature of 
academic publication. Moreover, between 1996 and 2010, their interest shifted from 
historical/legal evidence to political and policy topics, proved by the changing 
numbers of articles in each category in three periods. In 1996, intellectuals were 
conducting research on China’s historical and legal evidence that supported the claim. 
Now they are more interested in how to govern these disputed islands and what 
possible impact these islands may have on China-Japan bilateral relations.  
 Third, the POLs’ narratives are “patriotic” in nature, asking for military actions 
when the government is weak, but demonstrating patriotic sentiment when the 
government is assertive. They want to eradicate the humiliation China suffered from 
Japan during World War II. They demonstrated their patriotism in 1996, asking the 
government to be more assertive against Japan. In 2004 and 2010, POLs were mostly 
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quiet and supportive of the government, when the government was assertive.  
 While an incident may be initiated by the POLs or Japan, however, it should be 
noted that after an incident is initiated, it is the government who responds first, 
followed by the POLs, usually days or weeks after the government’s action. Finally, 
the intellectuals respond, whose publications may take months to be read by the POLs 
and the government. The time-lag among the narratives of these actors therefore is an 
important factor when considering their interactions.  
 To connect the analysis with Systems Theory, it can be inferred that in the box of 
“input”, the intellectuals are providing consistent “support” for the government’s 
claims, whereas the public is making “demands” to push the government to be 
assertive against Japan. From 1996 to 2010, however, these “inputs” seem to be 
consistent: the intellectuals are always supporting, and the public are always 
demanding. If the content of “inputs” from these two actors remains the same, what 
explains the variation of the “outputs” in three incidents? In the following chapter, I 
am going to examine the interaction between the government and the public to 
demonstrate how the government has learned to appease the public with assertive 
policy.   
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CHAPTER 7 CONVERGENCE AND CONFRONTATION OF NARRATIVES 
 This chapter explores the degree to which China’s policies on the Diaoyu Islands 
are motivated by both public mobilization and the actions of Japan. As part of the 
concept of “environment” in the Systems Theory, Japan’s actions function as the 
external impetus for the systems theory to process; on the other, intellectuals and 
POLs, by providing demands and support to the government, pushes the government 
to adopt foreign policies that could accommodate these voices. If the government 
does not adopt foreign policies that can “appease” domestic public mobilization, it has 
to spend extra resources to “quell” them.  
 In this chapter, I propose a framework based on Easton’s System Theory to model 
this nuanced interaction among government, the public and intellectuals in China’s 
foreign policy making. Easton’s Systems Theory provides a solid basis for this 
framework; however, the integration of two-level game in Systems Theory yields a 
more robust framework suitable for analyzing China’s Japan policy. 
 Chapter 6 presented different narratives and policy preferences from the 
government, intellectuals and public opinion leaders in the incidents of 1996, 2004 
and 2010. Over the same incidents, the government, intellectuals and public opinion 
leaders have different narratives. Their narratives led to different policy preferences, 
especially from the government side and the public. In general, the public usually 
demanded more assertive policy than the government is willing to accept.  
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Table 7.1 Labels of Policy Narratives (Different font sizes indicate the priority) 
 
Table 7.2 Actions of Government, Preferred Policy of Intellectuals and Policy 
Preference from POLs 
 
 As the Table 7.1 above shows, three actors offer different narratives on the same 
issue when a crisis happened. In addition, as Table 7.2 summarized, in three incidents, 
the government adopted different policy actions, while the intellectuals usually 
support government’s assertions, POLs usually have much stronger policy preferences 
than the other two actors.  
In 1996, for example, when the government was unsystematically “responding” 
to Japan’s actions over the Diaoyu Islands, emphasizing China’s sovereignty based on 
historical evidence, POLs were arguing for “military measures” to solve the dispute. 
Their narratives centered on the necessity of adopting military means to resolve the 
dispute.  
In 2004, in an incident that can be seen as the continuation of the 1996 incident, 
the government was much more active than in 1996 when DDM activists were 
arrested by Japan. After active protests of China, Japan released the arrested activists 
 Government Intellectuals Activists 
1996 
Sovereignty-Historical 
Sovereignty-legal 
Political 
Sovereignty-History 
Sovereignty-legal 
 
Patriotic 
Political 
2004 
Sovereignty-legal 
Sovereignty-Historical 
 
Economic 
Sovereignty-Historical 
Sovereignty-legal 
Patriotic 
Legal 
 
2010 Sovereignty-Legal 
Economic 
Sovereignty-Legal 
Sovereignty-Historical 
Patriotic 
 Government Intellectuals Public 
1996 
Low-level-High-level 
Protest 
(Support 
Government) 
Criticize, urge military 
2004 
High-level 
Protest-Countermeasures 
(Support 
Government) 
Patriotic support 
2010 Countermeasures 
(Support 
Government) 
Patriotic support 
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the next day. However, after the release, the Chinese government soon turned to 
appreciate Japan’s cooperation and constrain domestic public mobilization. While the 
government’s narrative in this incident emphasized the fact that the Diaoyu Islands 
were “China’s territory”, and turn to maintain good Sino-Japan relations after the 
crisis, POLs were demanding the release of activists and believed that their actions 
were “patriotic” and deserve respect, as evidenced by their declaration.  
 In 2010, however, the government responded to Japan’s arrest of Chinese 
fisherman with the most assertive policy among these three incidents. POLs still 
maintained their patriotic stance on this issue, and arguing for trade sanctions (a 
boycott of Japanese products). The government maintained a systematic response 
towards Japan’s actions and adopted an assertive policy when Japan delayed the 
release. POLs continued to make patriotic statements on this issue and called for 
stronger stance against Japan.  
 
 These presentations of empirical facts in Chapter 6 reveal the different narratives 
from three actors. However, the Chinese government is able to decide what course of 
action to take on foreign policy matters without established “moderating institutions” 
checking its decisions. As reviewed in Chapter 3, however, scholars have revealed the 
increasing influence from the intellectuals and the public on Chinese foreign policy 
making in the past decade. None the less, in the Diaoyu Islands dispute, how do we 
explain the policy actions of China, especially, why did China adopt an assertive 
policy in 2010? There are two explanations accounting for the variation of Chinese 
foreign policy in these three incidents. First, the government has been trying to 
accommodate public opinion. However, when its policy does not sufficiently “appease” 
the public’s demands, it has to spend extra resources to quell the demands. Second, 
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the government is responding to Japan’s actions. When Japan’s actions are strong, the 
Chinese government usually takes much stronger stances. Failing to do so, would 
again put the Chinese government facing strong public mobilization. These two 
explanations, from domestic and foreign sides respectively, explain why China is 
taking more assertive policies on islands disputes. China’s assertiveness has been a 
tendency in Chinese foreign policy, and arguably it will continue to be so.  
The rest of this chapter is organized to analyze these two explanations. The first 
part presents the domestic public opinion and evaluates its influence on foreign policy 
making. The second part presents the action-reaction model. In the third part, I would 
also argue that these two explanations are best captured in a framework that integrates 
Easton’s System Theory and Putnam’s two-level game. The Systems Theory per se is 
not sufficient for explaining the foreign policy making in China; by incorporating the 
two-level game, however, it captures the nuances of interactions between the 
government and public opinion, with the intellectuals providing evidence to support 
China’s claims.  
 
I. Responses to the Public: Appeasing vs. Quelling 
 The Chinese government faces a trade-off between “appeasing” and “quelling” 
when deciding to take actions over the disputed islands. On one hand, the Chinese 
government seeks to “appease” the POLs by adopting appropriate foreign policy; on 
the other hand, it also has to “quell” the POLs. The Chinese government tries to strike 
a balance between the “appeasing” and “quelling”.  
 From 1996 to 2010, the Chinese government is getting more sophisticated in 
balancing the two aspects of “appeasing” and “quelling.” After the POLs called for 
the assertive policy and criticized the government for not taking assertive stance in 
 202 
 
1996, the government turned to be more assertively in the subsequent incidents. As 
the latest incident in 2010 showed, on one hand, the Chinese government followed the 
ladder of policy actions and eventually employed an “assertive policy” against Japan; 
on the other hand, with its assertive policy, the effort needed to “quell” domestic 
sentiments decreases. As a comparison, in 1996, however, when the government’s 
response to the crisis was undeveloped and unsystematic, the domestic sentiments 
waged against Japan demanded a lot of attention from the government to maintain its 
stability – this effort of “quelling” domestic demands lasted until 2004, when the 
protests of the DDM eventually caused the second crisis. In 1996, China had to face 
the challenge from domestic public activists criticizing the government for being “too 
soft” towards Japan. In the context of China with the memory of “one hundred years 
of humiliation,” this criticism undermines the legitimacy of the Chinese government. 
  
 Analysis of these narratives leads to two findings on China’s foreign policy on 
disputed islands. First, the Chinese government answers to its domestic public 
mobilization with “appeasement” in the form of assertive foreign policy, and also 
“quelling” domestic voices after the incidents are solved. The level of “appeasement” 
and “quelling” are negatively related: the more assertive policy the Chinese 
government adopts, the less resource needs to be spent on “quelling.” This is an 
interaction that will be summarized and captured in the revised version of Easton’s 
system theory, as shows in Part III.  
Second, externally, the Chinese government reacts to Japan’s policy over the 
disputed islands. Specifically, the stronger position Japan takes on the disputed islands, 
the stronger Chinese domestic public mobilizations are, as a consequence, Chinese 
government has to either take a stronger policy against Japan as an “appeasement” 
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strategy, or spend more resources on “quelling” domestic public mobilization. Across 
these three incidents in the past 20 years, the Chinese government has learned to 
choose the former – i.e. to adopt much stronger, more assertive policies against Japan, 
instead of stricter domestic regulations on public mobilization.  
 These three incidents, however, do indicate a tendency in Chinese foreign policy 
making to “appease” public opinion and mobilization with stronger foreign policy, so 
the government can prevent the public from criticizing its being weak against Japan. 
Public opinion is always much stronger than what the government can adopt. 
Therefore, the government has to suppress the public mobilization if their policy does 
not help to “appease” the public. This finding, explains the phenomenon of a more 
assertive China Christensen described in 2010.  
  
Appeasing  
 In 1996, the Chinese government reacted towards Japan’s actions over the Diaoyu 
Islands. However, the Chinese government’s actions were mostly passive and 
responsive. During the meanwhile, the public waged protests against Japan and also 
the Chinese government, criticizing it to be too weak towards Japan. The government 
then had to spend extra resources to quell the domestic public mobilization.  
 The criticism from the public on the Chinese government’s “being too soft” was 
strong. The Chinese government obtains its legitimacy by being nationalist, and had 
sworn to terminate the “hundred years of humiliation.” “Being soft” towards Japan 
was the issue that sparked the May 4 Movement or December 9 Movement under the 
ROC government, which were both waged by the people and the intellectuals. 
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Figure 7.1 1996 Time Lag and Willingness to embrace assertive policy as 
reactions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
As Figure 7.1 shows, in 1996 when the government initiated the responses to 
Japanese actions, it started from low level of response – low-level of protest, 
emphasizing China’s historical sovereignty (symbolized in solid curve). However, 
days later, when the public mobilization was waged in mainland China on this dispute, 
they were advocating much stronger policy stances towards Japan (in dotted curve), 
including the use of military means to solve the dispute.   
 The expectation of the public was much “higher” than what the government did. 
In 1996, it was unlikely that China would wage a war against Japan considering 
China’s emphasis on stability in its foreign policy – and after a military crisis over 
Taiwan just months before. In that case, the government’s policy did not “appease” 
the public mobilization, therefore, while the government remains passive in 
responding to Japan’s actions, the public mobilization continued to surge (as the 
Willingness 
to embrace 
assertive 
policy 
Time 
Government’s action Public’s action 
Intellectuals’ action 
Quell 
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figure 7.1 showed in dotted curve). Empirically, the surge of public mobilization was 
evidenced by mass protests in mainland China and Hong Kong, and also the 
foundation of an organization striving for the defense of the Diaoyu Islands, China 
Federation of Defending Diaoyu. In addition, a massive signing movement waged by 
POLs, like Mr. Tong Zeng and those World War II heroes’ call of military methods 
from northern China’s Helongjiang Province.  
 As the dispute developed in 1996, the government did not take any further actions 
against Japan. Therefore, its actions did not meet the demands of the public. To adopt 
the terminology from David Easton, the “output” of the black box was not sufficient 
to “appease” the demands from the “input” side. Therefore, what the government did 
was to quell the surged public mobilization and to bring the public mobilization into a 
controllable level after September 18 (as indicated in the circle in lower right of figure 
7.1).  
 The intellectuals, however, were steady in providing “support” to the government. 
Their publications explored the historical evidence the Chinese government professed, 
and defended China’s claims of sovereignty. Their analysis may have had an influence 
on the Chinese government, however, their publications indicate the attitude of 
Chinese intellectuals towards this dispute, i.e. China has indisputable sovereignty over 
the dispute, and meanwhile, this dispute is also a key issue in Sino-Japan relations. 
During the meanwhile, their findings are cited by both the government on official 
newspapers and the POLs, who made advocates citing the findings of the intellectuals. 
In this sense, the intellectuals are playing the role of mediating institutions, mediating 
the relationship between the public and the government with their research and 
findings defending China’s sovereignty over the disputed islands. 
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 The incident in 2004, however, was different from the one in 1996 in how it 
developed and then evaporated. As mentioned above, the public mobilization has been 
waged since 1996 over the Diaoyu Islands. The continual actions of DDM activists 
caused this incident. The government immediately responded to the actions of Japan 
(i.e. arrests) and by answering to the call of the public of releasing the DDM activists. 
As figure 7.2 shows, the government initiated strong policy towards Japan and when 
the public mobilization was waged against Japan, the incident already had ended. In 
David Easton’s phrases, the political system generates “outputs” that appease the 
“demands” from the “input.”  
 
Figure 7.2 2004 Time Lag and Willingness to embrace assertive policy as 
reactions 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The narratives of the Chinese government in 2004 were more accommodating of 
the public sentiment than in 1996. The Chinese government clearly demanded the 
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Intellectuals’ action 
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release of the arrested DDM activists, and before the public mobilized, Japan 
immediately released the seven activists. In this incident, China’s policy was 
sufficient to “appease” the demands (or possible demands) of the public.  
 In Figure 7.2, the dotted curve indicates the activities of the public, in the form of 
several attempts to land on the disputed Diaoyu Islands. When the incident happened, 
almost immediately, the Chinese government (in solid line) responded with strong 
stance with nine times of protests in one day, demanding the release of Chinese 
citizens. After Japan agreed to the release, the public mobilization was immediately 
“appeased”. In this case, David Easton’s System Theory worked well. However, in 
reality, the Chinese government also spent some resources on subduing the public 
mobilization after the incident was solved.  
 
 In 2010, the government adopted the most assertive policy in these three incidents, 
and such an assertive policy prevented the necessity of quelling – after adopting the 
assertive policy, public mobilization, which came later, was mostly in the form of 
support to China’s assertive foreign policy. This assertive policy of the Chinese 
government has “appeased” the demands of the public.  
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Figure 7.3 2010 Time Lag and the Willingness to embrace assertive policy as 
reactions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
As figure 7.3 indicates, the government initiated strong stances, and increased its 
level of response gradually when Japan refused to release Mr. Zhan. This policy is so 
assertive that it did not even have any crossing points with the public mobilization. In 
other words, the policy had appeased the demands from the public with its assertive 
policy, and no resources needed to be spent on quelling any domestic public 
mobilization. The wave of public mobilization after the incident was started, but 
vanished soon in 2010 since the government has already resolved the dispute with it 
an assertive policy. However, the government also spent some time making sure mass 
protests would not turn into riots. Compared with 1996, however, this is less “political” 
since the government has already been strong towards Japan and achieved the goal of 
releasing arrested Chinese fisherman.   
What the analysis above tells us is, while they have different narratives on the 
same issue, the government interacts with public opinion either through assertive 
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policy to “appease”, or to quell the domestic public mobilizations. In 1996, the 
government “quelled” instead of adopting a satisfactory policy to appease; in 2004, 
the government responded quickly to terminate public mobilization, in 2010, however, 
the government acted on its own and appeased the possible domestic mobilization 
quickly. 
 These three patterns of actions between the government and public opinion reveal 
several things. First, the public “demands” are for more assertive policy than the 
government. As Figure 7.1 and 7.2 revealed, while the government and the 
intellectuals’ narratives often emphasize historical and legal principles, the public 
narratives emphasize patriotism, and argue for strong policy actions including trade 
sanctions or military methods. However, by adopting assertive policy and being 
“strong” against Japan, the government prevents the public from criticizing it.  
Second, from these texts and different policy preferences, we can tell that there is 
a time lag between the government policy and public opinion: when the incident 
happens, it is the government that first responds to the “actions” of the Japanese 
government. Public opinion usually explodes days or even weeks later, however, how 
the government responds directly influences the severity of the public opinion. How 
the government acts in an incident will create institutional memory that shapes how 
the public acts in incidents in the future.  
Third, in China, appeasement may not be the only option that a policy system 
responds to “inputs”. Sometimes, the government may need to directly “quell” the 
input. When the government adopts assertive policy, the public is more likely to be 
appeased; on the contrary, if the government’s policy was low-level protests, it is 
likely that the public will wage much stronger mobilization, criticizing both Japan and 
the Chinese government.  
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Fourth, from 1996 till now, the government has learned to adopt assertive policy 
in order to appease domestic sentiments. By comparing these three incidents, we can 
tell that the Chinese government’s action in 2010 was the most assertive one, and in 
this way, it successfully appeased domestic sentiments.   
  
What this analysis suggests was that public opinion has an influence on China’s 
foreign policy making – if the government does not listen to the domestic public 
opinion, it will have to spend resources on “quelling” them, as they did in 1996. 
However, such a role played by public opinion in Chinese foreign policy making 
towards Japan was “stagnant”. At least on the Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese 
government now knows about the public opinion, and understands how to act to 
prevent public mobilization from happening. In this sense, the government is striving 
to maintain its control by adopting assertive policies. This conclusion is supported by 
cross comparing the situations in these three incidents: China has the tendency of 
being more assertive on disputed islands. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, recent 
assertive policy on the Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal) dispute with the 
Philippines is more evidence showing this trend in Chinese foreign policy.  
  
Quelling  
 What David Easton’s System Theory is missing for the context of China, however, 
is another form of interaction between the political system and “inputs”. Other than 
using the policy “output” as a way to “appease” inputs, the government also quells the 
domestic public mobilization. This action of “quelling” is more likely to happen when 
the policy output was not sufficient to “appease” the public.  
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 In Figure 7.1 – 7.3, those circles indicate the government’s direct interaction with 
the public, quelling the public mobilizations. Across these three incidents, however, 
the government adopted different quelling strategies.  
On September 13, 1996, Mr. Tong Zeng, the DDM leader, was refused permission 
to protest when he applied for a permit protest on September 18.
1
 On September 15, 
as the Institute of Social Science stated, Mr. Tong Zeng was sent out of Beijing to 
lessen his influence on mass protests. On September 20, 1996, the authorities refused 
to permit the protest in Peking University, and send police in several cities to watch 
the protestors. Therefore, in 1996, the government actively prevented the protests 
from happening.  
 In 2004, after the DDM activists arrived in Beijing and Shanghai on March 26, 
the authorities immediately took them into custody, denying a public reception which 
was planned by Chinese activists. The next day, Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxin 
met with the Japanese ambassador in China, Yoriko Kawaguchi, noting China’s 
appreciation for Japan’s immediate release of Chinese citizens and emphasizing the 
importance of Sino-Japan relations.
2
 In 2004, the government’s quelling actions were 
less aggressive. Rather, with assertive policy, the public’s sentiments had been 
appeased (no massive protests criticizing the government as in 1996), therefore, the 
government made few efforts to manage social stability.  
 In 2010, however, after the government adopted assertive policies against Japan, 
the mass protests that came late were also quelled by the government. However, in 
this incident, the action of “quelling” was mostly to prevent them from turning into 
riots. Universities in major cities of China imposed curfews on their campus to 
                                                             
1 “Li Dai Bao Diao Shi Jian Ji Zai.” Institute of Modern History. China Academy of Social Science. 2008-6-16.  
2 “Beiri feifa kouliude 7 ming zhongguo gongmin anxuan huilai” (Seven Chinese Activists who were Illegally 
Detained By Japan Return Home) Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) March 27, 2004. 
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/11645/1049678.html> 
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prevent college students from protesting.
3
 Also in order to prevent students from 
participating in protests, the government required colleges and high schools in 
Changsha and Deyang to teach classes on the weekends.
4
 Similar to 2004, these 
quelling actions were not as aggressive as in 1996, but were adopted to serve the 
purpose of maintaining social stability.  
 These incidents all demonstrated the quelling of the Chinese government on 
public mobilization. Without powerful moderating institutions as in democracies, the 
government is able to adopt special strategies like imposing curfews on universities 
and changing school schedule to prevent mass protests from happening. The risk of 
allowing protests is risky for an authoritarian government.  
 The interaction of “quelling” was seen in all three incidents. The government 
does not want to see massive protests that may backfire the legitimacy of the 
government. However, the actions of “quelling” in these three incidents were different 
in nature: while in 1996, the “quelling” was towards domestic criticism on the 
Chinese government being too weak; in 2004 and 2010, after the government had 
solved the crisis, the actions of “quelling” were to manage the social stability and 
prevent the protests from going to extremes that could jeopardize social stability or 
challenge the government’s legitimacy – aversion towards public mobilization may be 
a trait of authoritarian states in China, either PRC or ROC government in the 1970s.
5
 
 At least three different techniques of “quelling” adopted by Chinese government 
can be documented, including using military police, “curfew” on campus, and 
relocating activists. Based on the government’s intention, they can be categorized into 
two main forms, one is the direct confrontation between the government and the 
                                                             
3 Shen Hua, “In order to Control Anti-japan protest, universities in China closed down” [Kong zhi fanri youxing, 
zhongguo dabufen xuexiao fengxiao] VOA News 2010-10-23.  
4 “Deyang had massive anti-Japanese protests” BBC news (Chinese) , 2003-10-23.  
5 As a DDM activist recalled, in 1971, the ROC government in Taiwan refused their application for protests 
against Japan’s actions on the Diaoyu islands. This description resembles what is happening nowadays in China. 
Taiwan, however, had its first democratic election in 1996.  
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public when mobilizations happen (use of military police), the other includes 
strategies that prevent public mobilization from happening in advance (curfew on 
campus, and relocating activists).  
 The existence of three quelling methods and the way the government adopted 
them in the three incidents indicate that the government is taking a position of 
permitting “moderate” level of protests. As the analysis reveals above, in 1996, the 
government dispatched police and relocated activists during and before the 
mobilization. In 2004 and 2010, however, the government adopted only “curfews” 
preventing students from participating in protests.  
The government, however, does allow some public mobilizations to happen. For 
instances, China’s quelling did not happen until the happening of several major 
gatherings in major cities of China in 1996, and the burning of Japanese flag in 2004 
and protest in major cities after 2010 incident. When the government is acting in 
response to public mobilization (as bottom-up theorists posit), the government also 
takes advantage of the public mobilization to achieve international gains. However, 
the government does not really play an active role in initiating protests against Japan 
as the top-down approach posits.  
At the international level, these protests actually make the demand of Chinese 
government towards Japan more persuasive at the foreign policy level in a “two-level 
game.”  
  
II. Memory of “Humiliation”: Japanese Action - Chinese Reaction model 
 The actions of Japan are the external impetus that begins the entire system of the 
policy making process. In this sense, the action-reaction model fundamentally 
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explains what policy China adopts policy. However, the actions of Japan impact 
Chinese politics with its influence exercised on both the government and the public. 
Therefore, the stronger Japan’s action is, the stronger China’s domestic public opinion 
is, and it pushes the Chinese government at a more difficult position of “appeasement” 
vs. “quelling.”  
 To understand China’s action towards Japan, it is good to start with a statement 
by Christensen: despite of more formidable US military force to China, Chinese 
analysts “view Japan with much less trust and, in many cases, with a loathing rarely 
found in their attitudes about the United States.”6 According to Christensen, Chinese 
aversion towards Japan sprang from two aspects, one is the historical legacy and 
Japan’s attitude towards historical issues; the other is a more imminent judgment on 
Japan’s military power and potential.7 
 
Context: “Japanese Side” as the Evil “Other”  
Logically, in a dispute like this one over the Diaoyu Islands, China should blame 
the other party for the dispute, i.e. Japan. However, according to the data compiled 
from newspapers and remarks by MFA spokespersons, the subject of Chinese 
condemnation was usually “the Japanese side”. More specifically, in the remarks by 
the MFA spokesperson, the term “Japanese side”[日方] seems to broadly include the 
Japanese government, the local Okinawan government (under which Japan claims the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are governed), the Japanese Coast Guard, or any interest 
groups from Japan. For example, these expressions are often mentioned: “the 
Japanese side shall correct their mistakes”8, “the Japanese side must apologize and 
                                                             
6 See pp. 52 in Christensen, Thomas. “Security Dilemmas in East Asia.” International Security 23-4: 49-80. 
7 Ibid, pp. 55.  
8 2010 -09-22, MFA statement on the Diaoyu Islands.  
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compensate for what they have done to China”9, and “the behavior of the Japanese 
side has violated the territorial integrity of China and infringed the human rights of 
Chinese citizens.”10  
Also, included in the “Japanese side”, the rightists of Japan are those who hold 
much stronger position on Japanese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. However, 
when they advocate Japanese sovereignty, or plan to land on the Diaoyu Islands, or 
suggest building beacons on the disputed islands, China’s response was a reiteration 
of the official position on the Diaoyu Islands, emphasizing its “indisputable 
sovereignty” over an “inherent territory of China” “since ancient times.”11 However, 
what is interesting is a recent article published by the People’s Daily in 2012. After 
reporting the remarks by the MFA spokesperson, the People’s Daily analyzed the 
incident, pointing out that  
“According to the police department of Okinawa, the Japanese government had 
been aware of the plan [of landing on the Diaoyu Islands], but it did not do 
anything to stop it, this inaction of the Japanese government caused noise and set 
obstacles for bilateral relations between Japan and China.”12  
 
By saying this, China believes this incident of landing on the disputed Diaoyu 
Islands was actually consented to by the Japanese government. Therefore, the 
Japanese government shall be responsible for any actions that threaten the territorial 
integrity of China over the Diaoyu Islands.  
In addition, it is interesting to note that when China makes statements against the 
action on the Diaoyu Islands by the “Japanese side”, the word “anyone” is often 
attached to the statement. On September 15, 2006, then MFA spokesperson Mr. Qin 
Gang responded to the comment by an American senator on the Diaoyu Islands, after 
                                                             
9 Official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 25, 2010.  
10 Remarks of the MFA spokeswoman, Ms. Zhang Qiyue on the Diaoyu Islands on September 25, 2010.  
11 2012-1-3, Remarks by MFA spokesperson, Mr. Lu Lei.  
12 The People’s Daily, 2012-1-3, 03. Original text as “冲绳县警察本部 3日发布的消息则证明，日本政府有关
部门从事发开始就得到相关信息，明知登岛未经许可却听之任之，给中日关系大局再次平添噪音和障碍.”  
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presenting the traditional Chinese position on this dispute, Mr. Qin emphasized that  
“Anyone who is attempting to challenge the Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu 
Islands cannot change the basic fact that they are Chinese territory.”13  
In 2010, then MFA spokeswoman, Ms. Jiang Yu also concludes her remark with 
this statement,  
“The conspiracy by anyone to violate Chinese sovereignty on the Diaoyu Islands 
is in vain and invalid.”14 
 
The usage of “anyone” here can be interpreted in two ways: first, it demonstrates 
the absolute determination of the Chinese government on the Diaoyu Islands. In this 
way, the spokespersons are speaking towards the existential threat, “the Japanese 
side”, which includes the Japanese government, and any Japanese groups. In addition, 
by emphasizing “anyone”, China reminds the Japanese government to be responsible 
for any actions conducted from “the Japanese side.” Second, the usage of “anyone” 
can be interpreted as an alert towards any other countries that are in territorial disputes 
with China (in the South China Sea for example). By reaffirming the absolute 
determination on sovereignty, China intends to deter anyone from contesting 
sovereignty over islands that China claims.  
  
The Chinese people feel cold towards the “Japanese side”. Chinese intellectuals 
are usually more objective in assessing China and Japan relations than the public, who 
views Japan as the enemy. In late 2002, Ma Licheng, an editor of the People’s Daily, 
published an article “New Thinking on relations with Japan” (Duiri Guanxi Xinsiwei). 
In this article, Ma described his trip to Japan, and advocated a rapprochement with 
Japan, criticizing Chinese “nationalist fanatics.” Ma believed that these irrational 
nationalist fanatics are the obstacles to a more cooperative relation with Japan.
15
 
                                                             
13 2006-9-15, remarks by MFA spokesperson, Mr. Qin Gang. 
14 2010-12-18. Remarks of MFA spokeswoman, Ms. Jiangyu 
15 Ma, Licheng, (2002) “New Thinking on the relation with Japan”. Dui ri Guanxi Xin siwei, published on 
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After this article was published, Mr. Ma soon received criticism, scolding, abusing, 
even life threat from the Chinese public. People called him “traitor”, net users posted 
articles denouncing his “new thinking” towards Japan, claiming that “Devils are 
devils” “we can never be friends with devils.”16 
The word “devil” (gui zi) in the Chinese vocabulary is reserved for Japanese. The 
debate after Mr. Ma’s article reflects public opinion towards Japan. The “hatred” or 
extreme negative feeling the Chinese public has towards Japan seems to be a barrel of 
explosives that can be ignited by even a tiny, personal event. 
The coldness of the Chinese towards Japan has also been supported by statistics. 
Lu Deping, in his survey on Beijing college students’ attitude towards Japan, reported 
that 93.5 percent of the participants agreed that Japan have “failed to face up 
sufficient to post wars.”17 Lu further concluded from the survey that China-Japan 
relation has “no cause for optimism,” because participants believed that Japan has not 
faced up history, rather, it acts arrogantly towards China in terms of historical issues. 
Worse still, participants believe that currently Japan has been trying to contain 
China.
18
 
China’s anti-Japanese sentiment is so strong that it prevails in all aspects, not only 
political, but also in economic and cultural domains. In 2003 a famous Chinese 
actress Zhao Wei had a series of pictures taken for a fashion magazine, with her 
clothes decorated in a Japanese flag. Soon, the Chinese public waged a huge protest 
on cyberspace against Zhao Wei, who had been one of the most popular actresses in 
China in 2003. People asked her to apologize and radical nationalist even threw 
excrement on her. The public believed that a Chinese celebrity should never wear 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Strategy and management 2002, 6.  
16 Gries, Peter. (2005). “China’s ’new thinking’ on Japan”. The China Quarterly, No. 184, pp. 831-850.  
17 See pp. 57, Lu, Deping. (2003). “Japan in the Eyes of Beijing’s University Students.” Chinese Education and 
Society, vol. 36, no. 6, November/December 2003, pp. 55–65. 
18 Supra, 64-65. 
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anything decorated with Japan’s flag. Also in 2003, the explosion of a mustard gas 
bomb left by Japanese troops in World War II in Qiqihar, and a sex party organized by 
the Japanese on September 18 in Zhuhai both caused nation-wide protests and 
accusation of Japan.
19
  
Economically, when political protests take place, a popular slogan asks the 
Chinese people to “boycott Japanese products” (dizhi rihuo). This has been a slogan 
used by patriotic protestors since the early twentieth century, however, it is still 
popular today. Using text messaging and social media, the slogan can transmit quickly. 
Though there is someone like Mr. Ma Licheng, and many more intellectuals who 
point out how infeasible and irrational, even naive it is to boycott Japanese products 
in the twenty-first century, these rational voices are soon submerged by the accusation 
of “traitors.” Mr. Ma Licheng, for example, had to leave Beijing shortly after his 
advocate of “new thinking” on relations with Japan, for the massive denunciation 
from the public calling him as a “traitor”. In 2003, when China was trying to build up 
bullet train system between Beijing and Shanghai, Chinese public waged another 
protest against Japanese-made products. A Chinese nationalist Feng Jinhua organized 
an online signature project to protest against the purchase of the Japanese bullet train 
(Shinkansen). Feng soon gathered about 100,000 signatures, and he sent them to 
Premier Wen Jiabao to demonstrate the opposition of the Chinese public against this 
possible billion-dollar contract with Japan. Feng believed his action made “significant 
influence”, which led to a Chinese government’s official announcement stating the 
contract was postponed and China would listen to “the opinion of its people.”20  
 
                                                             
19 Gries, Peter. (2005). “China’s ’new thinking’ on Japan”. The China Quarterly, No. 184, pp. 831-850.  
20 Li, Mujin. “Cyberspace nationalism led to a new chapter to Chinese nationalism” (Wangluo minzuzhiyi xiankai 
zhongguo minzuzhiyi xinpianzhang), published on International Herald Tribune (Guoji xianqu daobao),Beijing. 
2003-9-18.  
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Action-Reaction Model and the Two-Level Game 
In this context, the actions of Japan over the Diaoyu Islands reminds the Chinese 
public of the “hundred years of humiliation,” when Japan committed massive 
atrocities against China. Therefore, the Chinese public reacts with their narratives and 
demands for strong policy; while the Chinese government has to react to Japan’s 
actions with strong policies, facing the trade-off of “appeasing” and “quelling” 
domestically.  
The action-reaction model addresses China’s policies towards Japan over the 
disputed islands. After all, without the “actions” initiated by Japan, China would 
rather set aside the Diaoyu Islands dispute. As Mr. Deng Xiaoping said in the 1970s, 
China and Japan could “shelve” the dispute and focus on bilateral relations in the long 
term. With China’s diplomacy principle emphasizing “stability”, it is not hard to 
imagine the aversion of the Chinese government to see any incident on the Diaoyu 
Islands.  
 However, when Japan “acts” with respect to the disputed islands, China has to 
“react”. However, China’s “reaction” is proportionate to Japan’s action: the stronger 
Japan acts over the Diaoyu Islands, the stronger China will rebound. China’s possible 
“rebounds” are listed in the ladder of policy actions in Chapter 4, from the low-level 
protest to highest one of war. From the Japanese side, however, what is least tolerable 
for China seems to be “jurisdiction” issues with arrests, on the other extreme of 
“tolerable” would be the symbolic issues. For instance, in 2006 the Chinese public 
lacked interest for Japan’s unilateral symbolic actions of “flying over” the Diaoyu 
Islands. But when they do anything that changes the status quo of the islands situation, 
China is strongly offended. The “status quo” includes the ambiguity of sovereignty 
(per the consensus of shelving the dispute). However, when some citizens are arrested 
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for fishing, or landing on Japanese territory, and he/she will be trialed under the 
Japanese jurisdiction (in 2004 and 2010), China will be offended. These issues are 
what I call “jurisdiction” issues. China’s reaction will be much stronger on such issues. 
Nowadays, China has demonstrated more aversion towards Japan’s challenge on 
jurisdiction issues. For example, China’s frequent use of the word “legal” after the 
2010 incident is an evidence of the Chinese government’s emphasis on its intact 
“jurisdiction” over the Diaoyu Islands.  
 Such a covariance between Japan’s actions and China’s reactions indicates the 
validity of the action-reaction model in explaining China’s foreign policy making. 
However, when China reacts to Japan’s actions, where would it stop at? This is like a 
strong teenager showing his fist to his friend, but would he really attack? To analyze 
this “limit” is crucial to understand how China will balance “appeasement” and “quell” 
in the future. I would argue, the Chinese government is testing Japanese actions and 
domestic pressure against its policy principle for stability. In 2010, China has realized 
that it has to sacrifice some “stability” for appeasing domestic public sentiments.  
 On the other hand, however, the Chinese government also uses domestic public 
mobilization as a win-set in its negotiations with Japan. As mentioned above, despite 
of the quell, the Chinese government also allows for some mass protests in China, and 
in their negotiations, the domestic pressure becomes an important reason why China 
has to take assertive policies, to show to their counterparts that the government is 
actually constrained by public opinion.
21
 In the context of China, however, it is less 
about a win-set; rather, the government wants to explain to Japan why assertive 
policies need to be adopted, so a peaceful bilateral relationship can be maintained in 
the long run.  
                                                             
21 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International 
Organization 42 (1988): 427–460.  
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III. Framework: Integrating the Two-level Game in the System Theory 
Table 7.3 Elements of the Systems Theory 
 
 The previous version of the Systems Theory is “too abstract to be wrong.” For 
instance, the feedback loop in previous version was abstract, but it does not specify 
how the government interacts with support and demands from the “input” side.  In 
order to capture the nuances of Chinese foreign policy making, I propose a revised 
version of David Easton’s System Theory, integrating the “two-level game”, which 
links domestic policy with foreign policy.  
 Figure 7.4 presents the framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Public 
Demands 
Support Outputs In the 
Political 
System 
Response to 
Demands 
1996 Military 
troops on 
the 
Diaoyu 
From 
Intellectuals 
Low-Level 
Protest  
unsystematic  
Quell 
2004 Release 
detained 
activists 
From 
Intellectuals 
High-level 
Protest 
swift  
Appeasement/ 
quell 
2010 Release 
detained 
fisherman 
From 
Intellectuals 
 
Countermeasures 
assertive  
Appeasement 
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Figure 7.4 Revised Systems Theory for Analyzing Chinese Foreign Policy 
Making 
 
 
 
This revised version of the Systems Theory has several revisions that denote the 
interaction in China’s foreign policy making. First, I broke down the “feedback” loop 
into two, the “quelling (2)” and the “appeasing”. These two arrows symbolize that the 
Chinese government decide to either use assertive policy to appease the demands 
from the public, or to adopt quelling strategy to suppress the public’s demands. These 
two kinds of policy output cancel each other: when the government does not appease, 
it has to spend more resources on quelling, as happened in 1996; in contrary, if the 
government appeases the public, the quelling arrow shrinks – the government needs to 
adopt some quelling actions to prevent protests turning into riots, as happened in 2004 
and 2010. While they both are “policy outputs”, quelling has more domestic 
implication than “appeasement”. Meanwhile, appeasement impacts the foreign 
environment more profoundly: assertive policy impacts the environment, causing a 
similar Systems Theory functioning in Japan for example.   
Second, a small arrow, the “quelling (1)” arrow is added between “political 
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system” and “domestic environment”. This arrow symbolizes the policy of “quelling” 
public mobilization by the Chinese government before it makes any policy outputs. 
Theoretically, the government may decide to suppress the domestic mobilization 
before it takes any action over the disputed islands. It has not been observed in the 
disputed islands in the past two decades in China, however, in 1919, the May 4 
movement was an example, when the government decided to quell domestic 
mobilization even before it took any foreign policies against Japan’s actions in 
Shandong province. This arrow symbolizes something that can happen, but in these 
three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands, it has not been activated yet.   
 The third arrow on the top of the figure 7.4 is symmetrical to the “appeasement” 
arrow in Easton’s original version of System Theory. This “reaction” arrow denotes 
the impact of China’s foreign policy (“output”) on the foreign environment.  
 When the government enacts a foreign policy, the output impacts the environment. 
This impact was believed by Easton to be the reason why the policy system continues 
endlessly: when the policy outputs impact the environment, it creates opportunities for 
new inputs to generate. In the context of Chinese foreign policy making, this 
interaction between “output” and “environment” needs to be highlighted. When China 
takes actions over the disputed islands, the actions impact the external environment, 
including Japanese domestic politics and other island disputes China is involved in. 
As discussed in the second part of this chapter, the actions of Japan are the external 
impetus that gets the entire process of system theory working. Therefore, the actions 
of Japan over the Diaoyu islands (including but not limited to arresting Chinese 
citizens and landing on the disputed islands) are what stimulate the “input” from 
domestic side of China.  
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This model repeats among multiple incidents. After an incident, what happened in 
previous incident will have impact on the next around of Systems Theory in the next 
dispute incident. Previous output and appeasement are remembered by the public, and 
also are integrated into the new “environment” by creating what I call “institutional 
memory.” Institutional memory includes those memory actors have about previous 
incidents, over the other actors’ actions, consequences and strategies adopted by 
actors. For example, after 1996, with the weak stance of the Chinese government and 
its quelling actions towards domestic mobilization as memory, POLs implemented 
plans to land on the disputed Diaoyu Islands, and their success eventually led to 
another incident in 2004. The consequence of institutional memory may entail 
more/less hostility between the public and the government, more/less trust among 
domestic actors, or more/less communication between states. 
In this sense, each incident is not isolated; rather, it influences future actions of all 
actors in the incident. The accumulative nature of impact from each incident also 
indicates that there is possibility that the “institutional memory” may explode at other 
incidents, such as disputes over other issues. On the China-Japan relations, for 
example, 2005 protests in China was an example.  
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Figure 7.5 Repetition of the Systems Theory in Multiple Incidents. 
 
 
             Institutional memory integrated into the environment 
 
       
 
 
 
When the Chinese government takes policy actions towards Japan, the policy 
actions (“outputs”) also impact the foreign environment, and may stimulate another 
Systems Theory to function in other countries. For example, in 1996, such an impact 
was increasingly aggressive Japanese policy on the disputed islands; in 2010, however, 
the impact was series of protests in major cities of Japan in October, with protestors 
Incident 1 
Incident 2 
Incident 3  
Incident N 
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criticizing the Japanese government as “soft.”22 However, different from in China, 
they can demonstrate their sentiments in the next election. 
 
Figure 7.6 Protests of the Japanese in October, 2010 in Tokyo  
   
(Slogan written: “China has invaded Japanese Senkaku Islands.” “Japanese citizens 
must defend our territory.”)                                
 
 During the meanwhile, however, this arrow also transfers messages between 
domestic and foreign actors in a way similar to Putnam’s “two-level game.” By 
allowing public mobilization and demonstrations of domestic sentiments, the Chinese 
government shows Japan that it is acknowledging its domestic public opinion. In this 
sense, it ameliorates the relations and confirms the government’s legitimacy. But 
when the demonstration has been “sufficient” to get Japan to step back, the Chinese 
government soon quells public mobilization. In the most recent case in 2010, the 
Chinese government implemented curfews on universities and controlled protests in 
major cities.  
 
                                                             
22 “Rally for Senkakus” Japan Today. October 3, 2010.  
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Conclusion  
“The longer that China refrains from directly challenging Japan’s ‘effective 
control’ over the islands, the more consolidated and internationally recognized 
Japan’s title to the islands is likely to become through the legal principle of 
‘acquisitive prescription.’”23 Hagstorn’s concern may be true, the longer China 
remains quiet on the disputed islands, the more consolidated Japan’s de facto control 
over them is. And the Chinese government has not yet aggressively acted on the 
disputed Diaoyu Islands yet. However, from what we saw in the past twenty years 
over the Diaoyu Islands, this concern may ignore some important facts: Chinese 
policy activists never leave the disputed islands aside, and when Japan “acts”, the 
Chinese government always “reacts” promptly. Moreover, the Chinese government’s 
policy over the disputed islands has been more assertive in the past years, along with 
China’s foreign policy getting more assertive in general.  
Between the bottom-up and top-down approaches, I acknowledge that they both 
have validity when addressing the Chinese foreign policy making. However, what I 
have revealed from the three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands dispute is more 
leaning toward the argument of bottom-up approach: the public sentiment against 
Japan has been there, and it ignites and erupts when the external factors irritate China. 
Nonetheless, the validity of top-down approach is also felt: at least, the government 
can control where the public sentiment is erupting towards. In this sense, the 
government can “manage” while acting towards the public opinion, which erupts from 
bottom to the top.  
With the government’s assertive policy as the output, POLs and the public seem 
to be functioning as the causes. However, between POLs and the public, which is 
                                                             
23 Linus Hagstrom, “Quiet power: Japan’s China policy in Regard to the Pinnacle Islands,” The Pacific Review, 
Vol. 18 No. 2 (June 2005): 176. 
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causing which? This remains a puzzle, however, I would point out two scenarios to 
understand the interaction: If the dispute is towards the salient ends (involving 
jurisdiction issues, for instance), the public will mobilize and then they lend strength 
to POLs; however, on those issues leaning towards non-salient issues (symbolic, for 
instance), it is the POLs who first mobilize, and they sometime can mobilize the 
public, but most of the time, they cannot.  
These two forms of interaction are subject to many factors in domestic politics, 
including economic development, and government control. And these interactions 
allow future research on the domestic side of island disputes. 
As I analyzed in this chapter, when Japan “acts” over the disputed islands, “the 
environment” gets the entire “system theory” in China to work. The impact from 
Japan is not only on the government, but also on Chinese public opinion. With the 
memory of the “hundred years of humiliation” and bad feelings towards Japan, public 
opinion explodes usually days or weeks after the Chinese government reacts to 
Japan’s action. With their demands almost always more assertive than the Chinese 
government can take, the Chinese government has to take assertive policy against 
Japan in order to “appease” its domestic public opinion. If China does not react, or 
reacts not strongly enough, the public will wage mobilization criticizes the 
government, which requires the Chinese government to spend extra resources on 
“quelling” domestic mobilization. Chinese intellectuals, however, almost always 
support the Chinese government’s positions and stances by providing their historical 
and legal findings.  
 During the meanwhile, the Chinese government lets some public opinion to prove 
its domestic pressure when negotiating with Japan. These public mobilization shows 
that Chinese government is under pressure to do so, so bilateral relations will not be 
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hurt severely. As in 2004, China immediately turned to Japan for appreciation and 
building up long-term bilateral relations. When the incident is solved by Chinese 
government, it soon quells any domestic mobilization that may turn into riots.  
 To compare the finding of this chapter to the System Theory of Easton, the 
connection between “input” and “output” in the original version needs to be 
elaborated. When the public and the intellectuals provide “input”, it is the government 
in the “black box” that decides what “outputs” to adopt. However, it should be noted 
that the government is subject to “inputs” from two layers of the environment: one 
domestic and the other foreign. These two sets of inputs do interact: the stronger the 
foreign impetus is, the stronger the domestic demands will be. When the Japanese 
government acts over the disputed islands, it provides an external impetus for the 
domestic “input” to start, and the domestic “input” will be activated. The government 
in the black box will have to decide what “outputs” to take in order to “appease” the 
domestic “input.” What if the government’s output cannot sufficiently appease the 
domestic input? The public’s demands will then turn towards the government in the 
black box, as in 1996, which threatened the legitimacy of the government in an 
authoritarian state. If that happens, the government has to spend extra resources to 
“quell” the domestic demands.  
During the meanwhile, the “output” will also impact the foreign environment in 
an action-reaction model; strong reactions will impact the domestic politics of the 
foreign country as well. With an assertive output at the domestic pressure, however, 
the government is also able to demonstrate the pressure the government feels, 
therefore, it can repair the bilateral relations if necessary (as in 2004).  
 I have included these nuanced interactions between the government and the 
public in China in a revised version of System Theory, adding two arrows in the graph 
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(7.4). However, how does this graph apply to other islands dispute China is involved 
in, or even over Chinese foreign policy in general?  
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
China is more assertive than it was in the 1990s. Why is China more assertive? 
This is a question that has perplexed many scholars. Christensen (2010) for example, 
argued that this is a tendency explained by China’s more nationalist public opinion 
from its domestic side: public opinion, reflected in public mobilizations, exercises its 
influence on Chinese foreign policy making. According to Christensen, this tendency 
is not necessarily a bad thing, because it allows China to express clearly what it 
wants.  
To respond to the research questions stated in Chapter 4 in a nutshell, the Chinese 
government and the public do have different narratives, with the public asking for 
more assertive policies than what the government can produce. In a crisis, the 
government may either appease public demands with assertive foreign policy or 
directly quell the domestic demands. By adopting assertive policies against Japan, the 
Chinese government is more likely to appease the public’s demands and have their 
sentiments erupted towards Japan rather than the Chinese government.  
In previous chapter, I have illustrated these interactions in a revised model of the 
Systems Theory. Towards the discussion on bottom-up and top-down approaches in 
China’s foreign policy making, the revised Systems Theory is designed to depict the 
overlapping area of top-down and bottom-up approaches of China’s public 
mobilization, and offer a strong tool for depicting the Chinese foreign policy making 
process. It has specific emphasis on foreign policy issues that can agitate domestic 
public sentiments. While bottom-up is proved more valid in describing how the public 
mobilization of China erupts, top-down approach has its validity also. However, there 
does not seem to be powerful evidence to prove that the government really wanted 
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those public mobilizations. The government just takes advantages of those 
mobilizations after it can control them confidently.  
 However, the bottom-up approach may also be strengthened by integrating the 
role played by the government. Revised systems theory bridges the gap of these two 
approaches. However, it still needs future testing on various topics. As stated below, 
the generalizability of this model still needs work by applying it to more policy 
arenas.  
 
I.  Empirical Findings 
 In this dissertation I use narrative analysis to determine the right model that can 
describe and explain the increased assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy actions, 
with the Diaoyu Islands dispute as the case in question. This is important work 
because Easton presumes a unitary black box actor, but he applied it to American 
democracy regimes that have more than one actor and these actors are moderating 
forces. In this dissertation I test the Systems Theory in an authoritarian government, 
which has no established moderating forces – and weak mediating institutions. I 
found that the “black box” metaphor can still be applied in the Chinese context, and 
also the inputs are transformed into output by the opaque decision making process in 
the black box.  In this sense, the Systems Theory has some explanatory power in an 
authoritarian state. However, I discovered that by integrating two arrows in the 
Systems Theory model, it functions as a more robust tool for explaining foreign 
policy making in the Chinese context. The first set of arrows denotes “quelling”, in 
addition to “appeasing” as another form of interaction between the “political system” 
and the “input”, replacing the feedback loop in original version of the Systems Theory. 
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The second arrow symbolizes the impact of “output” on the foreign government, and 
it entails a two-level game incorporating the domestic politics and foreign politics of 
China. With this arrow, the Chinese government is allowing domestic “input” to add 
some win-set for negotiation, and also it cites the “input” in order to maintain 
long-term stability in bilateral relations. 
 In order to support the necessity and accuracy of these arrows, I followed the 
following structure in this dissertation. The nature of the Chinese government, 
structure and the role and strength of mediating institutions is the focus of Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 also provides the background information necessary to describe the historic 
relationships between China and Japan. The chronological review of the “hundred 
years of humiliation” in China (1842-1949) offers the background for understanding 
Chinese negative sentiments towards Japan. While the changes in political regimes in 
China can provide a partial explanation for more assertive foreign policy, history is a 
powerful path-dependent predictor, especially when one takes into consideration the 
effects of the collective psyche of the Chinese people following the 100 years of 
humiliation. 
This is witnessed, in particular, by the increasingly contested relationships 
occurring since 1996 related to the Diayou Islands. I use temporal analysis in Chapter 
5 to demonstrate that there are nuanced, but significant evolutions in Chinese 
narratives and policy action responses regarding to the three major Diayou Island 
crises (1996, 2004 and 2010).  
The Chinese government is fortunate to receive the consistent support of the 
intellectuals, as demonstrated in Chapter 6. However, the analysis in Chapter 6 also 
reveals that the Chinese government has learned about public opinion, and actually 
has been accommodating public opinion with more assertive policies. Analysis of 
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public opinion narratives shows that the public usually asks for assertive policies from 
the Chinese government in front of Japan, and especially, POLs believe an assertive 
policy is the patriotic way to react to Japan. These narratives and calls for policy 
actions build upon nationalist and patriotic sentiment and frequently result in calls for 
escalated policy actions by the government. This finding actually indicates that the 
political system is responding to the “demands” in “input”, as the Systems Theory 
indicated.   
How does the government respond? This is the focus of Chapter 7. First I conduct 
a side by side analysis of the policy narratives of government, intellectuals and POL’s 
showing where there are differences and the nature of the differences. Then I 
document the time lag that can explain differences, suggesting that the government 
takes foreign policy actions that are different at later points in time in 2010. With this 
evidence, I conclude that in order to maintain its legitimacy, the Chinese 
government’s policy actions are designed more to “appease” than to “quell” public 
demands for assertive foreign policy. In addition, I acknowledge the validity of the 
action-reaction model in Chapter 7. When Japan acts over the disputed Diaoyu Islands, 
China’s response is “proportionate” to Japan’s actions. Generally, the Chinese 
government and the public are likely to be irritated by Japan’s actions involving 
“jurisdictions.” Primarily, incidents featured by Chinese citizens being arrested are the 
top reason that upsets China. Following issues of arrest, those Japanese actions that 
change the “status quo” of the disputed islands, for instances, erecting beacons, 
displaying flags, are also concerned by the Chinese government and the public, with 
the intellectuals supporting the government’s claims.   
After Japan acts over the disputed islands, the Systems Theory functions in 
Chinese domestic politics in addition to the bilateral foreign policy arena. The 
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stronger Japan’s actions are, the stronger public opinion towards Japan is, and 
therefore POLs push for much stronger policy from the Chinese government, and the 
Chinese government has to take more assertive stance in order to “appease” strong 
domestic sentiment. During the meanwhile, whenever Japan acts, the public will 
respond with advocate for strong policies against Japan, who was the country blamed 
for China’s “one hundred years of humiliation.” The public’s call pushes government 
for assertive policies. However, the public’s demands are stagnant – the government 
knows what they would demand when an incident breaks out. Therefore, the best way 
to prevent public mobilization from happening, which can expand to other domestic 
policy actions by the government, is to adopt assertive policies against Japan and 
resolve the dispute as soon as possible.  
Using a two-level game to enhance Easton’s model’s explanatory power, in 
Chapter 7 I suggest the overlay of a two-level game (drawn from Putnam’s theory) in 
Easton’s Systems Theory. Instead of the “ratification” at Level II (domestic) that 
unites constituents for more win-sets at Level I (foreign policy) as Putnam stated, in 
China, this “ratification” (which is inherently “consensus”) between the government 
and the public is achieved through an interaction between the public mobilization and 
government’s quelling: the ratification is eventually made at a point comfortable for 
both the government and the public. At the end of chapter 7, I presented my revised 
version of Systems Theory, with two more arrows denoting, respectively, the 
interaction between the Chinese government and the public, and interaction between 
Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy.  
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II. Theoretical Contribution of this Analysis 
 In his article proposing the framework of two-level games, Putnam said while the 
domestic politics and foreign politics entangle, “it is fruitless to debate whether 
domestic politics really determines international relations, or the reverse. The answer 
to that question is clearly ‘Both, sometimes.’”1 What is more interesting question 
according to Putnam are “when?” and “how?” Therefore, Putnam proposed the 
“two-level game” to address the “when” and “how” question in the entanglement 
between domestic and foreign politics.  
 The entanglement between domestic and foreign politics is a topic that links 
discussions of public opinion with those of international relations. However, in 
authoritarian states, research on this entanglement remains insufficient. I aim at filling 
this gap by integrating the two-level game in a revised version of Easton’s Systems 
Theory. While either one of them is insufficient for explaining Chinese foreign policy 
making, an integration of them yields a robust model for addressing this gap of 
knowledge. This project therefore makes contributions in the following five aspects.  
First, this dissertation applies Easton’s Systems Theory to an authoritarian 
country. Since the Systems Theory was proposed by Easton, it has influenced the 
discipline of public policy. However, its drawbacks are also often the subject of 
discussion about the remedies that could alleviate them. Kingdon’s multiple-streams 
theory, for example is one of those remedies. However, in this project, I reveal how 
the Systems Theory can be used to address policy process in an authoritarian state like 
China with some modifications. The concept of the “black box” in Systems Theory is 
useful and appropriate for policy analysis in an authoritarian state like China. What 
this dissertation contributes, therefore, is the endeavor for systematic analysis of an 
                                                             
1 Pp. 437 in Putnam, Robert. (1988). “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games.” 
International Organization 42, 3: 437-460.  
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authoritarian state’s policy using the Systems Theory.  
Second, this project documents the rising influence of Chinese POLs as a 
mediating institution. By summarizing and analyzing narratives from the government, 
intellectuals and the public, I reveal their narratives as well as policy preferences at 
incidents. What the summary and analysis reveal, however, is the rising influence of 
the POLs. With the Internet and technology, POLs make themselves known to the 
public, and their advocates arouse the public sentiment towards “the others” in 
disputes. The government acknowledges their presence and has to quell their advocate 
when their advocates challenge the government’s legitimacy. Their presence and 
activity demand the Chinese government to maintain an assertive stance towards 
Japan.  
Third, I note that Chinese intellectuals are also mediating institutions, but they are 
not a domestic policy threat for the government. Their narratives expand the 
rationales that can be used by the Chinese government to leverage politics and policy. 
Their research is almost always supportive of China’s claim of the disputed islands. In 
this research, which draws upon articles published on China’s “core journals”, there is 
not a single one that objects to the Chinese government’s claim of sovereignty over 
the Diaoyu Islands. By documenting their publications over the Diaoyu Islands since 
1996, I present the attitude of Chinese intellectuals on this dispute. This summary also 
lays a foundation for future analysis of Chinese intellectuals’ role in Chinese foreign 
policy making.  
Fourth, I present a model that captures the nuances in Chinese foreign policy 
making. As my dissertation reveals, the Chinese government responds to island 
disputes in two dilemmas: one is “to appease” or “to quell”, the other is “to meet 
domestic demands” and “to maintain long-term relations at foreign policy aspect.” 
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Without nation-wide electoral institution, the Chinese government has to carefully 
“appease” public opinion, which asks the government to be assertive. On the other 
hand, the government still maintains its stability-oriented foreign policy principle 
established by Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s while it is adopting assertive foreign 
policy. These nuanced dilemmas are illustrated in the revised model of Easton’s 
Systems Theory, which shed light on policy analysis in the authoritarian state of 
China.    
The enhanced Easton’s System Theory is the key product generated in this 
dissertation. I adopt Easton’s concept of the “black box” for the policy making 
process in an authoritarian state. I also believe that the “inputs” and “outputs” are 
useful concepts to describe policy process in China. While the intellectuals and the 
public offer “support” and “demands” as “input” for the black box, the policy actions 
taken by the Chinese government are best known as the “outputs”. “Outputs” impact 
on the environment and also appeases the “input”. However, I added two arrows in 
the original version to illustrate policy making in an authoritarian state, first, the 
government also directly “quells” the “input”. Second, the policy “output” has an 
impact on the foreign “environment” in a two-level game, impacting Japan’s domestic 
policy, and also by allowing public mobilization to a manageable extent, it 
demonstrates foreign government(s) the “dilemma” the Chinese government is facing 
so bilateral relations are not severely harmed. This model captures the nuanced 
interaction among the Chinese government, Japanese government, and the Chinese 
public. What this model reveals about Chinese policy making also leads to practical 
implications for policy makers of both China and other countries.  
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III. Practical Implications of this Research 
 What does the research reveal about democratization process in China? While 
this research is not sufficient to illuminate the trajectory of Chinese politics in the 
future, however, it lays the basis for future investigation.  
First, the government is listening to the public. As many China scholars have 
found, this is happening due to the leadership change and technological development. 
And my research has revealed this trend.  
Second, the government is adjusting its policy following the public. The 
government is adjusting its policy to appease the public’s calls. My research reveals 
the existence of such a trend in islands disputes with Japan.  
As those eras with strong leaders are gone, so are those days when the 
government made policy totally ignoring the public opinions. This is definitely a 
signal of being less authoritarian than before.  
However, this does not indicate democratization will take place soon. Rather, it 
shows tendency towards that end. In order to reveal whether this trend will eventually 
lead China to democracy, we still need findings on many other issues, including social 
media, and Chinese government’s behavior on domestic issues, and other foreign 
policy issues. But my approach has offered methods for investigating future 
government actions, for example, on the Spratly Islands with the Philippines and 
Taiwan, and other domestic issues. 
Furthermore, my dissertation yields several implications for policy makers. I 
categorized them into two paragraphs, one is for China, the other for “the rest of the 
world,” who are (or will be) interested or influenced by a more assertive China.  
One thing that this research detects, but was not able to systematically analyze 
was the influence of social media during the last two incidents over the Diaoyu 
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Islands (the Internet was not popular in China in 1996). However, it is an undeniable 
fact that recently social media’s influence has increased, and more and more people 
have learned about the Diaoyu Islands. In China, social media will include the 
Microblog (Chinese version of Twitter), Renren (Chinese version of Facebook) and 
numerous Bulletin Board Systems (BBS). While censorship may serve the 
government’s purpose in quelling public mobilization, and by blocking posts on social 
media, the government may prevent mass protests from happening, nonetheless, it 
also undermines the government’s legitimacy by blocking people’s access to 
information. Assertive policies adopted recently by the Chinese government may 
secure its image as a nationalist government that can and will terminate China’s 
humiliation in history. However, by blocking people’s access to information, it 
undermines the public’s perception of the government as a government willing to 
listen to its people. As revealed in my dissertation, public mobilization is often 
organized by POLs, including active college students. When the government controls 
social media and makes the official media as the only source of information, it allows 
people to question the validity of “official media.” But do the official media have 
enough credibility among the public? It probably does not when all other narratives 
are censored. POLs, however, then become a narrow source that funnels the 
information to the public. Their possible distortions of the information may cause a 
bigger mobilization among the public. Therefore, it is wise for the government to stop 
censorship on social media and let all sources of information flow.  
 
For the rest of the world, however, an assertive China is not necessarily a bad 
thing – if the government is influenced by public opinion, rather than a narrow group 
of hardcore nationalists. First, it should be acknowledged that more assertive foreign 
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policies do not indicate China has abandoned its pursuit of world stability in foreign 
policy; rather, the Chinese government is responding to its domestic pressure, mostly 
from the public. The Chinese government does not want to see radical changes in its 
foreign policy, therefore, it will utilize its resources to quell the domestic sentiment 
after it feels secure about its legitimacy in front of the public and makes sure it can 
control the public sentiment. 
 Second, for countries currently in islands dispute against China, for example, 
Japan, Philippines and Vietnam, what upsets China most are those actions that change 
the status quo. After the public gets upset, the Chinese government almost has to 
respond with assertive policies. Recently, sanctions of banana imports from the 
Philippines offer a good example, when Philippine stood against China over the 
Huangyan Island in South China Sea, China quickly responded with trade sanctions 
on imported Philippine bananas. The other countries may view China’s actions as 
endeavors to change the status quo.  
Therefore, it becomes necessary to understand whether the Chinese government’s 
actions are pushed by its domestic politics, or whether the government has clear 
intentions to change the status quo. Though the task is hard, it must start with an 
investigation of the public’s sentiments and evaluate the position of the Chinese 
government. This dissertation offers a framework that can be utilized to understand 
the interaction between the government and the public when a crisis happens.  
 Third, future foreign policy of China can be determined by the domestic call for 
assertive policies and the adherence of the Chinese government on stability-oriented 
policy. Since Deng established the principle for Chinese foreign policy, the Chinese 
government has sought to maintain regional stability for its economic development. 
Meanwhile, with its economic growth rate has been at double digits for the past two 
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decades, domestic calls for more assertive policies has pushed the Chinese 
government towards the assertive end. While China wants to maintain stability, it has 
also become more assertive than it was before (say in 1996). Future Chinese foreign 
policy will be dictated by a compromise between domestic pressure and the 
government’s willingness to maintain stability. However, based on the research of 
these three incidents, domestic pressure is pushing this “compromise” towards a limit 
of what the principle of “maintaining stability” can tolerate.  
 Despite of these implications generated from this dissertation, this project faces 
several challenges in both internal and external validity. 
 
IV. Threats to Internal and External Validity  
 I acknowledge several threats towards this research project that limit the validity 
and generalizability of the findings.  
 First, reliability of data: in order to replicate the research, researchers will need to 
gather narratives from the government, intellectuals and the public. Obstacles to 
replication may suffer from limits in two aspects: first, the language barrier. The 
Chinese language is more abstract than the English language; therefore, the exact 
same word may be interpreted differently to include different meanings, and a 
common usage of a phrase may have implications that are not easily caught by 
non-native speakers. For instance, in this project, the Chinese government mentioned 
the word “Japanese side” as the “other” in the dispute. This saying actually replaced a 
more common expression of “Japan”, but includes local governments and interest 
groups in Japan. With this saying, China treats Japan as a homogenous entity. 
Therefore, when replicating, it is important to understand the cultural background and 
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idiomatic implications. Second, the narratives of the public are hard to replicate. 
Among the three actors, the government’s official speeches are concise and 
carefully-drafted, the intellectuals’ publications are well documented, the narratives of 
the public, however, are hard to capture. Measuring public opinion is a daunting task 
in all countries, and it is even more challenging in authoritarian states due to the 
censorship of media and control of protests. In this project, I relied on POLs as a 
proxy to gauge the public opinion. Their opinions and actions are posted on their 
website and interviews, their advocates are also recorded by media from outside 
China (VOA, BBC for example). However, when replicating the research, researchers 
may find it difficult to gather identical reports. In this project, I have noted the 
methods for gathering the data in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, which hopefully will 
facilitate research replication. 
 Second, as a dissertation on a current dispute, this project may suffer from 
inter-reader biases. Specifically, for example, some Japanese readers may find it hard 
to accept the saying that they were mostly responsible for China’s memory of the 
“hundred years of humiliation,” and they might be perplexed as to why China keeps 
demanding Japanese apology for what they did in World War II. Some Taiwanese 
(part of China) may view Taiwan as an independent country contesting the 
sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands with mainland China and Japan. Despite of possible 
different viewers’ bias at this project, I believe facts can best speak for the situation. 
Therefore, in this project I avoid using subjective adjectives – whenever I have to, I 
try to cite it from the description of other authors. In Chapter 2, for instance, I 
minimize my own bias when discussing the Nanking Massacre by citing the other 
authors who have worked on this topic, instead of making my own narratives.
2
  
                                                             
2 This was one of the cruelest war crimes in human history, and Japan has yet to officially apologize.  
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 Externally, generalizations of findings in this project may be limited. My findings 
may extend to other island disputes China is facing, other kinds of disputes China is 
involved in, or to other authoritarian regimes. However, the generalizability of 
findings is limited in two ways. First, this project is limited to certain background(s). 
For example, what has happened with the Diaoyu Islands may not be repeated in other 
disputes, where China does not have such negative sentiments towards Japan. 
However, such analysis is valuable for “generalizing” a specific pattern of narratives. 
For instance, speeches emphasizing national pride and historical sovereignty in the 
Diaoyu Islands will offer insights for understanding disputes with similar historical 
backgrounds in other countries. For example, findings on the dispute between China 
and Japan inform us why and how the Liancourt Islands
3
 dispute between Japan and 
Korea happened, and why Koreans waged massive protests against Japan.
4
  
Second, to generalize findings in this project to other island disputes and other 
forms of disputes China is facing needs work. China adopted a different approach 
when solving territorial disputes in its northern border with Russia, for example. 
Other variables, including power ratios in a dispute, existence of institutions and 
perception of China towards its opponent all play a role in explaining how and why 
China adopts certain policy but not the others. In a word, policy analysis requires 
consideration and investigation on a case-by-case basis. 
After all, this project offers a solid basis for future research on these topics 
including other islands disputes of China, and Chinese foreign policy making. What 
this project reveals is a model that integrates the domestic politics with foreign policy 
making in China, where the decision making process is still hidden in a “black box.” 
This enhanced model of Systems Theory reveals that foreign policy making in China 
                                                             
3 Korea calls them “Solitary Islands”, while Japan names them as “Bamboo Islands”.  
4 Korea was annexed and colonized by Japan since 1910, until it gains its independence after Japan surrendered in 
1945. .  
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is reactive to external impetus and also susceptible to its domestic public opinion. The 
external impetus, public opinion and government actions are in a positively 
proportionate correlation. In the domain of China’s Japan policy, this correlation is 
especially robust considering the historical memory China has towards Japan. On the 
basis of this revised version of systems theory, future research can be conducted 
following several paths.  
 
V. Future research 
 This revised version of Systems Theory lays the foundation for future research on 
topics including Chinese foreign policy and Chinese domestic policy, especially when 
international disputes involving China break out. Beginning with the findings of this 
project, I foresee three topics that can be further developed by testing the model.  
 First, China and other island disputes: China is currently facing another island 
dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. As opposed to the Diaoyu 
Islands, the dispute over the Spratly Islands is multilateral, directly involving China, 
Vietnam, Philippine, and indirectly involving the United States. Therefore, in order to 
conduct a thorough analysis of China’s actions over the Spratly islands, my enhanced 
model of Systems Theory helps to analyze when and why China takes assertive 
actions towards these countries.  
 Recently, China adopted some assertive policies against the Philippines after the 
Philippine government announced that the Huangyan Island, which is 124 miles from 
the west coast of the Philippine Province of Zambales, was part of its territory. China 
refrained from direct confrontation, but adopted a series of actions criticizing the 
Philippine government, including public criticism by the MFA, and the banana 
 246 
 
embargo. These actions and China’s narratives can be tested using the revised model 
of Systems Theory produced in this dissertation.  
 In addition, the role played by the United States in the dispute over the Spratly 
Islands can also be addressed by referring to this model. Whenever the United States 
makes a comment over the Spratly islands, the Chinese public responds with 
comments expressing their sentiments. China’s anti-America sentiment is by no 
means as strong as that towards Japan, but it is perhaps much stronger than towards 
the Philippines, which is a small state that has never been a target of Chinese 
nationalism in history. 
5
  
 The multilateral relations over the Spratly Islands offer several dyads of 
international relations for research. In June 2012, China’s confrontation of the 
Philippines is still ongoing. When the current crisis ends, an analysis of China’s 
actions against the Philippines, and a comparison of China’s actions in that dispute 
and in the Diaoyu Islands dispute against Japan will help to configure a bigger piece 
of the jigsaw puzzle of China’s foreign policy making. Future research on China’s 
actions in islands disputes, on the basis of the findings in this project, can be 
developed after the current dispute over the Spratly islands is settled. 
Second, China in other policy arenas: beyond the islands dispute, China also 
faces many other foreign policy issues that can arouse domestic public sentiments, 
including US arm sales to Taiwan, the nuclear crisis in North Korea and Iran. These 
areas may also stir up China’s domestic public sentiment and therefore, renders the 
revised Systems Theory advocated in this project useful for analysis of the reactions 
of the Chinese government. What this project strives to produce is a model useful for 
explaining China’s foreign policy by drawing upon the influence from its domestic 
                                                             
5 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the United States was one of the earliest countries that forced China to sign those 
treaties in Qing Dynasty. In 1900, the United States were also one of the eight countries who sent troops to Beijing.  
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politics. Therefore, future research may test this model in other policy arenas beyond 
political and military ones, rather, for example, on environmental, commercial and 
human rights issues. To echo Putnam’s words, what is interesting is not whether 
foreign and domestic policies entangle, but how and when do they interact. By 
expanding this model to more policy arenas, we will be able to systematically 
summarize the patterns, if any, of China’s actions on the international stage. 
Third, social media’s influence on Chinese politics will be an interesting topic as 
well. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the development of social media enables 
the Chinese public to know more about international politics. The Chinese 
government has censorship of Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube. Without access to 
world-wide social media, how is the public opinion shaped by the Chinese 
government? How are those Chinese social media, including blogs, BBS, Microblog 
and instant messages, controlled by the government? How do their existence and the 
government’s control influence Chinese public opinion on foreign policy issues? Do 
they influence people to be more nationalist or more cosmopolitan? These topics are 
worth further research to explore the interaction between the Chinese government and 
the public on foreign policy making. 
Future researchers can test the mediating institutions and determine under what 
circumstances they would become “moderating institutions” in China. This will be a 
topic observing China’s political reform to determine when mediating institutions will 
develop into mature moderating institutions checking the decision making of the 
Chinese government.  
 Last but not least, future research will address the question of “what is the upper 
limit of an ‘assertive China’?” In order words, how much more assertive will China 
be? As summarized in part II of this chapter, China’ future foreign policy will 
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comprise somewhere between the push from public opinion and government’s 
willingness to maintain its stability-oriented foreign policy. Therefore, what is 
important for predicting future Chinese foreign policy is to what extent China is 
willing to give up its “stability-oriented” foreign policy. This change will be 
manifested by future assertive policies adopted by China in disputes. I do not foresee 
China going to a war in the near future; however, China will be more assertive 
towards its opponents in disputes, especially in territorial disputes. “More assertive 
policies” will include trade sanctions, including control of materials important for 
other countries, but it is hard to imagine China will wage conflicts with its neighbors 
in foreseeable future. But it is worth analyzing how much more assertive the Chinese 
government is willing to be, under the influence of its domestic actors.   
After all, wars are not desired. As Carl von Clausewitz stated centuries ago, “wars 
are the extensions of politics.” Studying the Diaoyu Islands dispute from the Chinese 
perspective, I find that the word “politics” involves different “images” of the same 
incidents: nationalism vented with posters in the street, policy actions in the form of 
high-ranking dialogue and also mountains of products and fruits stacked at ports as a 
result of the dispute.  
A common understanding of the dispute and acceptable actions are constructed 
between the general public and government. In the past decades, China demonstrated 
a tendency to be assertive in defending its territorial integrity, and it has been trying to 
deter all the others who are contesting against China’s territorial sovereignty. During 
this process, China’s narratives are crucial for understanding its actions and also 
deciphering all the nuanced considerations inside and outside of the black box. These 
narratives also help to make predictions on how China will act in future disputes. 
Narratives contain a lot of information.
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